Opinion
20-CV-0156 (CM)
01-22-2020
ERNEST CALVINO JR., Plaintiff, v. JIM GLASER, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL :
Plaintiff brings this action pro se. By order dated January 21, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis ("IFP"). The Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 ("[A]n action is 'frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, using the Court's general complaint form, brings this action invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction. He claims that Defendant conspired to harm him. Plaintiff asserts the following facts, verbatim:
On January 17, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint. (ECF No. 3.)
I had seen this Attorney in a hotel in Northumpton M.A., This persons what in a table next to me, when, I was having breakfast last mouth, I try to not file a claim againt him for harassment or corruption because, I was not sure, he had electronily mislead me inside this court with audio electronic he haves something to do with court corruption because he had property, busnesses asset that belong to me, he obtain his above mention because he know Miguel S. from union street Springfield M.A. and he have sue in the court of law for him.(ECF No. 3, 5 ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks the return of property and monetary damages.
Miguel Sosa is one of many people that had stole sensitive, personal, intellectuar information from me. he Miguel know my property, busnesses asset, money, banks because of Jackeline Guerrido that misleading my female friend that, I had busnesses with seam my and her and other people in court and other places this Attorney had work with them.
DISCUSSION
A. Frivolous Complaint
Even when read with the "special solicitude" due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, Plaintiff's claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which he can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's amended complaint cannot be cured with another amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
B. Plaintiff's Litigation History
Since December 17, 2019, Plaintiff has filed numerous frivolous actions in this Court. He filed this and other frivolous complaints even after the Court warned him that further vexatious or frivolous litigation in this Court will result in an order barring him from filing new actions IFP unless he receives prior permission. See, e.g., Calvino v. Jones, ECF 1:19-CV-11601, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019). On January 10, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further actions in this Court IFP without first obtaining permission from the Court to file his complaint. See Calvino v. Fauto L., ECF 1:19-CV-11958, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2020).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. The Court dismisses this action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: January 22, 2020
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge