Opinion
F084601
11-30-2023
ANGELA ERIKA CANTU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
The Wagner Law Group, Nicholas J.P. Wagner and David D. Doyle, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Erin E. Holbrook, Chief Counsel, Alan M. Steinberg, Deputy Chief Counsel, Douglas Johnson, Marysia Okreglak, and Darren S. Nakashima, Deputy Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 20CECG00632 . Kimberly Gaab, Judge.
The Wagner Law Group, Nicholas J.P. Wagner and David D. Doyle, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Erin E. Holbrook, Chief Counsel, Alan M. Steinberg, Deputy Chief Counsel, Douglas Johnson, Marysia Okreglak, and Darren S. Nakashima, Deputy Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Plaintiff and appellant Angela Cantu sued the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and James Hinson for alleged injuries sustained in a motor vehicle incident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Caltrans and Hinson. Cantu appealed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 19, 2018, Angela Cantu and James Hinson, a Caltrans employee, were involved in a motor vehicle collision on State Route 168 in Fresno.
Two months later, on August 17, 2018, Caltrans received, via facsimile, a letter from counsel retained by Angela Cantu. The body of the letter stated, in full:
"Please be advised that we have been retained by Angela Cantu to assist her with regard to personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Fresno, California on the above-referenced date, involving a vehicle driven by your insured James F. Hinson.
"We would appreciate written confirmation of our representation and ask that any future correspondence regarding this claim be directed to our office. We are currently gathering additional information and would appreciate copies of any statements or other information which may have been provided to you by our client. We would also ask that you provide our office with a declaration page confirming coverage and policy limits. We hereby revoke any prior authorizations provided to you by our client.
"We look forward to working with you in resolution of this claim." (Unnecessary emphasis omitted.)
On August 23, 2018, Richard Maynard, an analyst with the California Department of General Services, responded to Cantu's "letter of representation dated 8-17-2018," and asked her attorneys to provide "a copy of your client's signed Authorization of Representation." Maynard also reciprocally informed Cantu's attorneys that he would be "handling this file for the State of California." Maynard further acknowledged counsel's requests for information and representation that they were currently investigating the matter, by reciprocally asking for appropriate information. Significantly, for present purposes, Maynard advised: "The State of California has a six-month statute of limitation. If your claim is not resolved within six months from the date of loss, California law requires you to file a formal claim with the Government Claims Program (GCP) (Government Code 900, et seq.). To obtain a claim form, you need to contact the GCP at (800) 955-0045 or visit their website at http://www.dgs.ca.gov/orim/Programs/GovernmentClaims.aspx."
Cantu's counsel, however, took no further action until January 8, 2020, over 18 months after the underlying (June 19, 2018) traffic collision. In the meantime, the sixmonth claim period lapsed on December 19, 2018. Eventually, on January 8, 2020, Cantu's counsel filed a Government Claim form, along with the $25 filing fee and an application to file a late claim. Thereafter, on February 19, 2020, Cantu filed a complaint in the Fresno County Superior Court.
On October 18, 2021, defendants Caltrans and James Hinson filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that Cantu had failed to file an appropriate claim under the Government Claims Act, a mandatory prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. After the briefing was complete, the trial court, Judge Kimberly Gaab, granted the motion for summary judgment. Judgment was subsequently entered in favor of Caltrans and James Hinson. Cantu's appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Any party may move for summary judgment in an action if it is contended that the action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) "Summary judgment is granted when there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) This court reviews de novo the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment and we are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons or rationales." (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1001 (Hersant).)" 'We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.'" (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249-1250.)
"[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court's action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. (See Evid. Code, § 500.) . „ A defendant [moving for summary judgment] bears the burden of persuasion that 'one or more elements of' the 'cause of action' in question 'cannot be established,' or that 'there is a complete defense' thereto. ([Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1), (o)(2)].)" (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fns. omitted.)
II. Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Based on Cantu's Failure to Comply with the Government Claims Act
Cantu argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Caltrans and Hinson on grounds she had not complied with the Government Claims Act. We reject Cantu's contentions.
A. Trial Court's Ruling on Issue of Government Claims Act Compliance
The trial court found Cantu had not complied with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act in this matter. The trial court ruled, in part: "This is a personal injury action arising out of an auto accident allegedly caused by defendant James Hinson, a defendant California Department of Transportation employee. The complaint alleges a single cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. The Judicial Council form complaint checks boxes indicating that plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute and has complied. [Citation.]
"Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not comply with the Government Code claim presentation requirements. The main issue presented in this motion is whether plaintiff's counsel's August 17, 2018 letter of representation to the Department of Transportation substantially complies with the claim presentation requirements. [¶ ]...[¶ ]
"An action for 'money or damages' may not be maintained against the 'state' or a 'public entity' unless a written claim has first been timely presented to the defendant and rejected in whole or in part. (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 905.2, 945.4.) Presentation of a claim, when required by law, is a mandatory prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action against a public entity, and failure to file a claim is fatal to the claimant's cause of action. (State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) It is an element of the cause of action. (Id. at pp. 1239-1244.) [¶ ]_[¶ ]
"To gauge the sufficiency of a particular claim against a public entity, two tests must be applied: Is there some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial compliance. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447.)
"Plaintiff's counsel sent the Department of Transportation a representation letter on August 17, 2018. Although it includes plaintiff's counsel's mailing address, it does not include '[t]he post office address of the claimant,' any '[monetary] amount claimed,' or 'whether the claim would be a limited civil case,' and it fails to even indicate that plaintiff is seeking money damages at all. (Gov. Code, §§ 910, subds. (a), (d) and (f); see Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1061 [finding claim defective because, among other things, it did not contain 'the dollar amount claimed or whether the claim would be limited civil case"]; Loehr v. Ventura City Cmty. Coll. Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083 ['Nowhere in the letter is there a claim for money damages, nor, for that matter is there even an estimate of the amount of any prospective injury, damage or loss.']; Pac. Tel. &Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 191 [holding that claim did not satisfy substantial compliance where it did not give 'notice of . „ the extent of the damages claimed'].) It is undisputed that plaintiff's August 17, 2018 letter does not contain this information. [¶ ]_[¶ ]
"Since plaintiff's counsel's letter does not touch on many of the required elements of a claim as specified in Government Code section 910, there is no substantial compliance. Summary judgment must be granted, unless defendants have waived the defense.
"Government Code section 910.8 provides that if, in the opinion of the [Department of General Services], a claim as presented fails to comply substantially with the requirements of sections 910, 910.2 or 910.4, the [Department] may, within 20 days after the claim is presented, give written notice of the claim's insufficiency, stating with particularity defects or omissions therein.
" 'Any defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented is waived by failure to give notice of insufficiency with respect to the defect or omission as provided in Section 910.8.' (Gov. Code, § 911.) [¶ ]_[¶ ]
"When a public entity receives written notice that a claim for money damages exists and that litigation may ensue, it has the responsibility under sections 910.8 and 911 to notify the claimants of any defect that renders the document insufficient under sections 910 and 910.2. (Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist. [(1989)] 49 Cal.3d [699,] 709.)
"Where a letter from a claimant's attorney merely requests information and indicates that the attorney is evaluating the matter, the letter does not constitute a 'claim as presented.' (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.) Two essential elements of a 'claim as presented' can be distilled from the case law. First, the letter must indicate that a demand is being made for financial compensation. Second, it must indicate that failure to satisfy the plaintiff's demand could result in litigation. (Green v. State Center Community College Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358-59; see also Foster v. McFadden (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 943, 946; Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 709.)
"In this case, counsel's letter references an accident in which plaintiff sustained injuries. It advises the Department of Transportation that plaintiff is represented by counsel in relation to the injuries she sustained. It requests that any future communications be sent to plaintiff's counsel's office, and the letter provides the address. It requests information about insurance coverage. Although the letter contains the word 'claim' twice, there is no reference to a demand for compensation, and there is no indication that counsel would initiate litigation if the demand for compensation (which was not made) was not satisfied. [Citation.] Those are the two essential elements of a 'claim as presented,' and the letter at issue contains neither. Accordingly, the court finds that the notice-waiver provisions of Government Code sections 910.8 and 911 do not apply."
B. Cantu's Claims are Barred Under the Government Claims Act
Pursuant to the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.), a plaintiff seeking money damages against public entities and public employees acting within the scope of their employment, is required to file an initial claim with the relevant public entity. (See Gov. Code, §§ 905, 905.2.) Failure to do so, bars the plaintiff from suing the public entity and public employees. (Gov. Code, § 945.4; State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 1240, 1244 ["failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity"; compliance with the claim presentation requirement is an element of a cause of action against a public entity].)
Generally, the initial claim must be presented to the relevant public entity within six months of accrual of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) If a claim is not presented within this six-month period, a claimant has up to one year after accrual of the cause of action to apply in writing to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subds. (a), (b).) A public entity cannot grant a late claim application after the expiration of the one-year period. (Dixon v. City of Turlock (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 907, 912.)
"Claims for personal injury and property damage must be presented within six months after accrual; all other claims must be presented within a year." (Judicial Council of California v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091; Gov. Code, § 911.2.)
Cantu did not assert below, and does not assert on appeal, that she was not required to submit a claims notice under the Government Claims Act prior to filing the instant lawsuit. Accordingly, for purposes of our analysis, we assume she was required, as a threshold matter, to file a claim. We conclude Cantu's complaint is barred under the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)
(i) Cantu's August 17, 2018 Letter to Caltrans Does Not Constitute a Claims Notice Under the Government Claims Act
The essential elements of a claim are set forth in Government Code section 910, subdivisions (a) through (f). (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1082 (Loehr); Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060-1061 (Olson).)
Under Government Code section 910, a claim must include: "(a) The name and post office address of the claimant. [¶ ] (b) The post office address to which ... notices [are] to be sent. [¶ ] (c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted; [¶ ] (d) A general description of the . „ injury, damage or loss incurred ._ [¶ ] (e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known. [¶ ] (f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case." (Gov. Code, § 910.)
Here, the August 17, 2018 letter sent by Cantu's attorneys to Caltrans did not satisfy all the requirements specified in Government Code section 910, subdivisions (a) through (f). The letter therefore did not constitute a claim for damages within the meaning of Government Code section 945.4.
(ii) Substantial Compliance Exception Does Not Apply
Cantu argues that, to the extent the August 17, 2018 letter did not constitute a claim for purposes of the Government Claims Act, it nonetheless satisfies the requirements of the Act because it substantially complied with the latter. "Where there has been an attempt to comply but the compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance controls. Under this test, the court must ask whether sufficient information is disclosed on the face of the filed claim 'to reasonably enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit.'" (Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083; Olson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060 [under the doctrine of substantial compliance," 'the court may conclude a claim is valid if it substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements for [a] valid claim even though it is technically deficient in one or more particulars' "].) "The doctrine of substantial compliance, however, cannot cure total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff's failure to comply meaningfully with the statute." (Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083.)
Government Code section 910, subdivision (d) requires that a government claim include "[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim." Further, Government Code section 910, subdivision (f) requires that a claim must specify "[t]he amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000)," or "[i]f the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim" but "it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case."
Respondents Caltrans and James Hinson contend that Cantu's August 17, 2018 letter does not provide any description of the injuries allegedly suffered by Cantu, and, moreover, "does not include '[t]he post office address of the claimant,' any '[monetary] amount claimed,' or 'whether the claim would be a limited civil case.'" Caltrans and Hinson note that the letter "fails to even indicate that plaintiff is seeking monetary damages at all." Caltrans and Hinson argue "the letter does not substantially comply with the Government Claims Act requirements."
We agree. While Cantu's August 17, 2018 letter references a motor vehicle accident, it does not describe the circumstances of the accident or any alleged injuries. More importantly, the letter does not specify the type of resolution contemplated by Cantu or whether a lawsuit was anticipated. (See Olson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061 [finding claim defective because, among other things, it did not contain the dollar amount claimed or whether the claim would be a limited civil case]; Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083 ["Nowhere in the letter is there a claim for money damages, nor, for that matter is there even an estimate of the amount of any prospective injury, damage or loss."]; Pac. Tel. &Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 191 [holding claim did not constitute substantial compliance where it did not give "notice of ... the extent of the damages claimed"].) Accordingly, the August 17, 2018 letter did not substantially comply with the Government Claims Act. (See Del Real v. City of Riverside, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 769 (Del Real) ["Substantial compliance contemplates that there is at least some compliance with all of the statutory requirements."].)
(iii) "Claim as Presented" Doctrine Does Not Apply
Cantu next contends her August 17, 2018 letter constituted a "claim as presented."" 'A "claim as presented" is a claim that is defective in that it fails to comply substantially with Government Code sections 910 and 910.2, but nonetheless puts the public entity on notice that the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if it is not paid or otherwise resolved. A "claim as presented" triggers a duty on the part of the governmental entity to notify the claimant of the defects or omissions in the claim. A failure to notify the claimant of the deficiencies in a "claim as presented" waives any defense as to its sufficiency.'" (Olson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1061-1062.)
"[A] document constitutes a 'claim as presented' . if it discloses the existence of a 'claim' which, if not satisfactorily resolved, will result in a lawsuit against the entity." (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 709.) "Such a written notice claiming monetary damages thereby satisfies the purposes of the claims act-to facilitate investigation of disputes and their settlement without trial if appropriate." (Ibid.) Similarly, in Green v. State Center Community College District (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1348 (Green), this court explained that to constitute a claim as presented, "the content of the correspondence to the recipient entity must at least be of such nature as to make it readily discernible by the entity that the intended purpose thereof is to convey the assertion of a compensable claim against the entity, which, if not otherwise satisfied, will result in litigation." (Id. at p. 1358.) However, where a letter from a claimant's attorney merely requests information and indicates the attorney is evaluating the matter, the letter does not constitute a" 'claim as presented.'" (Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.)
