Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-5328
December 11, 2003
ORDER-MEMORANDUM
AND NOW, this 11th day of December, 2003, upon consideration of Defendant Louis R. Bell's Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 14) and Plaintiff's Response thereto (Docket No. 16), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
The Court notes that Plaintiff's pro se response to Defendant Bell's Motion to Dismiss was untimely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the absence of a timely response, a motion may be granted as uncontested by the Court pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c). The Court declines, however, to grant the Motion as uncontested and instead has considered the Motion on its merits.
Pro se Plaintiff Thomas James Campbell, who is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous police officers, including Defendant Louis R. Bell, alleging that the named Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, in January 2002, he was "severely beaten" and "repeatedly shocked by a tazer stun gun" during the course of his arrest by the named Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also alleges that he sustained several injuries, including two broken shoulders and numerous burns, that were inflicted after he had surrendered and been handcuffed by the named Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied medical treatment, "as ambulances were kept at a distance away while [he] was beaten and tortured." (Id.) Defendant Bell has moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
When determining a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must accept as true all well pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.3d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted when a Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts, consistent with the complaint, which would entitle him or her to relief. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).
Defendant Bell argues that Plaintiff's allegations that he was beaten and tazer-shocked by 15 officers and denied medical attention, without specifically identifying when and where the alleged incident took place and how the alleged actions by the police officers violated any federally protected rights, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983. Although Plaintiff's Complaint fails to specifically identify the constitutional rights implicated by Defendant Bell's actions, it is clear from the allegations that he claims that the Defendants used excessive force in the course of arresting him and that the Defendants deprived him of access to medical care. See Hiqqins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that courts "should apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name") (quoting Holley v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). A claim that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" requirement. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). In determining whether force used to affect a particular seizure is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397. Proper application of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396.
While the Complaint does not include allegations concerning the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's arrest, it provides adequate notice to Defendant Bell of the basis of the claim for relief. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that complaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory under lenient federal standards of notice pleading). Indeed, the brief submitted by Defendant Bell in connection with the instant Motion contains allegations concerning the specific circumstances of Plaintiff's arrest, thus confirming that the Complaint provided Defendant Bell with adequate notice. See Def. Brief at 3 (stating that "[P]laintiff was evading arrest after he was believed to have murdered an Upper Darby police officer" and that "[P]laintiff was considered to be armed and dangerous at the time of this pursuit and failed to peacefully submit to arresting officers").
To establish a constitutional violation based on deprivation of medical care, a plaintiff must prove (1) that his medical needs were serious and that (2) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to such needs.Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). Although Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth allegations addressing his need for medical attention following the alleged excessive force incident and the deprivation thereof by the Defendants, the Complaint does not allege that Defendant Bell was both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health and safety. As noted above, however, under the lenient standards of notice pleading a Complaint need not allege facts that touch upon every element of the legal claim. Weston, 251 F.3d at 459. Liberally construed, the allegations of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint sufficiently state a claim for deprivation of access to medical care against Defendant Bell.
Defendant Bell also argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not demonstrated how any act or omission of the police officer fell outside the scope of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creiqhton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). In order to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, the Complaint must allege that the official violated a "clearly established" right. McLauqhlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2001) (citingAnderson, 483 U.S. at 635). The Court must first determine whether a plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right, and if so, then examine whether the right was "clearly established."Id. at 571. For a constitutional right to be clearly established, "there must be sufficient precedent at the time of the action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited." Id. at 572. "The essential inquiry is whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that [his or her] conduct comported with established legal standards." Id. at 571.
As discussed above, the allegations in the Complaint, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, sufficiently state claims for violations of his constitutional rights. Moreover, the constitutional claims that he alleges were "clearly established" as of January 2002, when the violations allegedly occurred. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (holding that use of objectively unreasonable force in course of arrest violated Fourth Amendment); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires government to provide medical care to persons injured while being apprehended by police). Nevertheless, the Complaint does not contain sufficient detail to enable the Court to assess whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged actions of Defendant Bell were unconstitutional. Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot determine whether the doctrine of qualified immunity is applicable. See Kevin M. v. Bristol Township Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 00-6030, 2002 WL 73233, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002)("Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which can only be grounds for dismissal if the defense is evident from the complaint; plaintiff is not required to anticipate that the defense will be raised and respond to it in the complaint.").
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Bell's Motion to Dismiss is denied.