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holding that "[i]t is well established that" "post-trial jury inquiries may not be used to impeach a verdict" "absent evidence of extraneous prejudical information or outside influence"
Summary of this case from Tatum v. JacksonOpinion
No. 99 Civ. 5129 (LTS) (THK)
February 26, 2003
K. C. Okoli, Esq. and Rudy M. Brown, Esq., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Deborah I. Meyer, Esq., MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought this action alleging claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution and conspiracy against the City of New York, individual New York City police officers, Magdalena Sanchez, Pauline Perry, Detective Cesar Rivera and Detective Sandra Piedra, Plaintiff's estranged wife Denise Campbell, and Maureen Hunter. The complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's civil rights arising out of an arrest and prosecution for rape and sexual abuse of his wife's daughter, Rashima Richards, and an arrest for criminal contempt for violation of an order of protection. Plaintiff was tried in state court on the rape charge and acquitted.
A trial was held in this case and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendants on all of the Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff now moves to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence and for a new trial. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and for a new trial is denied.
Juror Misconduct
As a threshhold matter, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of juror misconduct. Plaintiff asserts that statements made by certain jurors when questioned by the attorneys after the conclusion of the trial showed that the some of the jurors misunderstood the applicable law, or did not follow the Court's instructions.
Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
It is well established that, absent evidence of extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence, post-trial jury inquiries may not be used to impeach a verdict. "[I]f post-verdict juror testimony could be used to impeach a verdict, `the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.'" United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)); see also Burgos v. United States Lines, 547 F. Supp. 830, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("a jury verdict will not be disturbed on the basis of counsel's conversations with jurors"). Plaintiff has offered no suggestion, much less any evidence, that the jury was subject to extraneous, prejudicial information or outside influence. Accordingly, counsel's assertions concerning post-trial juror statements concern inadmissible matters and the motion for a new trial is denied to the extent it is premised on alleged juror misconduct.
Whether the Verdict is Against the Weight of the Evidence
Plaintiff moves for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
The decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 as to whether to grant a new trial following a jury trial on the ground that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 263 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993). However, the trial judge should exercise such discretion only in "the most extraordinary circumstances." United States v. Locasido, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993). A district court's authority to grant a new trial based on the weight of the evidence is limited to instances in which the court is "`convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" Ishay v. City of New York, 158 F. Supp.2d 261, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 608, 623 (2d Cir. 2001)). When considering whether a verdict is so "seriously erroneous" as to justify a new trial, the district court "is free to weigh the evidence and `need not view [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.'" Farrior v. Waterford Board. of Education, 277 F.3d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting DCL Management. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, Plaintiff contends that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to rebut the presumption of probable cause for the arrest of the Plaintiff created by the grand jury's indictment of Plaintiff on rape, sexual abuse and sodomy charges. It is well established that a grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause that may be rebutted only be a showing of fraud, perjury, or the deliberate or intentional suppression of evidence by the police. See Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1994).
The issue for determination on this motion is not whether there was some evidence upon which the jury could have found the presumption of probable cause rebutted, but whether the jury's verdict was seriously erroneous or constituted a miscarriage of justice.
The Court has considered the evidence presented at trial in light of Plaintiff's arguments and concludes that the jury's verdict in favor of Defendants on the claims relating to sexual misconduct charges should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence. At most, Plaintiff contends the evidence showed that the Office of the District Attorney did not present to the Grand Jury exculpatory evidence that could have discredited the testimony of Rashima Richards. Such prosecutorial decisions do not amount to fraud, perjury or deliberate or intentional suppression of evidence by the police. Nor does the Court find the jury's verdict in this regard, in light of the trial evidence, seriously erroneous or constituting a miscarriage of justice.
Plaintiff also argues that the jury's implicit finding of probable cause for Detective Rivera's arrest of Plaintiff on sexual misconduct charges was against the weight of the evidence, contending that Rivera did not sufficiently investigate the facts himself, but relied upon a file prepared by another police officer. Plaintiff does not allege that Detective Rivera deliberately or intentionally suppressed evidence. Detective Rivera testified at trial as to his basis for arresting Plaintiff. The jury had the opportunity to evaluate the testimony and concluded that Detective Rivera had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Having considered the trial evidence and Plaintiff's arguments. the Court concludes that the jury's verdict in Detective Rivera's favor on this claim was neither seriously erroneous nor a miscarriage of justice.
Plaintiff also claims that the jury's verdict in Defendants' favor on Plaintiff's claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution arising from Plaintiff's February 3, 1997 arrest for violation of a protective order was against the weight of the evidence. A false arrest claim requires a showing that a defendant intended to confine plaintiff, the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and the confinement was not otherwise privileged. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 188 (2d Cir. 1995). If an arresting officer has probable cause to arrest a plaintiff, plaintiff may not maintain a claim of false arrest. See id. at 118-19. In order to prove a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, termination of the proceeding in the plaintiff's favor, lack of probable cause to commence the proceeding, and actual malice as motivation for the defendant's actions. See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997).
At trial, the evidence focused on whether certain defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff in February 1997 for violation of a protective order. The evidence introduced at trial provided a sufficient basis upon which the jury could properly conclude that Detective Piedra had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Among other things, that evidence showed that two prior complaints had been lodged against the Plaintiff. Detective Piedra testified that she had also interviewed parties who had alleged that Plaintiff had attempted to enter the apartment of Denise Campbell. At trial, Detective Piedra testified that she interviewed Denise Richards, Rashima and Rashima's brother prior to Plaintiff's arrest for violation of a protective order. Plaintiff contends that the information Detective Piedra received was not trustworthy because it was based on the statements of minors, namely Rashima Richards and Rashima's brother. The jury evaluated the testimony of the witnesses and apparently credited the testimony of Detective Piedra as well as that of Denise Campbell and Rashima Richards. A jury's credibility determinations are entitled to deference, and the court should not ordinarily set aside a verdict where an issue depends upon the jury's credibility determination. See United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 1998); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[w]here the resolution of issues depended upon assessment of the credibility of witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial."). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the verdict on the claims relating to the alleged violation of the order of protection was not against the weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff also contends that "there is overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy by the defendants against Mr. Campbell" and that the jury's verdict in Defendants' favor on Plaintiff's civil rights conspiracy claim was against the weight of the evidence. (See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 24.) Plaintiff bases this contention principally on comments allegedly made by jurors during a post-trial interview. As explained above, any evidence of such post-trial juror statements is inadmissible and Plaintiff's arguments based on such statements will not be considered by the Court. Aside from comments from the jury, Plaintiff cites various aspects of the trial evidence, arguing that it painted an "overwhelming" picture of the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiff argues, for example, that Officer Perry visited Denise Campbell and Rashima Richards "in order to discuss how to get Denise Richards . . . into better accommodation." (See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 26-27.) Officer Perry testified that she visited Denise and Rashima Richards to follow-up on the rape allegation that Denise Campbell made the day before. (See Tr. 656-64.) The jury examined this evidence and concluded that it weighed in favor of the Defendants. As stated above, the Court will not disturb the jury's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d at 363. The cited evidence, even if construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as establishing the existence of a conspiracy to harm Plaintiff, is insufficient to demonstrate that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants conspired to deprive him of his rights because he was a man. The jury determined that no such conspiracy had been proven. The Court, having reviewed the evidence and Plaintiff's contentions, concludes that the verdict is neither seriously erroneous nor a miscarriage of justice in respect of this claim. Plaintiff thus has identified no basis upon which the Court properly could conclude that the verdict on this claim was against the weight of the evidence. For all of the foregoing these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is denied.
Amendment of the Complaint
Plaintiff also moves to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow the pleadings to conform to issues actually tried, not to extend the pleadings to introduce issues inferentially suggested by incidental evidence in the record." Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1086 (1977); see also Cole v. Layrite Products Co., 439 F.2d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 1971); Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1969). "In a motion under rule 15(b) to amend the complaint to conform to the proof, the most important question is whether the new issues were tried by the parties' express or implied consent and whether the defendant "would be prejudiced by the implied amendment, i.e., whether he had a fair opportunity to defend and whether he could offer any additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different theory." Browning Debenture Holders' Committee, 560 F.2d at 1086. Prejudice is inferred if a party did not have a fair opportunity to defend against the new claims. See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 40 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy against the "the Bronx District Attorney, and his two Assistant District Attorneys, Amy Cheng and Scott David Staton." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, at 6-7.) Plaintiff contends that the Bronx District Attorney's Office did not introduce evidence before the grand jury which indicted Plaintiff on the rape charge, that Rashima Richards had refused to be examined by a doctor. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff argues that, if the grand jury had known this fact, that "it is more likely than not that the grand jury would not have indicted Mr. Campbell." (Id.)
Plaintiff's motion does not appear to seek to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence but, rather, seeks to add new defendants in connection with Plaintiff's conspiracy and malicious prosecution charges. Nevertheless, construing Plaintiff's motion as an application to amend the complaint as against the existing Defendants to conform to evidence at trial, it is denied because there is no basis to conclude that any "new issues" were tried on the parties' implied or express consent. Indeed, there was no verdict or finding in the jury's special verdict regarding the issues Plaintiff seeks to add to the complaint. Thus, amending the complaint would not be relevant to the issues on which the jury made findings in reaching its verdict. See Browning Debenture Holders' Committee, 560 F.2d at 1086.
In addition, the parties that Plaintiff seeks to add to the complaint would be prejudiced by such an amendment. The parties Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against did not have notice of the claims, and they were not present or represented as parties at trial. Under these circumstances, it is clear that permitting Plaintiff to amend the complaint at this juncture would be prejudicial because the new defendants did not have a fair opportunity to defend against these claims. See Browning Debentures, 560 F.2d at 1086; Town of Orangetown, 718 F.2d at 40 n. 10; Miwon, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nissho-Iwai American Corp., No. 80 Civ. 4731, 1984 WL 363 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1984)
Moreover, amending the complaint to add the Bronx District Attorney and ADAs Cheng and Staton would be futile because it is well-established that "prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages arising from activities that are `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'" Carson v. Rivers, 35 F. Supp.2d 250, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d. Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff's claims against the Bronx District Attorney and ADAs Cheng and Staton arise from ADA Staton's testimony that the District Attorney's Office is solely responsible for the decision to present evidence to the grand jury. Plaintiff further complains that ADA Cheng did not present evidence to the grand jury concerning Rashima Richards' reluctance to be examined by doctors subsequent to the filing of her rape complaint. These matters concern the judicial phase of the criminal process and the District Attorney and ADAs Cheng and Staton are immune from suit in this regard. See Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d at 99-100 ("a prosecutor is absolutely immune with respect to a decision whether or not to prosecute . . . [s]uch protection also applies to the conduct of actual litigation . . . including presentation of evidence to the grand jury."). In light of all of the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint is denied.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial and to amend the complaint is denied in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.