Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt

9 Citing cases

  1. City of Winder v. Barrow Cnty.

    899 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 2024)   Cited 5 times

    In addition to "property taxes," OCGA § 36-70-24 (3) (B) lists "insurance premium taxes" as a potential source for revenue, which cuts against the County’s argument that the term property taxes refers to taxes of any kind because such an interpretation would improperly make the term "insurance premium taxes" superfluous. See Camden Countyv. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b), 883 S.E.2d 827 (2023) (noting fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should "avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage" (citation and punctuation omitted)). [16] Also, OCGA § 36-70-24 (3) (B) refers to "special service districts" and makes clear that the listed mechanisms for funding are to be levied or imposed within a special service district.

  2. Lovell v. Raffensperger

    897 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 2024)   Cited 3 times
    Affirming dismissal of complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Paragraph V (b) in an action brought against the Secretary of State and local boards of election, but not the State and the applicable counties

    This means we afford the constitutional text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b), 883 S.E.2d 827 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). "Doing so requires careful attention to not only the language of the clause in question, but also its broader legal and historical context, which are the primary determinants of a text’s meaning."

  3. State v. Sistersong Women of Color Reprod. Justice Collective

    No. S23A0421 (Ga. Oct. 24, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    See U.S. Const., Art. V (describing the procedures required for amending the United States Constitution); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. X (describing the procedures required for amending or replacing the Georgia Constitution). See also Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 506 (2) (b) n.16 (883 S.E.2d 827) (2023) (noting that, in order to change the Georgia Constitution's meaning, the "only option was to propose a constitutional amendment"); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226-227 (40 S.Ct. 495, 64 LE 871) (1920) ("The framers of the Constitution realized that it might in the progress of time and the development of new conditions require changes, and they intended to provide an orderly manner in which these could be accomplished; to that end they adopted the Fifth Article

  4. Roberts v. Cuthpert

    No. S23A0631 (Ga. Sep. 19, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 502 (2) n.12 (883 S.E.2d 827) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 746-747 (2) (452 S.E.2d 476) (1994) (holding state's sovereign immunity extends to counties).

  5. Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper

    No. S23Q0625 (Ga. Sep. 19, 2023)   Cited 5 times

    We acknowledge that including both "wanton" and "reckless" in OCGA § 51-1-11 (c), when "wantonness" is primarily understood as involving a greater degree of reckless indifference than "reckless" conduct alone, appears to be in tension with the surplusage canon, which counsels that we should interpret statutory language so as to avoid redundancy when possible. See Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (2) (b) (883 S.E.2d 827) (2023) ("[C]ourts generally should avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

  6. Madison v. Old 41 Farm, LLC

    No. A23A0860 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    As the Georgia Municipal Association, Inc., pointed out in its amicus curiae brief in support of Madison in this case, "in our system of limited government, [the judiciary's] duty is to hold parties to the language they use [in ordinances] and not to save them from it." Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 517-518 (883 S.E.2d 827) (2023) (Bethel, J., concurring dubitante). (b) Madison's discretion.

  7. CSX Transp. v. Gen. Mills

    82 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2023)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that "[b]ased on . . . public policy concern, . . . a party who was not negligent generally would not be required to indemnify a party who was negligent unless a contract 'explicitly and expressly' required indemnification"

    Under Georgia's collateral estoppel rule, CSX would be precluded from raising arguments about General Mills's negligence in the indemnity suit only if the Burchfield lawsuit involved "the same parties or their privies." Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 883 S.E.2d 827, 833 (2023) (explaining that collateral estoppel precludes "re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated . . . in another action between the same parties or their privies" (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). By contrast, under the federal rule, a non-party to a previous action (General Mills) may assert collateral estoppel offensively to preclude a party to the previous action (CSX) from litigating issues decided in the previous action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).

  8. Fahey v. Kolcun Tree Care, LLC

    No. 22-14319 (11th Cir. Jul. 11, 2023)

    And "it is well settled that in interpreting statutory text, 'courts generally should avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.'" Camden County v. Sweatt, 883 S.E.2d 827, 837 (Ga. 2023) (quoting Middleton v. State, 846 S.E.2d 73, 79 (Ga. 2020)). If the legislature had wished to extend immunity to any person, it could have simply said "any person" rather than setting forth a detailed list and then rendering it meaningless by the concluding phrase "any other person."

  9. Camden Cnty. v. Union Carbide Corp

    2:22-CV-77 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2023)

    Since the motion's filing, however, the Georgia Supreme Court has issued an opinion which impacts the underlying issues in this case. See Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt, No. S22A0837, 2023 WL 1786415 (Ga. Feb. 7, 2023); Dkt. Nos. 54, 55. Plaintiff has notified the Court that, in light of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision, it concedes its claims for breach of contract (Counts I and II) and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count