Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CV-3008
March 31, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On May 8, 2003. Plaintiff David Callison ("Plaintiff) brought suit against his employer the City of Philadelphia ("City" or "Defendant") alleging that the City violated the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA" or "Act")), by interfering with the exercise of his rights under the Act and dismissing him in retaliation for his taking FMLA leave. Compl. ¶ 23. On January 20, 2004, the City moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Dkt. No. 18). After filing his brief in opposition to the City's Motion, on February 17, 2004, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on his interference claim. (Dkt. No. 20). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.
I. Factual Background A. Callison's Sick Leave
Plaintiff David Callison was hired by Defendant City of Philadelphia (the "City") on February 2, 1998, as a Heavy Duty Maintenance Technician in the City's Office of Fleet Management (the "OFM"). Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff had a commendable attendance record during his first two years with the OFM. In 2000, however, Plaintiff took twenty-six sick days after being diagnosed with deep anxiety reaction and stress. Deposition of David Callison ("D. Callison Dep."), Ex. D-4. As a result, on October 30, 2000, Plaintiff was placed on the "Sick Abuse List" pursuant to the City's Sick Leave Policy. Id., Ex. D-9.
The Sick Leave Policy provides that an employee who is out sick must remain at home during regular working hours and is subject to random checks by a sick leave investigator. City of Philadelphia OFM Employee Manual ("Employee Manual") at 27. If the employee needs to leave his or her home, the employee must notify the Sick Leave Hotline when leaving and upon return. Id. at 27. Plaintiff took a sick day on January 8, 2001, and was not home when the sick leave investigator called him. Deposition of Shelita Winfield ("Winfield Dep.") at 15; D. Callison Dep., Ex. D-4. The following day, Plaintiff called Ms. Winfield and left a message on her voicemail, disputing his placement on the Sick Abuse List. Id. at 16, Ex. Winfield-2; Personnel File of David Callison ("Personnel File") at 12-13.
The OFM's Personnel Assistant, Marion Colby, investigated Plaintiff's claim by reviewing all of Plaintiff's sick notes and comparing them against his attendance record. Deposition of Mary Colby ("Colby Dep.") at 24-25. During the course of her investigation, Ms. Colby noticed that the note signed by a Dr. Kuruvilla, which Plaintiff submitted in connection with his absence of August 3, 2000 (the "August Note"), appeared to be altered. Id. Specifically, the hand-written portion of note had been altered from "off work today 08/02/2000" to "off work today 08/03/2000." Deposition of Christina Derenick, Ex. Denerick-1. Ms. Colby asked her administrative assistant, Sherry Ferraro, to investigate the alteration of the August Note. Colby Dep. at 27. Ms. Ferraro contacted Dr. Kuruvilla, who stated that the August Note was indeed altered, and that neither she nor anyone in her office altered it. Deposition of Sherry Ferraro ("Ferraro Dep.") at 25; Exs. Ferraro 1-2; Colby Dep., Ex. 1.
On January 24, 2001, Plaintiff went on approved FMLA leave. Personnel File at 11. The City informed Plaintiff that while on FMLA leave, he was subject to the rules and regulations of the City's Sick Leave Policy. Id. A sick leave investigator called Plaintiff on January 29, 2001, and February 7, 2001, to ensure his compliance and, on both occasions, Plaintiff was not at home. Callison Dep., Exs. D-5, D-7. On February 21, 2001, the OFM notified Plaintiff that he was in violation of the City's Sick Leave Policy and that his punishment would be held in abeyance until he returned to work. Personnel File at 10.
The City approved Plaintiff's FMLA request on February 13, 2001, making it retroactive to January 23, 2001.
Upon his return from FMLA leave, Plaintiff received four days suspension without pay. Colby Dep. at 69-72. Ms. Colby also brought disciplinary charges against him for altering the August Note. Id. Plaintiff testified at his disciplinary hearing that someone in Dr. Kuruvilla's office had altered the August Note, but he was unable to offer any evidence in support of his testimony. Following the hearing, on May 17, 2001, Ms. Colby recommended that Plaintiff receive a thirty day suspension with intent to dismiss pursuant to Civil Service Regulation 21.06, which provides that "falsification of proof to justify such sick leave shall be cause for dismissal." D. Callison Dep., Exs. D-7, D-11. The OFM's Human Resource Manager, Christine Derenick approved Ms. Colby's recommendation. Id., Ex. D-7. Accordingly, the City suspended Plaintiff for thirty days beginning May 22, 2001, and dismissed him on June 21, 2001. Id.
