Opinion
Nos. 14-03-00846-CV, 14-03-00847-CV.
Memorandum Opinion filed March 16, 2004.
On Appeal from the 180th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 729,925 and 727,765.
Dismissed.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FROST and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court's order for involuntary outpatient commitment. In one issue, Nathan Dale Campbell argues the court's order is in error because there has been a "break in the chain of commitments" due to the trial court's failure to render an order of commitment for the year 2001. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
A. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1996, appellant was indicted for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. He waived a jury trial, and the trial court found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
Consequently, in 1997, appellant was committed to a mental health facility pursuant to article 46.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The trial court must conduct an annual hearing to determine whether appellant continues to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46.03, § 4; TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE § 574.035. Each order of commitment issued by the trial court expires after one year. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE § 574.035(h). Appellant has contested his commitment every year since 1999 and, as he acknowledges, has "lost every time." However, in 2002, this Court reversed the trial court's 2001 commitment order and remanded for a new trial, concluding the trial court submitted an erroneous jury charge (" Campbell III"). In May 2002, while the State's motion for rehearing in Campbell III was pending, the trial court conducted another recommitment hearing to determine if appellant continued to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. Appellant demanded a jury trial on remand of the 2001 commitment order, but the trial court denied the demand as moot on September 19, 2002.
See Campbell v. State, 125 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
The trial court can recommit appellant only if it finds he meets the criteria for commitment set forth in section 574.035 of the Health and Safety Code. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE § 574.035; Campbell v. State, 118 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The criteria relate to the appellant's dangerousness and mental condition at the time of the hearing. See Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 793.
Another commitment order was issued by the trial court on May 31, 2002, which was appealed to this Court. See Campbell v. State, 118 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (" Campbell IV"). On appeal of the 2002 commitment order, appellant argued that because the 2001 commitment order was reversed, there was a "break in the chain of commitments" and he should be released. We overruled all of appellant's issues and affirmed the trial court's 2002 commitment order. See Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 805 — 06.
Appellant filed a petition for review of our Campbell IV opinion. While appellant's petition was pending in the Texas Supreme Court, he filed this appeal "to ensure, that if he wins on petition for review," he does not waive the "break in the chain of commitments" argument. On December 5, 2003, appellant's petition for review was denied.
B. ANALYSIS
Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court is bound by its previous decision in a subsequent appeal of the same case unless its previous decision is clearly erroneous. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003). In this case, when appellant appealed the trial court's 2002 commitment order, he raised the very same argument he raises here and, relying on State v. Roland, we squarely rejected appellant's argument in our Campbell IV opinion. See Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 804 — 05. As noted, appellant's petition for review of our Campbell IV opinion was recently denied; therefore, we find our ruling on this issue in Campbell IV is the law of the case. Moreover, in his appellate brief, appellant acknowledges that he previously raised this issue and lost, but claims he raises the argument again only to ensure it is not waived should he prevail on his petition for review. However, because appellant's petition was denied, there is no reason to continue to "preserve" this issue. Accordingly, we conclude appellant's "break in the chain of commitments" argument arising from reversal of the 2001 commitment order is moot, and therefore we dismiss this appeal. See 43.2(f).
973 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1998).