Opinion
No. 3-737 / 02-1948.
Filed December 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, John S. Mackey, Judge.
Owners of adjoining pieces of property appeal, and cross-appeal, from the trial court order regarding their respective easement rights. AFFIRMED.
Dale Goeke, Waverly, for appellant.
Natalie Williams Burris of Swisher Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, and Robert Thompson, Reinbeck, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Waverly Tire Co. and John and Pamala Campbell, as owners of adjoining pieces of property, appeal and cross-appeal from the trial court order regarding their respective easement rights. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
John and Pamala Campbell own and operate a boat retail and repair business on certain property in Waverly ("parcel A"). Parcel A is bordered on the south by parcel B, and on the west by parcel D. Parcel C is located to the southwest of parcel A. Waverly Tire Co. (Waverly Tire) owns parcels B, C, and D. Waverly Tire operates a tire sales and repair business on parcel B.
Prior to 1975 all of the land comprising parcels A, B, C, and D was owned by Ivan and Loretta Ingersoll. In that year, they sold the land now known as parcels A and B to Waverly Tire. In the transfer, the "sellers" (Ingersolls) reserved a fifty foot wide easement running east and west through the center of parcels A and B "for road and driveway purposes to provide a method of ingress and egress to real estate located immediately west of the premises." That land "immediately west of the premises" is what is now known as parcels C and D.
By real estate contract later that year, Waverly Tire sold to the Campbells the north one-half of that property, or parcel A. That sale was made subject to an easement twenty-five feet in width located on the south half of parcel A "which was reserved by Ivan Ingersoll and Loretta Ingersoll . . . for road and driveway purposes in order to provide a method of ingress and egress to the property located immediately west." Eventually, Waverly Tire acquired parcel C in 1988 and parcel D in 2000.
After Waverly Tire remodeled its building in 1999, the Campbells became concerned about a change in truck traffic flowing to that building. In 2000, the Campbells, in response, erected a nautical fence along the south edge of their property and bisecting the easement. Waverly Tire believed the fence interfered with the access to its business, alleging it caused trucks to reach its building only with difficulty. After the fence was erected, Waverly Tire's president, Ardith Fox, instructed the Campbells it was illegal and should be taken down. When the Campbells refused, Fox caused a semi-trailer and vehicles to be placed at the end of the nautical fence, near where the properties had highway access. The Campbells claimed this made access to their business difficult.
On July 18, 2001, the Campbells filed a petition for declaratory judgment alleging Waverly Tire's trailer and vehicles encroached on a common driveway shared by the properties and requesting their removal. Waverly Tire responded with a counter-claim, asserting the fence erected by the Campbells interfered with use of the easement, and seeking its removal. The parties stipulated the issues to be tried at trial, one of which was: "Does an easement exist over Campbell's property for the benefit of real estate owned by Waverly Tire? If so, what is the extent of the easement?"
Following a trial, the court issued a ruling concluding "there exists an express access easement burdening the Campbells' Parcel A along the entire southerly border thereof for a distance of 25 feet in width for the benefit of Waverly Tire for the sole purpose of ingress and egress of Parcel D owned by Waverly Tire." The court further concluded the easement was appurtenant and not personal to the Ingersolls and that it does not exist to benefit Waverly Tire's parcel B. Because the fence did not hinder Waverly Tire's use of the easement for ingress to and egress from parcel D, the court did not order the fence's removal. In its subsequent ruling on the parties' posttrial motions, the court ruled, among other things, that because Waverly Tire now owns parcels B, C, and D, and thus has access to parcel C through parcel B, the doctrine of merger applies and extinguishes any necessity of an easement over parcel A for the benefit of parcel C. Waverly Tire appeals and the Campbells cross-appeal.
II. Scope of Review.
Because this case was tried in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. 6.4. In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to the fact-findings of the trial court, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g).
III. Discussion.
Waverly Tire contends the court improperly concluded that, despite the fact an easement does exist, the fence erected by Campbells did not interfere with Waverly Tire's use and thus did not need to be removed. Second, it contends the court wrongly concluded the easement benefiting parcel C was extinguished by the doctrine of merger. Finally, it asserts the court should have ruled that alternative legal theories support the establishment of an easement burdening the Campbell's land.
In their cross-appeal, the Campbells assert the court incorrectly found an access easement exists because the easement at issue was personal to the Ingersolls, and has thus expired. They also allege the court erred in failing to adjudicate Waverly's responsibility to construct and maintain a road or driveway.
A. General Easement Principles.
"An easement is a liberty, privilege, or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from ownership." Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Iowa 1982). When an easement is created, and the owners intend it to be an incident of the ownership of the dominant estate, and it directly benefits the dominant estate, then the easement is appurtenant. Rank v. Frame, 522 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Appurtenant easements run with the land and pass with the description of the property to which they are appurtenant without specific designation and purchasers of the servient property take subject to the easement without express reservation. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 1128, 29 N.W.2d 518, 526 (1947).
B. Existence of the Easement Regarding Parcel D.
The district court held an express access easement exists burdening parcel A, for the benefit of parcel D, for the sole purpose of ingress and egress. The parties differ on whether the easement continues to exist at the present time. Upon our de novo review, we believe the district court properly concluded an express appurtenant access easement exists burdening parcel A for the benefit of parcel D, solely for the purpose of ingress and egress.
