Cameron v. Coach Apparel Store

4 Citing cases

  1. McKinnies v. City of New York

    23-CV-2567 (HG) (JRC) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    In any event, because Plaintiff is proceeding Pro se, the Court would otherwise consider Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD as if she had brought them against the City directly. See, e.g., Cameron v. Coach Apparel Store, No. 07-cv-3991, 2009 WL 536068, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009) (“Keeping in mind that Plaintiff appears Pro se, the Court will construe his claims against the New York Police Department[,] . . . which is not a suable entity, as being claims against the City of New York.”); Maier v. NYPD, No. 08-cv-5104, 2009 WL 2915211, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (collecting cases).

  2. Vasquez v. City of New York

    22-CV-05068 (HG) (VMS) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2024)   Cited 8 times

    Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I will consider Plaintiff's complaint against the Office of the Mayor as if he had brought his claims against the City of New York (the “City”) directly. See, e.g., Cameron v. Coach Apparel Store, No. 07-cv-3991, 2009 WL 536068, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009) (“Keeping in mind that Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court will construe his claims against the New York Police Department[,] . . . which is not a suable entity, as being claims against the City of New York.”);

  3. Pierre v. N.Y.C. Fire Dep't

    22-CV-7425 (HG) (SJB) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2024)   Cited 4 times

    Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I will consider Plaintiff's complaint against the FDNY as if she had brought her claims against the City of New York directly. See, e.g., Cameron v. Coach Apparel Store, No. 07-cv-3991, 2009 WL 536068, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009) (“Keeping in mind that Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court will construe his claims against the New York Police Department, . . . which is not a suable entity, as being claims against the City of New York.”);

  4. GAFT v. MITSUBISHI MOTOR CREDIT OF AMERICA

    07-CV-527 (NG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2009)   Cited 9 times
    Dismissing FDCPA claim against Equifax

    To the extent a Rule 56.1 statement cites to an affidavit, the affidavit must be a sworn statement of fact based on personal knowledge "that would be admissible in evidence at trial." Cameron v. Coach Apparel Store, No. 07-CV-3991, 2009 WL 536068, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009). A court may disregard "portions of an affidavit that are not based upon the affiant's personal knowledge, contain inadmissible hearsay or make generalized and conclusory statements."