Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-60-AW-GRJ
05-27-2020
Donald CALVERT and Mariam Martin, individually and as assignees for Travis A. Stewart and Shelly M. Stephens, Plaintiffs, v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.
Jeffrey James Humphries, Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiffs. Juan Pablo Caceres, Paul Hudson Jones, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
Jeffrey James Humphries, Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Juan Pablo Caceres, Paul Hudson Jones, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
FINAL ORDER
Allen Winsor, United States District Judge
This case involves a dispute about insurance coverage. Both sides have moved for summary judgment, and Defendant Safeco has moved to dismiss. ECF Nos. 32, 33, 35. This order grants Safeco's summary judgment motion, ECF No. 32, denies Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, ECF No. 35, and denies as moot Safeco's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 33.
The issue is whether a Safeco insurance policy covered a particular accident. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Donald Calvert and Mariam Martin were passengers injured in a single-truck accident. ECF No. 1-1 (SAC) ¶ 39(c). Shelly Stephens owned the truck, having bought it just a few days before. SAC ¶ 39(a). Travis Stewart was driving with Stephens's permission. SAC ¶ 6.
The two injured passengers (Calvert and Martin) sued Stephens (as owner) and Stewart (as driver) in state court. See generally SAC. Stephens and Stewart turned to Safeco, Stephens's insurer, but it denied coverage. SAC ¶ 11. Stephens and Stewart then agreed to entry of judgments against them, and they assigned to the injured passengers all rights under Stephens's insurance policy. SAC ¶ 12. That led to this case, in which the passengers (as assignees) seek a declaratory judgment that the Safeco policy covered the accident. The policy provided liability coverage for "[a]ny person using [Stephens's] covered auto with [her] express or implied permission." ECF No. 1-4 at 61. It is undisputed that Stephens owned the truck and that Stewart was driving with permission. The whole issue, then, is whether the truck was a "covered auto." If it was not, there is no coverage: the policy specifically excludes coverage for any vehicle Stephens owned other than a "covered auto." ECF No. 1-4 at 63.
It is undisputed that Stephens assigned her rights, but the parties dispute whether Stewart ever signed an assignment or had a judgment entered against him. See ECF No. 1-4 at 148 n.5. It does not appear that a judgment has been entered against Stewart, and the record does not include any assignment he signed. Although this fact is disputed, it will not preclude summary judgment because, as explained below, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory judgment they seek either way.
Plaintiffs first added Safeco as a defendant in their state-court action. ECF No. 1-4 at 157. Safeco removed, and this court dismissed the claim against Safeco as premature. ECF No. 13-1. The court then remanded to state court. ECF No. 1-4 at 155; see generally Case No. 1:18-cv-34 (N.D. Fla. 2018). On remand, the state court entered an agreed final judgment against Stephens in favor of both Plaintiffs. ECF No. 1-5 at 122-23. Plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, again including Safeco as a defendant. ECF No. 1-5 at 2. The Second Amended Complaint also named Stephens's insurance agency, Treweek Insurance Agency, LLC, as a defendant. ECF No. 1-5 at 4. Safeco again removed. ECF No. 1. The court dismissed the claims against Treweek based on fraudulent joinder and denied Plaintiffs' motion for remand. ECF No. 20 at 2-4. At the recent summary judgment hearing, the parties indicated they did not wish to revisit the remand or joinder issues and instead sought a resolution of the contract issue.
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The policy defines "covered auto" as any vehicle listed on the declaration page and any "newly acquired vehicles." ECF No 1-4 at 59-60. The truck was not on the declarations page, ECF Nos. 1-1 ¶ 6; 1-3 at 3, so it had to be a "newly acquired vehicle" for coverage to exist. The policy attached certain conditions for any "newly acquired replacement vehicle" or any "newly acquired additional vehicle." ECF No. 1-4 at 59. The truck was an additional vehicle—not a replacement vehicle, see ECF No. 35 at 2—so these limitations applied:
For any newly acquired vehicle that is in addition to any shown in the Declarations coverage shall apply for the first thirty (30) days after you acquire the vehicle, including the date of acquisition. Coverage shall be the broadest coverage we provide for any vehicle shown in the Declarations. This coverage applies only if:
(a) you acquire the additional vehicle during the policy period shown on the Declarations; and
(b) there is no other insurance policy that provides coverage for the additional vehicle.
If you wish to add or continue coverage you must ask us to insure the additional vehicle within thirty (30) days after you acquire the additional vehicle. This thirty (30) days of coverage includes the day you acquire the vehicle.
ECF No. 1-4 at 60. The parties agree that Stephens acquired the vehicle within the 30 days before the accident. ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 1, 5; ECF No. 35 at 11. And they agree Stephens insured the truck with another insurer, First Acceptance. See ECF No. 31-2 at 6. But the First Acceptance policy did not provide liability coverage; it included only personal injury protection and coverage for property damage, comprehensive losses, and collision. The dispute is whether this other insurance policy still counts as an "other insurance policy." As Plaintiffs explain, "[t]he crux of the dispute in this case hinges on what Safeco meant when it said, ‘and there is no other insurance policy that provides coverage for the additional vehicle.’ " ECF No. 35 at 12 (emphasis removed).
According to Plaintiffs, this phrase is ambiguous and therefore must be interpreted in favor of coverage. Cf. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc. , 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007) ("Insurance contracts are construed ... with any ambiguities construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage."). They say that another insurance policy does not "provide[ ] coverage for the additional vehicle" (as that Safeco policy uses that phrase) unless it includes "coverages that duplicate coverages under the Safeco policy." ECF No. 35 at 12-13. Safeco responds that there is no ambiguity—that under the policy's plain language, the First Acceptance coverage was a "policy that provides coverage for the additional vehicle." ECF No. 36 at 4. Safeco has the better of this argument.
The policy does not define "other insurance policy that provides coverage." But under Florida law, undefined terms in insurance policies do not necessarily make the language ambiguous. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 711 So. 2d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 1998). Instead, "[w]hen a policy provision remains undefined, common everyday usage determines its meaning. Clear and unambiguous language in a policy should be accorded its natural meaning, and courts should not extend strictness in construction to the point of adding different meaning to language that is clear." Nateman v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. , 544 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (marks and citation omitted). Applying common everyday usage, I conclude that the First Acceptance policy "provided coverage" for the truck. ECF No. 31-2 at 6. It may not have provided liability coverage—or coverage identical to Stephens's other coverage—but it nonetheless "provided coverage."
The Safeco policy could have required the other insurance to provide "identical" coverage or some other category of coverage, but it did not. The phrase is unambiguous. Cf. Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Easdon Rhodes & Assocs. LLC , 872 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding no ambiguity in policy exclusion "explaining coverage was only provided under the provision if ‘you do not have any other insurance available to you which affords the same or similar coverage’ "); Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Alpine Towing, Inc. , No. 18-21387-CIV, 2019 WL 2009176, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019) (applying a nearly identical provision and concluding a truck was not an "additional auto" because it was covered by another policy).
Because Safeco's interpretation of the contract is correct, Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion must be denied. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory relief they seek. For the same reasons, Safeco's summary judgment motion is granted. That leaves Safeco's motion to dismiss. Safeco argued that Stewart never had a judgment, so he never had any standing to seek a declaration as to the policy's language. But even if that is correct, the Plaintiffs—Calvert and Martin—have standing to seek the declaratory judgment based on their assignment from Stephens. They are entitled to seek a declaration as to whether the truck was a "covered auto." So it makes no difference whether Stewart could have sought a declaration on his own—or whether Plaintiffs had an assignment only from Stephens. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
IT IS NOW ORDERED:
Safeco's summary judgment motion (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion (ECF No. 35) is DENIED. Safeco's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33) is DENIED as moot. The clerk will enter a judgment stating, "This case was resolved on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed on the merits, and Plaintiffs will take nothing from this action." The clerk will then close the file.
SO ORDERED on May 27, 2020.