Opinion
No. CV 07-4032988
August 9, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance Co. ("Cambridge Mutual"), a homeowners' insurer, seeking a decree that it has no obligation to defend certain claimed insured persons.
Third-party defendants, Lucious Whitaker, Jr. and the Edward H. Deming Agency, Inc. move to strike the third-party complaint brought by the third-party plaintiffs, Gilles Michaud and Michaud Enterprises, LLC.
I.
This case arises from an accident which occurred at 15 Reservoir Road in Farmington. Connecticut, the alleged residence of Mary Anne Tillona and Gilles Michaud on June 27, 2005, when the decedent, Richard Gregoire, an employee of the framing sub-contractor, Sirois Carpentry, LLC fell through the first floor of the home leading to his subsequent death. Joyce Gregoire was later named administratrix of the defendant's estate on August 3, 2005 and brought suit against Michaud Enterprises, LLC and Gilles Michaud for damages. At the time of the accident, the 15 Reservoir Road property had a homeowners' insurance policy through the plaintiff, Cambridge Mutual, a policy which had been issued on May 31, 2005 and was effective until May 31, 2006. The only "insured" listed under the Cambridge Mutual homeowners policy was Mary Anne Tillona.
The terms of the policy defined an "insured" as "a. your relatives; or b. [o]ther persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above." The policy also provided certain exclusions, which included injuries "(b) [a]rising out of or in connection with a `business' engaged in by an `insured.' At the time of the accident, Mr. Michaud and Ms. Tillona were not married, but were "partners" living together.
In her action as administratrix, Joyce Gregoire alleged that Gilles Michaud/Michaud Enterprises, LLC was the general contractor of the 15 Reservoir Road property at the time of the accident and their negligence contributed to the decedent's death. Because Gilles Michaud was not listed as an "insured" under the terms of the homeowners' policy, and the suit brought by the Gregoire estate allegedly arose from Gilles Michaud's business relationship with Sirois Carpentry, Cambridge Mutual denied coverage as to the action brought against Michaud Enterprises, LLC, but agreed to defend Giles Michaud under a reservation of rights, pending the determination of this declaratory judgment action.
On February 25, 2008, Gilles Michaud and Michaud Enterprises brought the present third-party complaint against the Edward H. Deming Agency and Lucious Whitaker. Whitaker was an insurance agent working for the Deming Agency, which obtained the homeowners policy with Cambridge Mutual. In their third-party complaint, Gilles Michaud and Michaud Enterprises, LLC allege that Ms. Tillona had contacted the Edward H. Deming Agency "sometime prior to June 27, 2005" and requested that Gilles Michaud be included as a named "insured" under the homeowners' policy, but that the agency failed to satisfy her request. Sometime between November and December 2005, Ms. Tillona again requested this change, and it was at that time that Gilles Michaud was eventually added to the policy on an amended declarations page. However, Cambridge Mutual has reserved its rights in defending Gilles Michaud, as they contend that Michaud was not an "insured" at the time of the accident. Gilles Michaud and Michaud Enterprises, LLC maintain that the failure to add them to the policy prior to the accident is due to the negligence of the Deming Agency and/or Mr. Whitaker.
In their present motion to strike, Deming and Whitaker allege that they have no ultimate liability to the third-party plaintiffs and that a third-party complaint is an improper instrument for addressing the claims of Michaud Enterprises, LLC and Gilles Michaud.
II.
Third-party defendants claim that under § 52-102a, impleader is only available when a person may be liable to the defendant for part or all of the plaintiff's claim; that the original complaint is a declaratory action and seeks no monetary damages, nor does it allege any negligence and/or fault on the part of Deming and Whitaker; that there is no way they can be liable as a result of the plaintiff's action; and finally, that the third-party plaintiffs' action is a new action and not one seeking indemnification from any of the plaintiff's claims. The third-party plaintiffs argue that their complaint includes claims which arise out of the same "transaction" as the original complaint, and may include claims for damages in excess of those sought in the original complaint.
III.
An impleading party "has the burden of alleging facts sufficient to bring an action within the requirements of the statute . . . As a fundamental and threshold requirement, a third-party plaintiff must allege that the third-party defendant is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Commissioner v. Lake Phipps Land Owners Corp., 3 Conn.App. 100, 102, 485 A.2d 580 (1985).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-102a provides that a defendant may implead "a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between parties." Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 232 Conn. 27, 33, 653 A.2d 168 (1995).
Practice Book § 17-54 et seq. sets forth the scope, conditions, and procedure for declaratory judgment actions. Colony Insurance Co. v. Oracle Lounge, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07-4029107 (May 1, 2008, Bellis, J.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 481]. That decision points out that the statute authorizing the courts to render declaratory judgments is to be liberally construed. Practice Book § 17-56(b) provides: "All persons who have an interest in the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment that is direct, immediate and adverse to the interest of one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants in the action shall be made parties to the action or shall be given reasonable notice thereof."
Our courts have historically held that in most instances, even third-party complaints which allege claims independent and exclusive of the original action may survive a motion to strike. In Chen v. Celon, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 02-039 1304 (March 30, 2006, Rodriguez, J.) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 105], the court held that "The purpose of § 52-102a, like that of [Federal] Rule 14(a), is clearly to obviate the multiplicity of actions . . . [It also] to facilitate litigation, to save costs, to bring all of the litigants into one proceeding, and to dispose of an entire matter without the expense of many suits and many trials." Id., quoting Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 588, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988). In denying the plaintiff's motion to strike the third-party plaintiff's claims, which contained allegations in excess of those alleged in the original complaint, the court stated that while a third-party complaint may contain claims beyond those in the original action, "the authority to join claims against a properly impleaded party, arising out of the same transaction or transactions, can be found by reading the impleader statute in conjunction with the Practice Book rule for joinder of actions." Chen v. Celon, supra.
Similarly, in Wise v. Bickford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 97-571001 (Sept. 17, 1997, Teller, J.) [ 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 218], the court denied a motion to strike and held that excess claims could be brought in a third-party complaint under § 52-102a, noting: "There is no provision in the statute prohibiting the joinder of causes of action, whether in tort, contract, or for indemnification in a third-party complaint." (Emphasis added.) Id. The court went on to add that "[w]hile the impleading of a third-party defendant, such as [here] is clearly ancillary to the original case, § 52-102a nevertheless contemplates that the pleadings therein are to be treated in the same manner as the ordinary civil action.
This line of reasoning was also applied in the case of Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Black, 40 Conn.Sup. 63, 480 A.2d 614 (1984). In Black, the court similarly acknowledged that § 52-102a is based on Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that "[w]hen a federal court is faced with a third-party complaint which includes a claim for damages in excess of, or different from, those sought by the original complaint, Rule 14(a) is read in conjunction with Rule 18(a) so as to allow any and all claims to be pleading against a properly impleaded third-party defendant." Id. The court denied the third-party defendant's motion to strike the third-party complaint, which contained additional allegations and claims than those found in the original complaint.
As in the above cases, this third-party action involves a complaint which alleges claims in excess of those involved in the instant declaratory judgment action. This court has a longstanding tradition to avoid the multiplicity of actions and promote the interest of judicial economy. Since the third-party complaint entails similar and related issues and involves interests that may be affected by the outcome of the declaratory judgment action, the motion to strike is denied.