In considering this question, we have reviewed all of the documents and considered the apparent intent of the grantor. See Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). In the original document in which the Ingersolls transferred parcels A and B to Waverly Tire, the sellers reserved an easement "to provide a method of ingress and egress to real estate located immediately west of the premises. . . ." That property "immediately west" would later become parcels C and D. When Waverly Tire transferred parcel A to the Campbells, the real estate contract again contained the same language reserving the easement for "ingress and egress" purposes to the same parcels to the west. Thus throughout the relevant chain of title to parcel A, the existence of the easement is recorded. Parcels C and D are landlocked. As the title documents reveal, the purpose of the easement was solely for ingress and egress to the landlocked real estate. The purpose was not to benefit parcel B, on which Waverly Tire sits. Nor did the Ingersolls establish the easement for the purpose of allowing trucks to use it for a turnaround as they accessed parcel B. See Keokuk Junction Ry. Co. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000) ("To determine the scope of the easement, this court compares the language of the easement with the proposed use."); Cline v. Richardson, 526 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (noting continued use of an easement must not place a greater burden on the servient estate than was contemplated at the time of formation). We affirm the district court's determination that an appurtenant easement was established by the Ingersolls for the limited purposes of ingress and egress to parcels C and D.
C. Removal of the Fence.
The district court did not require the Campbells to remove the nautical fence bordering the south edge of their property, concluding the fence did not interfere with the ingress and egress purposes of the easement. We agree with this resolution. The only purpose revealed in the documents for the easement was to allow ingress to and egress from the landlocked real estate to the west. Waverly Tire currently owns parcels B, C, and D and thus has no access problems to parcel D. Moreover, the northern twenty-five feet of parcel B, mentioned in the original easement language, provides sufficient access for Waverly Tire to access parcel D. Thus, the fence does not hinder Waverly Tire in the exercise of that limited purpose.
D. Other Bases for an Easement to Benefit Waverly Tire.
Waverly Tire maintains the district court should have found other, independent bases for the existence of an easement benefiting their parcel B. Moreover, Waverly Tire claims the court should have held an easement was created by prescription, by implication, and by promissory estoppel, permitting Waverly Tire's customers and trucks to use the southernmost twenty-five feet of the Campbell's property. On our de novo review, we conclude Waverly failed to meet its burden of proof on each of these theories.
An easement by implication arises where the parties clearly intend to create an easement but do not put it in writing. See Schwob v. Green, 215 N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Iowa 1974). The party claiming such an easement must prove: (1) separation of title; (2) the intent of permanency was manifest because the use giving rise to the easement was long continued and obvious before separation occurred; and (3) the easement is continuous rather than temporary, and essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or retained. Bray v. Hardy, 248 Iowa 794, 797, 82 N.W.2d 671, 673 (1957). On our de novo review, we conclude the use claimed by Waverly Tire is not "essential to the beneficial enjoyment of" parcel B and no easement by implication was therefore created in this case.
In Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954), our supreme court recognized application of promissory estoppel in the context of a land-use restriction. The essential elements of promissory estoppel are well-established: (1) a clear and definite promise; (2) proof the party urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) a finding the equities support enforcement of the agreement. In re Estate of Graham, 295 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1980). We conclude no easement was created by promissory estoppel in that there was no clear and definite promise allowing Waverly Tire to use the Campbells' property for turnaround purposes or to allow trucks easier access to their building on parcel B.
Finally, an easement by prescription is created when a person uses another's land under a claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously, continuously, and hostilely for ten years or more. Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996). No easement by prescription was created here because Waverly's use was permissive rather than hostile. See Burgess v. Leverett Assocs., 252 Iowa 31, 36, 105 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1960) (conduct which shows intention to hold title exclusive of others shows hostile possession).
E. Merger of Easement Regarding Parcel C.
In its ruling on the parties' motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), the district court stated: "As defendant now owns Parcels B, C, and D, defendant has ready access to Parcel C through Parcel B and the court concludes the doctrine of merger applies which would extinguish the necessity of an easement over Parcel A for the benefit of Parcel C."
In the situation where the dominant and servient estates become the property of one owner, the easement is extinguished under a merger theory. Tamm, Inc. v. Pildis, 249 N.W.2d 823, 837 (Iowa 1976). Thus, merger does not occur in the absence of "unity of title." See id. A merger occurs when the dominant (benefited) estate and the servient (burdened) estates are owned by the same person, thereby extinguishing an easement by virtue of unity of title and possession, given that one has no need of an easement over one's own property. Seymour v. Harris Trust Sav. Bank, 636 N.E.2d 985, 996 (II. 1994).
Here, because Waverly Tire does not own both the dominant estate (parcel C) and the servient estate (parcel A), the doctrine of merger is inapplicable. We therefore conclude the district court erred in finding the doctrine of merger operated to extinguish the necessity of an easement over parcel A for the benefit of parcel C. However, our determination the easement was not extinguished by merger does not alter our disposition of the case. Because Waverly Tire's access to parcel C is not obstructed by the Campbells' fence, the court appropriately exercised its equitable powers in refusing to order its removal.
F. Driveway Construction and Responsibility for Maintenance.
In their cross-appeal, the Campbells claim the district court should have, after determining an access easement existed for ingress and egress, adjudicated Waverly's responsibility for construction and maintenance of a road or driveway if one is ever constructed in the future. Campbells request a remand to the district court for a determination of those obligations. We decline to order such a remand We note that although the easement allocates to "sellers" the cost of construction and maintenance of a road or driveway "in the event it is necessary to use [the easement] for road or driveway purposes," for ingress or egress to parcels C and D, neither party claimed such necessity in the district court. There does not appear to be any evidence that either party has either begun construction of a roadway or desires that one be built. In the absence of such evidence, we conclude this claim is not "ripe" for judicial consideration See e.g. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) ("A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.").