Opinion
Case No. 3:12-cv-414
12-18-2013
JANEL L. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Judge Timothy S. Black
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore unentitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (See Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") (Tr. 60-66) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on October 5, 2004 and alleged that she became unable to work on November 30, 1998. (Tr. 15, 131-33). Plaintiff claims that she was disabled due to migraine headaches, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, mood disorder with depressive and anxiety features, and obesity. Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 15).
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, and in an April 2008 decision, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that Plaintiff was disabled as of January 1, 2004, but not before that time. (Tr. 57-66). Plaintiff requested review of this decision by the Appeals Council and in August 2010 the Appeals Council ordered remand to an ALJ for a new hearing and a new decision, finding that the decision was "deficient with respect to evaluation of both periods under consideration." (Tr. 67-71).
In August 2011, a different ALJ held a hearing on Plaintiff's claims. (Tr. 840-83). Plaintiff, a medical expert, and a vocational expert testified with Plaintiff's attorney in attendance. (Tr. 840-83). The ALJ rendered her decision in October 2011, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time from November 1998 through the date of the decision because, despite severe physical and mental impairments, she had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a restricted range of light-level, low stress work, encompassing a significant number of jobs. (Tr. 12-35). The ALJ's decision became final and appealable in October 2012 when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 7-10). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is an assessment of "the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
Plaintiff was thirty-six years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 12, 131, 840). She graduated from high school and from July 1991 through December 2002, held a variety of service industry, office, and general labor jobs including: customer service representative, receptionist, desk clerk, laborer, cleaner, child care worker, cafeteria worker, and veterinary assistant. (Tr. 17, 34, 165).
The ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of her decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on June 30, 2000.(Tr. 19-35).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 30, 1998, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, headaches, mood disorder with depressive and anxiety features (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined at 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) subject to the following additional limitation: low-stress work (i.e., no assembly-line production requirements or fast-paced duties).
6. The claimant is unable to perform past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on October 1, 1974. She is currently 37 years old and is classified as a "younger individual" for Social Security purposes (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has a high-school education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. The claimant does not have "transferable" work skills within the meaning of the Social Security Act (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act from November 30, 1998, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to DIB or SSI. (Tr. 66).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff's severe impairments or a combination thereof did not qualify her as disabled; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated the evidence regarding the opinions of Drs. Lorenz and Lisanti; and (3) the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence by finding that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work. The Court will address each error in turn.
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
"The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm."Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, she must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
Neither party presented background facts for the Court's review. Accordingly, the Court incorporates herein the facts as presented by the ALJ in his decision. (Tr. 19-35).
At the hearing Plaintiff complained of symptoms including persistent fatigue, depression, and anxiety with panic attacks. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff claims that she is often short of breath and has generalized pain in the neck, shoulders, lower back, and hips/legs. (Id.) She has severe headaches that occur about twice per week (which she characterized as migraine headaches). Plaintiff experiences less severe (non-migraine) headaches almost every day and becomes anxious around other people. (Id.)
Dr. Boyce, a medical expert, testified about Plaintiff's alleged impairments. (Tr. 18). Upon review of the records he opined that evidence failed to show Plaintiff's obesity constituted a "severe" impairment. (Id.) Therefore, he found that there were no complicating cardiac issues or other related physical manifestations associated with obesity that could have been considered "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 18-19). Dr. Boyce maintained that the evidence documented symptoms (primarily fatigue) that were attributed to fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome. (Tr. 19). Plaintiff had also exhibited mild tender points periodically since February 2005. (Id.)
B.
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly found that her severe impairments, or a combination thereof, did not qualify her as disabled.
The record reflects that the ALJ assessed the effects of each of Plaintiff's impairments, severe and non-severe, individually and collectively. (Tr. 18-33). While the ALJ primarily discussed Plaintiff's various physical and mental conditions one at a time, she still found that Plaintiff had multiple severe physical impairments (chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, headaches) and mental impairments (mood disorder, with features of depression and anxiety), referred to Plaintiff's impairments as a whole several times, and explained that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or "combination of impairments" that met or equaled a listing. (Tr. 18-33). See, e.g., Gooch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he fact that each element of the record was discussed individually hardly suggests that the totality of the record was not considered.").
See also Smith-Marker v. Astrue, 839 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2011) (the "ALJ does not necessarily need to provide a detailed 'combined effects' analysis...it is sufficient for the ALJ to refer to the claimant's 'impairments' (plural) and 'combination of impairments'").
Therefore, the record reflects that the ALJ reasonably considered and accounted for the individual and combined effects of Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments.
C.
Next, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of Drs. Lorenz and Lisanti.
In November 2004, Plaintiff's family doctor, Dr. Lisanti, referenced Plaintiff's fibromyalgia and opined that "[t]he duties of being a full time single mom takes all the strength and stamina that [Plaintiff] has on a daily basis, if she adds working outside the home to it, it proves to be too much for her body." (Tr. 335). In October 2010, Dr. Lorenz, another family doctor, opined, among other things, that Plaintiff could sit one or two hours at a time and six hours total in an eight-hour workday; could stand or walk about 15 minutes at a time and up to four hours in an eight-hour workday; could not lift more than five pounds even occasionally; and needed to lie down one or two hours during an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 779-87). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not giving these doctors' opinions controlling weight.