Here, the August 17, 2018 letter sent to Catrans on behalf of Cantu, was signed by a paralegal at a law firm. The letter indicated that the firm had been retained to represent Cantu in connection with a traffic accident. The letter further indicated the firm was "currently gathering additional information" and requested pertinent information from Caltrans. Rather than supplying information that would enable Caltrans to investigate, the letter "revoked any prior authorizations" provided by Cantu. The letter did not include a demand for monetary compensation, nor did it indicate that should monetary compensation not be forthcoming, litigation would follow. Under applicable caselaw, the letter, therefore, cannot reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to assert a claim under the Government Claims Act. (See Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359 ["There is nothing in the subject letter that makes it readily discernible that appellant was making a compensable claim against [the relevant government entity] or that the failure to satisfy it would result in litigation."]; see also Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 [where letter seeks information to allow "counsel to appraise the case," it "cannot be reasonably interpreted to contemplate litigation should it not receive an adequate response"].)
Cantu's citation to Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391 (Simms), is unavailing as that case is distinguishable; in contrast to the letter in the instant matter, the correspondence at issue in Simms contained an explicit threat of a forthcoming lawsuit should the concerns expressed therein be ignored. (See Simms, supra, at pp. 395, 404 ["Simms's May 2018 letter both threatened litigation to seek compensation for his perceived injuries from medical malpractice and defamation and detailed the facts underlying the claims he contemplated asserting."].)
We conclude Cantu's letter of August 17, 2018, was not a "claim as presented" and did not trigger the notice-or-waiver provisions of Government Code sections 910.8 and 911.
Finally, Caltrans and Hinson argue:
"[E]ven if Appellant's letter is considered 'a claim as presented,' the Respondent's letter dated August 23, 2018, was a notice of insufficiency because it set forth that if her claim was not resolved within six months from the incident, California law required that she file a formal claim with the Government Claims Program. The letter also warned that any correspondence with any State office other than the Government Claims Program would not comply with Government Code section 900, et seq. Furthermore, Respondent also provided the web address to find a correct claim form. [Citation.] With this information, Appellant or her attorney was put on notice that even though she communicated with the State, she was still required to file a formal Government Claim within six months of the incident. At no point did Respondents waive this requirement."
We are persuaded by respondents' alternative argument set forth above, as well.
III. Issue of Whether James Hinson Was Acting in Course and Scope of Employment
Cantu next challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment on grounds that summary judgment was not proper as to James Hinson. Specifically, Cantu argues: "Respondents did not present admissible evidence that respondent Hinson was in the scope of his employment." We reject Cantu's contention that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Hinson.
In this context, the trial court ruled:
"The parties disagree on the question of whether the moving papers establish that Hinson was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The complaint clearly alleges that he was. Plaintiff, in the opposition, misconstrues his own complaint in arguing that the pleading is inconsistent [on this point]. Paragraph MV-2(a) identifies Hinson as the driver of the vehicle [involved in the motor vehicle accident with Cantu's vehicle]. Paragraphs MV-2(b), (c) and (d) identify State of California/Department of Transportation as the employer of the driver, owner of the vehicle, and the defendant who entrusted the vehicle[, respectively]. Paragraph MV-2(e) alleges that the State of California/Department of Transportation and Hinson were the agents and employees of the other defendants acting in the course and scope of their employment. Read as a whole, the complaint clearly alleges that Hinson was employed by the State of California/Department of Transportation and was acting in the scope of his employment/agency at the time of the accident."
We agree with the trial court. The complaint clearly states that defendant James Hinson was the defendant who operated the motor vehicle in question. The complaint further states that the State of California/Department of Transportation was the defendant that "employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment," owned the vehicle that was operated with its permission, and entrusted the vehicle. Finally, the complaint identified Hinson as one of the defendants who were "the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency."
In sum, we detect no error in the trial court's analysis and affirm. (See Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1127 ["in seeking summary judgment, 'a defendant may rely on the complaint's factual allegations, which constitute judicial admissions [and] are conclusive concessions of the truth of a matter and effectively remove it from the issues' "]; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 747 ["In moving for summary judgment, a party may rely on the doctrine of judicial admission by utilizing allegations in the opposing party's pleadings to eliminate triable issues of material fact."].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. --------- Notes: [*] Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.