Opinion
Case No. 2:14-cv-303
10-03-2014
Larry Canady, Plaintiff, v. Doctor Eddy, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff Larry Canady, a state prisoner, filed this action alleging that his due process rights were violated when the prison's rules infraction board entered judgment against him without permitting him to participate in the proceedings. Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff then filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, alleging that defendants have refused to provide him with certain eye drops to treat his eye condition and to provide him with pain medication. On September 4, 2014, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation regarding plaintiff's motion, and recommended that the motion be denied. See Doc. 17. Plaintiff filed an objection to the report and recommendation on September 15, 2014, see (Doc. 19), and defendants filed a response to plaintiff's objection on September 24, 2014, see Doc. 20.
This matter is now before the court for consideration of the report and recommendation and plaintiff's objection. If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).
As the magistrate judge correctly explained, the factors for ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction are: "(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction." City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014)(en banc)(internal quotation marks omitted). The same factors are weighed in considering whether a temporary restraining order should issue. Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1199, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006). These factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated considerations that must be balanced together. Id. The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 382 (6th Cir. 2014).
The magistrate judge first noted that to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the failure to provide medical care, a prisoner must show that he has a serious medical condition and that the defendants displayed a deliberate indifference to his health. Doc. 17, p. 2 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)(inmate must prove both an objective and subjective component: (1) a sufficiently grave deprivation, such as serious medical needs; and (2) a sufficiently culpable state of mind (wantonness)); and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). To be liable under the Eighth Amendment, officials must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety, must be aware of facts from which they could conclude that a substantial risk exists and must actually draw that conclusion. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. A complaint that a prison doctor or official has been negligent with respect to medical diagnosis or treatment does not state a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1994).
The magistrate judge first concluded that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on his Eighth Amendment Claim. Plaintiff alleges in his motion that the health care provider, a nurse practitioner, improperly regarded the specialist's order as a recommendation rather than an order to be followed. The magistrate judge noted that plaintiff acknowledged in his motion that eye drops were administered to him; they were just not the eye drops he believes he should have been given, those being the prescription eye drops recommended by a specialist. The magistrate judge concluded that the allegations in plaintiff's motion, which suggested that the medical specialists disagreed about his treatment, were not enough to establish deliberate indifference. Doc. 17, p. 3-4. The magistrate judge further concluded that plaintiff's argument that he should have been permitted to administer the eye drops himself rather than having them administered by a nurse practitioner so that he would make sure that the drops were re-ordered every thirty days did not demonstrate the likelihood of success on an Eighth Amendment claim. Doc. 17, p. 4. The magistrate judge also discussed plaintiff's allegations that, although plaintiff had seen a renal specialist, the prison doctors were not providing him with the type of pain medication he believes he should receive. The magistrate judge concluded that this also amounted to plaintiff merely disagreeing with the course of treatment he was receiving, and that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence demonstrating that he has been denied necessary care or pain medication. Doc. 17, p. 4.
The magistrate judge correctly stated that choosing one doctor-supported treatment regimen over another doctor-supported treatment regimen does not amount to deliberate indifference. Doc. 17, p. 3-4. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F.App'x 602 (6th Cir. 2014), "a desire for additional or different treatment does not suffice by itself to support an Eight Amendment claim." Id. at 605. A claim that the medical staff failed to provide more or better treatment, as opposed to showing indifference to plaintiff's medical condition, amounts to a plea to "'second guess medical judgments' as opposed to enforce the cruel-and-unusual-punishments ban in the Eighth Amendment." Id., (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976)). See also Rhinehart v. Scutt, 509 F.App'x 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2013)(neither negligence alone, nor a disagreement over the wisdom or correctness of a medical judgment is sufficient to allege a deliberate indifference claim); Kirkham v. Wilkinson, 101 F.App'x 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2004)("[A] difference in opinion between a prisoner and the medical staff about treatment does not state a cause of action.... This court is reluctant to second-guess medical judgments where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute concerns the adequacy of that treatment."); Chapman v. Parke, 946 F.2d 894 (table), 1991 WL 203080 at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 1991)(difference of opinion regarding treatment is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). Further, "a prison doctor who relies on his medical judgment to modify or disagree with an outside specialist's recommendation of how to treat an inmate is not said to act with deliberate indifference." Williams v. Smith, No. 02 Civ. 4558(DLC), 2009 WL 2431948 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009).
Addressing the remaining factors relevant to a preliminary injunction, the magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted, because he failed to allege that he was being denied treatment for his eye condition or pain medication for his renal condition; rather, he simply disagreed with the treatment being provided. Doc. 17, p. 5. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff had failed to show that his condition will worsen if he does not immediately receive the requested relief. Doc. 17, p. 5. The magistrate judge found that the third factor, which required weighing the interests of the defendants against plaintiff's interests, weighed against preliminary injunctive relief because plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Doc. 17, p. 5. Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that no public interest would be served by granting the requested relief, noting that interference by federal courts in the administration of state prison matters is generally disfavored. Doc. 17, p. 5 (citing Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1988). After weighing the relevant factors, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Doc. 17, p. 6.
In his objection, plaintiff repeated his allegations that the specialist recommended Lumigan, a brand of prescription eye drops, but that the prison eye doctor would not order these drops, and allegedly left matters as the specialist prescribed and referred plaintiff back to the ophthalmology clinic. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Eddy would only let him have a yearly visit to the ophthalmology clinic. Plaintiff alleges that discovery concerning his medical records will clear up all confusion about his eye drops. Doc. 19, p. 2. However, plaintiff admits that he is receiving treatment for his eyes, and that he is permitted to go to the ophthalmology clinic at least once a year. His renewed allegations that he should be receiving Lumigan rather than some other eye drops are not sufficient to demonstrate that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that his motion failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits on his Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff further states in his objection that on July 29, 2014, he was placed on a low dose of pain medication. Doc. 19, p. 2. He states that "the physicians here are now treating my pain situation, and hopefully will get it correct." Doc. 19, p. 2. Defendants correctly note, see Doc. 20, p. 2, that since plaintiff is now receiving pain medication, his request for injunctive relief concerning his pain management is moot. See Chapman, 1991 WL 203080 at *2 (noting that plaintiff's request for injunctive relief was rendered moot after plaintiff had the surgery he requested).
Having reviewed the report and recommendation and plaintiff's objections in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b), the court finds that plaintiff's objection is without merit. The court has balanced the factors relevant to injunctive relief, and agrees with the conclusion of the magistrate judge that granting such relief is not warranted in this case. The court overrules plaintiff's objection (Doc. 19), and adopts the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (Doc. 17). Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction (Doc. 12) is denied. Date: October 3, 2014
s/James L. Graham
James L. Graham
United States District Judge