Opinion
A20-1403
04-12-2021
Shawn Canada, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
ORDER OPINION
Olmsted County District Court
File Nos. 55-CR-10-3516, 55-CR-10-3569 Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Cleary, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In May 2010, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shawn Canada with third-degree criminal sexual conduct and domestic abuse. In October 2010, he pleaded guilty to both offenses. The district court sentenced Canada to 62 months in prison for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and 18 months in prison for domestic abuse, to be served concurrently. The district court also imposed a ten-year conditional-release period for the third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Canada did not file a direct appeal.
2. In November 2012, Canada filed his first petition for postconviction relief. The district court denied the petition after determining that it was "completely without merit." This court affirmed, and the supreme court denied review. Canada v. State, No. A13-0478 (Minn. App. Nov. 18, 2013), review denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 2014). Canada subsequently filed additional petitions for postconviction relief in November 2014, July 2016, and April 2019. The district court denied all three petitions.
3. On August 28, 2020, Canada filed the current petition for postconviction relief. He asserted that he was entitled to postconviction relief because he received an aggravated sentence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact essential for the punishment to be enhanced, that his speedy-trial rights were violated, and alleged various other constitutional and statutory violations. The district court denied the petition without a hearing after determining that the claims were both time-barred and procedurally barred. Canada now appeals.
4. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. Id. A district court may summarily deny a petition when the petition, files, and records conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020).
5. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years after the later of the entry of judgment of conviction, if no direct appeal was filed, or the final appellate disposition of the person's appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2020). This time limitation bars postconviction relief unless one of five statutory exceptions can be shown. Id., subd. 4(b)(1)-(5). The petitioner must also establish that he timely filed the petition in response to those circumstances. See id., subd. 4(c) (establishing two-year time limit for exceptions). In general, "[a] petitioner bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that facts exist that warrant postconviction relief." Tscheu v. State, 829 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 2013).
6. The district court denied the petition after determining that the claims were time-barred and that no exception applied. We agree. The petition was filed well past the two-year filing deadline, and is thus untimely unless one of the five statutory exceptions applies. The petition does not contain any reference or argument addressing the statutory exceptions. Canada has therefore failed to meet his burden of establishing that one of the statutory exceptions applies and that he timely filed his petition in response to those circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).
7. The district court also determined that the claims were procedurally barred. In State v. Knaffla, the supreme court held that after a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised on appeal and all claims known at the time of the appeal "will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). This procedural bar also applies to claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in previous petitions for postconviction relief. Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006). Claims that are otherwise Knaffla-barred may be considered "(1) if a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) if the interests of justice require review." Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Minn. 2005).
8. This is Canada's fifth petition for postconviction relief. Canada's claims include that his speedy-trial rights were violated, that he did not receive a copy of the conditions of his release, and that he received an aggravated sentence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to have any fact essential to punishment found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Canada knew or should have known of all of these claims at the time he filed his first petition for postconviction relief. And he does not argue that either of the exceptions to the Knaffla rule apply. Canada's claims are therefore procedurally barred.
We note that Canada received a guidelines sentence for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, based on his criminal-history score of one. Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV (2008). His claim that his 62-month sentence was an "enhanced" sentence is therefore without merit.
9. Finally, Canada makes various claims that relate to the revocation of his supervised release. A petition for postconviction relief is not the proper means to raise these issues. Such claims must be raised through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2015) (stating that "judicial review of the Commissioner's administrative decision implementing the sentence imposed may be obtained by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus").
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: 4/12/21
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Chief Judge Susan L. Segal