Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co.

15 Citing cases

  1. Treminio v. Crowley Mar. Corp.

    649 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2023)   Cited 6 times
    Denying motion to dismiss in the instant action because the dispute over Blanco's presence was a material fact

    McAlpin v. Sokolay, 596 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Further, "[a] privilege exists as a matter of law to engage in reckless or even outrageous conduct if there is sufficient evidence that shows the defendant 'did no more than assert legal rights in a legally permissible way.' " Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co., 595 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d at 279).

  2. Archer v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP

    Case No: 8:16-cv-3067-T-36AAS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2020)

    These facts alone distinguish this case from the majority of retail-related false imprisonment claims brought pursuant to Florida law. See, e.g., Morris v. Albertson's, Inc., 705 F.2d 406, 408 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff accused of shoplifting agreed to accompany store personnel to store office); Harder, 174 So. 3d at 529 (plaintiff arrested and held almost 24 hours); Louis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 719 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (plaintiff arrested and held for several hours); Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co., 595 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (plaintiffs accused of shoplifting agreed to accompany store personnel to store office, where they were held for about two hours); Hood v. Zayre Corp., 529 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (plaintiff accused of shoplifting taken to store security office); Hernandez v. K-Mart Corp., 497 So. 2d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (plaintiff accused of shoplifting agreed to accompany store security guard to a room in the back of the store where she was interrogated, threatened with police action, and strip-searched); DeMarie v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 442 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (plaintiff questioned in room in the back of the store and subsequently arrested); Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (plaintiff invited to store's security office where he was held for at least 15 to 20 minutes, but less than 30 minutes, and charged by police with shoplifting); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Kincaid, 335 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (plaintiff accus

  3. GolTv, Inc. v. Fox Sports Latin Am. Ltd.

    277 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2017)   Cited 35 times
    Finding that the Court did not have jurisdiction over defendant under the federal long-arm statute because the defendant's contacts with the United States did not give rise to the claims raised in the amended complaint

    That the Jinkises were committing intentional torts or illegal acts is also not an impediment to finding they were acting as Full Play's agents: "a corporation may be held criminally responsible for illegal acts of its employees if the acts are (a) related to and committed within the course of employment, (b) committed in furtherance of the business of the corporation, [or] (c) authorized or acquiesced in by the corporation." State v. Mun. Auto Sales, Inc. , 222 So.2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (alteration added; citations omitted); see alsoCanto v. J.B. Ivey & Co. , 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("[A]n employer is liable for intentional acts of an employee when the employee is acting within the scope of the employer's apparent authority, even if the employer did not permit or otherwise authorize the act, or it was not necessary or appropriate to serve the interest of the employer." (alteration added) (citing Dieas v. Assocs. Loan Co. , 99 So.2d 279, 280–81 (Fla. 1957) (other citations omitted))

  4. Saadi v. Maroun

    Case No. 8:07-cv-1976-T-24-MAP (M.D. Fla. May. 20, 2009)   Cited 1 times
    Finding that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether statements “reasonably interpreted as assertions that Plaintiff has committed felonious acts” are libelous per se under Florida law

    In addition, regardless of whether the two are alter egos, an employer can be held liable for defamation or international infliction of emotional distress committed by its employees in the scope of their employer's apparent authority, even if their acts did not serve the employer's interest. Canto v. J.B. Ivey Co., 595 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Here, the presence of Defendant International's copyright symbol on a website solely operated by Defendant Maroun, which hosts the controversial postings and which disseminated the personal addresses and phone numbers for Plaintiff and Plaintiff's elderly parents, creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant Maroun's postings on the ALCC website were made within the scope of Defendant International's apparent authority.

  5. Moore v. Federated Retail Holdings, Inc.

    Case No. 6:07-cv-1557-Orl-31GJK (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2009)

    Defendant concedes, however, that no Florida court has ever held that Section 812.015 extends to claims for defamation.But see Pollock v. Albertson's, Inc., 458 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (per curiam decision affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment, presumably under Section 812.015, to merchant on defamation claim brought by individual falsely accused of shoplifting). Irrespective, however, of whether Section 812.015 extends to defamation claims, Defendant observes that the common law of defamation includes a qualified privilege for statements made in good faith by a merchant's employee concerning a suspected shoplifter. See, e.g., Canto v. Ivey and Co., 595 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that, absent malice, defamatory statements made in good faith during detention of suspected shoplifters are privileged). Accordingly, Defendant contends that the statements made by its employees to, and concerning, Plaintiff during his detention are privileged.

  6. Thompson v. Orange Lake Country Club, Inc.

    224 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Fla. 2002)   Cited 28 times
    Denying summary judgment and ordering parties to review and submit relevant portions of worksharing agreement, where neither side offered agreement with motion materials

    Schreidell v. Shoter, 500 So.2d 228, 232 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986). Generally, a corporate employer can be held vicariously liable for an intentional act of its employee when the employee is acting within the scope of the employer's apparent authority, even if the employer did not permit or otherwise authorize the act, or it was not necessary or appropriate to serve the interest of the employer. Dieas v. Associates Loan Co., 99 So.2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 1957); accord CANTO v. J.B. Ivey and Company, 595 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1992); Lay v. Roux Lab., Inc., 379 So.2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980); Wackenhut Corp. v. Greene, 238 So.2d 431, 432 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970). III. APPLICATION

  7. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Case—-Report No. 12-01

    130 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    In Southland Corp. v. BartshBartsch, 522 So.2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), the court held that a conveniencestore manager's conduct (having a six-year-old child arrested for stealing gum) was no more than an assertion of the store's rights in a legally permissible way, and was privileged “as a matter of law.” In Canto v. J.B. IvyIvey & Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), two children were detained by a merchant who suspected them of shoplifting; citing McCarson and the Restatement (2d) of Torts, the court found “no evidence in the record suggesting that the conduct of either employee even approached the limits of this privilege.” See also Mallock v. S. Mem'l Park, Inc., 561 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

  8. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases

    35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)   Cited 37 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Adopting Florida Standard Jury Instruction 402.4c

    In Southland Corp. v. Bartsch, 522 So.2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), the court held that a convenience store manager's conduct (having a six-year-old child arrested for stealing gum) was no more than an assertion of the store's rights in a legally permissible way, and was privileged "as a matter of law." In Canto v. J.B. Ivey Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), two children were detained by a merchant who suspected them of shoplifting; citing McCarson and the RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS, the court found "no evidence in the record suggesting that the conduct of either employee even approached the limits of this privilege." See also Mallock v. S. Mem'l Park, Inc., 561 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

  9. In re Standard Jury Instructions — Civil

    645 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    In Southland Corp. v. Bartsch, 522 So.2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA), review dismissed, 531 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1988), the court held that a convenience store manager's conduct (having a six-year-old child arrested for stealing gum) was no more than an assertion of the store's rights in a legally permissible way, and was privileged "as a matter of law." In Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Co., 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), two children were detained by a merchant who suspected them of shoplifting; citing McCarson and the Restatement of Torts, the court found "no evidence in the record suggesting that the conduct of either employee even approached the limits of this privilege." See also Mallock v. Southern Memorial Park, Inc., 561 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

  10. Davis v. Bailynson

    268 So. 3d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    Appellants are correct that there is no tortious liability for assertion of a legal right because "[a] privilege exists as a matter of law to engage in reckless or even outrageous conduct if there is sufficient evidence that shows the defendant did no more than assert legal rights in a legally permissible way." Rivers v. Dillards Dep't. Store, Inc. , 698 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (quoting Canto v. J.B. Ivey & Co. , 595 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ). "The litigation privilege applies across the board to actions in Florida, both to common-law causes of action, those initiated pursuant to a statute, or of some other origin."