With respect to Dr. Lisanti's conclusion that working outside the home would be too much for Plaintiff's body, the ALJ explained that she was "reject[ing it] as speculative and unsupported by substantial evidence." (Tr. 33). See Braoudakis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:10cv59, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19235, at *16-17 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2011) ("the ALJ properly gave little weight to physician's opinion where the doctor did not provide a function-by-function assessment and only gave an opinion that claimant was "quite limited"). The ALJ then proceeded to reference substantial evidence that undermined Dr. Lisanti's conclusion of disability, noting among other things that: (1) treating rheumatologist Robert Schriber concluded that Plaintiff's conditions do "not meet any of the musculoskeletal criteria for disability" (Tr. 333); (2) consulting physician Dr. Danopulos concluded that Plaintiff's "ability to do any work-related activities is not affected or restricted from her somatic complaints" (Tr. 363); and (3) Plaintiff's own statements that her symptoms had improved with physical therapy (Tr. 336).
See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(3) ("Supportability. The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.").
With respect to Dr. Lorenz's October 2010 opinion, the ALJ explained that Dr. Lorenz's extreme restrictions were "neither well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques nor consistent with other substantial evidence in the case record." (Tr. 24). See C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(4) ("Consistency. Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion."). The ALJ then explained that Dr. Lorenz's limitations are "excessive in view of rather innocuous clinical findings, [Plaintiff's] history of conservative care and treatment, and the recommendation of other treating sources for increased exercise." (Tr. 26). The ALJ also maintained that Dr. Lorenz's "pessimistic assessment of [Plaintiff's] functional capabilities" was also in conflict with Plaintiff's reported daily activities. (Tr. 27). Specifically, Plaintiff
For example, in January 2005 Plaintiff exhibited "excellent range of motion of the joints in the upper and lower extremities." (Tr. 30). On January 19, 2005, Dr. Schriber stated that Plaintiff "does not meet any of the musculoskeletal criteria for disability. (Id.) A February 1, 2005 medical report confirmed the diagnosis of fibromyalgia but rather than indicating that the claimant was "disabled," stressed the need for aerobic exercise as well as "fresh air and daylight at least half an hour a day." (Tr. 25). Plaintiff's physical examination was essentially negative, showing no evidence of synovitis in the upper extremities, symmetrical reflexes, and good range of motion of the hips and spine with full muscle strength in both the upper and lower extremities. (Id.) Examining physician Dr. Danopulos concluded that the claimant's "ability to do any work-related activities is not affected or restricted from her somatic complaints." (Tr. 26). Upon examination in May 2008 there was evidence of only "[v]ery mild tender points." (Tr. 31). On November 20, 2008 Plaintiff's condition was described as "improved." (Id.) Plaintiff was sleeping better with the use of Ambien and her symptoms were described as "considerably improved." (Id.)
maintains a household that includes her boyfriend, her (currently impaired) mother, and a dependent child who is impaired (most significantly with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). [She] is the primary care giver for her child. She also helps her mother who is recovering from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. She does household chores. She assists her son with homework when he returns from school. [Plaintiff's] hobbies include photography, scrapbooking, and reading.(Tr. 27).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ gave good reasons for discounting Drs. Lisanti and Lorenz's opinions.
D.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence by finding that she had the RFC to perform light work.
"[I]n evaluating the claimant's subjective complaints of pain an administrative law judge may properly consider the claimant's credibility, and we accord great deference to that credibility determination." Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004); Mullen v. Bown, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Indeed, [t]he opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness, evaluating what is said, and considering how it fits with the rest of the evidence gathered before the person who is conducting the hearing, is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.'").
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ found her not to be credible when discussing her social functioning based on her interactions with her family. However, the ALJ never disputed Plaintiff's testimony that her symptoms occur outside of family interaction. (Tr. 869-70). Nevertheless, the ALJ still found that Plaintiff had no more than mild limitations in social functioning, in part because of evidence that she interacts with others on a regular basis; she shops and runs errands; and a treating counselor found no significant limitation in Plaintiff's ability to relate to others. (Tr. 27 citing Tr. 559).
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ dismissed her allegations of anxiety because she has not seen a mental health counselor even though she testified that her mental health treatment was stopped because of budget concerns at the Troy Health Center. However, there is no evidence that the ALJ "penalize[d] her for budget concerns at Troy Health Center." (Tr. 860). The ALJ simply found that Plaintiff's "treatment history [as a whole] is not consistent with a find[ing] of disability." (Tr. 33).
Specifically, Plaintiff testified: "I'm not seeing anybody currently. I was going to the mental health center in Troy, but they stopped their counseling and treatment there. They were going through some budget problems, I guess. They had, the girl I was seeing, I had seen her for like four years and she ended up doing a job change. And so then I was going to go see somebody else, but then, now they've kind of cut it back all the way. So I've just recently started looking into seeing somebody again because I'm struggling again with certain things. I haven't found anybody yet though." (Tr. 860).
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The Court's duty on appeal is not to re-weigh the evidence, but to determine whether the decision below is supported by substantial evidence. Raisor v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of light work and therefore was not disabled. The issue is not whether the record could support a finding of disability, but rather whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that Janel Campbell was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income, is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED; and the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, whereupon, as no further matters remain pending for the Court's review, this case shall be CLOSED.
___________________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge