Opinion
02A-02-004
Submitted: May 6, 2002
July 15, 2002
Dear Counsel:
This is the Court's decision in the matter in the appeal of Catherine Calloway ("Claimant")of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board ("Board").
I. FACTUAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 1, 1991, the Claimant injured her neck while employed by E.I. DuPont Nemours Co. ("DuPont"). On October 28, 1994, the Board found that Calloway was disabled and ordered DuPont to pay her medical expenses. On May 26, 1998, the parties came to an agreement as to how the payments would be made: DuPont would accept the compensability of treatment for fibromyalgia and myofacitis provided to Claimant as outlined by Dr. Debra Hobbs, the Claimant's treating chiropractic physician. On April 1, 1999, the Claimant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due seeking an order directing DuPont to continue paying for chiropractic treatment for fibromyalgia. On June 8, 1999, the Board wrote an Order After Hearing and Stipulation.
The language in that Order is the center of this dispute. It states: 1.) Claimant's past treatment for fibromyalgia/myofacitis as outlined by Dr. Hobbs in her testimony is compensable and the Employer shall pay for the same in full. 2.) Claimant's ongoing treatment for fibromyalgia/myofacitis as outlined by Dr. Hobbs in her testimony is compensable and the Employer shall pay for the same in full. 3.) In the course of complying with paragraph two of this Order, should the Employer in good faith object to a particular expense as outside the scope of treatment described by Dr. Hobbs or that a particular expense is no longer necessary or is being charged at an unreasonable rate for like services, Employer shall provide written notice of denial to Claimant, through counsel, as to the specific charge or expense that Employer objects to, the grounds therefore, and shall pay any bills or reimbursements or portions thereof which are not subject to that specific objection.
On November 23, 1999, the Board stated that it would only authorize three additional months of chiropractic care and the Claimant appealed. On August 31, 2000, the Court reversed the Board's decision, holding that the Board had erroneously placed the burden of proof on the Claimant to show that the chiropractic treatment was compensable. Calloway v. DuPont, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-12-002, Stokes, J. (August 31, 2000). On December 28, 2000, the Board issued a Decision on Remand in which it denied DuPont's petition to terminate. On September 21, 2001, the Claimant requested another legal hearing, alleging that Dupont had failed to pay medical bills as required by the Board's decision. On October 22, 2001, the Board ordered the Claimant to present medical testimony that her treatment is reasonable, necessary, and causally related to her industrial accident. The Claimant filed a letter with the Board. On January 15, 2002, the Board issued an Order Following Re-argument, which denied the Claimant's reconsideration request. It then concluded that the issue of medical compensability requires a full trial with witnesses and medical experts rather than a brief legal hearing.
On April 9, 2002, the Claimant filed an Opening Brief with the Court arguing that DuPont had not offered any evidence that it had satisfied any of the three factors outlined in the June 1999 hearing. On April 24, 2002, DuPont filed its Answering Brief requesting that the Court affirm the orders of the Board. The Claimant filed a Reply Brief on May 3, 2002, reinstating her earlier charges.
DuPont feels the Board correctly held that the issue of medical expenses cannot be resolved in the context of a legal hearing because it requires the presentation of witnesses and other evidence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battisa v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super. 1986), app. dism., 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 29 Del. C. § 10142(d).
III. DISCUSSION OF LEGAL ISSUES
DuPont maintains that the Claimant is trying to coerce the Board into ordering it to pay the Claimant without the crucial testimony of medical experts. Yet, as the Board seems to be well aware, this would not be an appropriate resolution to this dispute. The Board held on October 22, 2001 that these "issues . . are not appropriate to be resolved during a routine legal hearing." Id. at 2. Later, on January 15, 2002, the Board held that the "determination of appropriate medical treatment must rest upon the findings and opinions of trained physicians and cannot be established by the testimony of one who is not trained to make such a determination." Id. at 6. See Lee v. A.C. S. Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 352 (Del.Super. 1987); Mountaire of Delmarva, Inc. v. Glacken, 487 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1984). As DuPont correctly states, the only function of the Superior Court is to ascertain that the Board acted properly by ruling that it cannot resolve the medical expenses dispute within the confines of a brief hearing. When the Board held that it does not possess the authority to make medical determinations without the advice of experts in the field, it indeed acted with prudence. The two Orders were thereby well- reasoned and correct. Furthermore, as DuPont duly notes, the Court may dismiss an appeal involving an unappealable interlocutory order pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 72(i).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court hereby affirms the order of the Board, and dismisses the Claimant's appeal. IT IS SO ORDERED.