Plaintiff appealed his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission. D. Callison Dep., Ex. D-6. Following a hearing at which Dr. Kuruvilla testified that she did not alter the August Note and Ms. Colby testified that she believed Plaintiff was responsible for the alteration, see id. at 14-16, 18-21, the Civil Service Commission denied Plaintiffs appeal. Civil Serv. Comm'n's Findings and Decision of Dec. 14, 2001 (No. 400SD).
B. Callison's Medical Insurance
In April 2001, Plaintiff's wife, Michelle Callison, brought the couple's son, Timothy, to the hospital. Deposition of Michelle Callison ("M. Callison Dep.") at 34. The hospital informed Mrs. Callison that their medical insurance had been cancelled. Id. Mrs. Callison called Plaintiff's union, District Council 33, which assured Mrs. Callison that their benefits would be reinstated. Id. at 36. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Callison contacted their insurance provider, Keystone Insurance Company ("Keystone"), to confirm the reinstatement of benefits. Id. at 42. Keystone advised Mrs. Callison that their benefits had not been reinstated, however. Id. After calling the union several times to no avail, on May 21, 2001, Mrs. Callison called the Department of Labor ("DOL") about their benefits. Id. at 43. The DOL informed Plaintiff and Mrs. Callison that their medical insurance had been cancelled because of a "clerical" error and that it had been reinstated. Id. at 44.
On the same day, Ms. Derenick received a call from the DOL, which informed her that Plaintiff had filed a FMLA complaint regarding the cancellation of his medical insurance. Deposition of Christine Derenick ("Derenick Dep.") at 40-41. Ms. Denerick informed the DOL that she had spoken with District Council 33 and was under the impression that the issue had been resolved. Id. She also explained that under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between District Council 33 and the City, the City is merely responsible for making monthly premium payments to District Council 33. Id. The City made these payments to District Council 33 on behalf of Plaintiff from January 2001 through June 2001. See Affidavit of Valerie Hayes ("Hayes Aff") ¶ 8.
Plaintiff became a member of District Council 33 on March 3, 1998, and the City stopped administering his health benefits on that date.
On May 22, 2001, Ms. Derenick contacted Plaintiff's union, which informed her that Plaintiff's benefits had been reinstated. Derenick Dep. at 41. She also confirmed that Plaintiff's union would ensure payment of any hospital bills Plaintiff incurred while his medical insurance was cancelled. Id. The following day, Ms. Denerick left a voicemail with the DOL, offering further assistance in the event that Plaintiff's benefits were not reinstated. Id.
Keystone ultimately paid for Timothy Callison's hospital bills. M. Callsion Dep. at 45-47.
III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c): see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). In reviewing the record, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor."Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the record discloses no genuine issues as to any material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). There is a genuine issue for trial "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Such affirmative evidence — regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial — must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989).IV. Analysis
Courts have recognized that the FMLA creates two distinct causes of action. See Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., 255 F. Supp.2d 417, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines. Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001) and Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2001)). First, it is unlawful under the FMLA for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or deny" an employee's right to take twelve weeks of FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2002). Claims pursued under this section are referred to as "interference" claims. See Marrero v. Camden City Bd. of Soc. Servs., 164 F. Supp.2d 455, 463 (D.N.J. 2001). Second, the FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by [ 29 U.S.C. § 2615]." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2002). This portion of the FMLA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has taken FMLA leave. See Marrero, 164 F. Supp.2d at 463. Plaintiff contends that the City interfered with his ability to take FMLA leave and dismissed him in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. The Court will address Plaintiff's arguments in turn.
A. Callison's Interference Claim
Interference claims are based on the prescriptive sections of the FMLA which create substantive rights for eligible employees. These rights set floors for conduct by employers. See Hodgens v. Gen Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159(lst Cir. 1998) (citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1997)). Interference claims "are not about discrimination." Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp.U, 234 F. Supp.2d 478, 485 (D.N.J. 2002). "The issue is simply whether the employer provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA — for example, a twelve-week leave or reinstatement after taking a medical leave." Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159.
To state a claim of interference, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was entitled to the benefit denied. See, e.g., Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of the City, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001). Looking at the Complaint and his briefs, it is difficult to even ascertain what benefits Plaintiff claims were denied to him by the City. Plaintiff was granted twelve workweeks of leave and upon returning to work, he was restored to his former position.
Relying on Marrero v. Camden County Bd. of Soc. Servs., Plaintiff argues that the City's Sick Leave Policy diminished his rights under the FMLA. 164 F. Supp.2d 463-64; see Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Br.") at 13-14. Marrero, however, is distinguishable. The employer in that case had a policy requiring employees to provide a doctor's certificate for any absences in excess of five consecutive days. Id. at 464. The FMLA, however, requires employers to give employees at least fifteen days to provide medical certification that the condition necessitates extended leave. Id. The court held that the employer's internal policies were invalid because they were in direct conflict with the provisions of the FMLA. Id. at 463-464. In this case, the City's requirement that an employee who is on FMLA Leave must call the Sick Leave Hotline when leaving home during regular working hours does not conflict with any substantive provisions of the FMLA.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the City's subjecting employees on FMLA leave to the rules and regulations of its Sick Leave Policy is inconsistent with the purpose of the FMLA. See Pl.'s Br. at 15-16. The stated purposes of the FMLA are: (1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families; (2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons; and (3) to accomplish these purposes in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(3). In the Court's view, these goals are not compromised because the City requires employees on FMLA leave to notify the Sick Leave Hotline when leaving home during regular working hours. Indeed, the requirement neither prevents employees from taking FMLA leave nor discourages employees from taking such leave. It simply ensures that employees do not abuse their FLMA leave.
B. Callison's Retaliation Claim
Retaliation claims are based on the "proscriptive rights" of the FMLA which prevents an employer from discriminating against an employee who has taken FMLA leave. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the adverse action and Plaintiff's exercise of his FMLA rights. See Campetti v. Career Educ. Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-CV-1349, 2003 WL 21961438, at *14 (E.D.Pa. June 25, 2003) (citing Alfiano v. Merck Co., Inc., 175 F. Supp.2d 792, 795 (E.D.Pa. 2001)). Assuming for summary judgment purposes only that Plaintiff satisfies the first two elements of his prime facie case, the City argues that there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Plaintiffs dismissal was causally connected to his taking FMLA leave. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mem.") at 7-10. The Court agrees.
As with other claims of discrimination, retaliation claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-6, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Accordingly, upon establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him or her and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1065-67 (3d Cir. 1996). Once the employer demonstrates that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual. Id.
Plaintiff was dismissed pursuant to Civil Service Regulation 21.06 for falsifying the August Note. His dismissal was not an unusually harsh punishment. Civil Service Regulation 21.06 mandates the dismissal of an employee who falsifies proof of sick leave. Moreover, there was nothing "suspicious"about the events surrounding Plaintiff's dismissal. See Pl.'s Br. at 20-21. Ms. Colby discovered that the August Note had been altered before Plaintiff took FMLA leave, and she recommended that Plaintiff be dismissed prior to his filing a FMLA complaint with the DOL. Although there may be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff actually altered the note, see Derenick Dep. at 55, there is no evidence to link Plaintiff's dismissal to his taking FMLA leave.
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the City waited sixteen days to issue a written warning to him for violating its Sick Leave Policy on January 24, 2001; the first day of his FMLA leave. See Pl's Br. at 21. Plaintiff, however, fails to mention that as of January 24, 2001, his request for FMLA leave had not yet been approved by the City. Indeed, the City approved his request for FMLA leave on February 13, 2001, and made such leave retroactive to January 24, 2001. See Personnel File at 11.
Nor is there any evidence connecting Plaintiff's suspensions to his taking FMLA leave. Plaintiff was suspended without pay for violating the City's Sick Leave Policy. Significantly, the City held in abeyance his suspensions until he returned from FMLA leave in April 2001. See Campetti, 2003 WL 21961438, at *14 (holding that there was no evidence to connect the plaintiff's discharge to his taking FMLA-approved leave, in part, because the plaintiff's employer did not question him about sexual harassment allegations brought against him by several co-workers until he returned to work).
The Court also rejects Plaintiff's claim that the City "admitted" it violated Plaintiff's proscriptive rights by "canceling [his] health benefits during and after he took approved FMLA leave." See Pl.'s Br. at 22. Plaintiff's argument is based on nothing more than the mischaracterization of Ms. Derenick's testimony. He offers no evidence that the City cancelled his medical coverage or was responsible for administering his benefits. On the other hand, the Callisons' calling District Council 33, Keystone and the DOL, but not the City, upon learning their medical coverage had been cancelled, suggests they were aware that the City played no role its cancellation.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, this day of March, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 18), Plaintiff's response thereto, and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 20), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 18) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 20) is DENIED.
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant City of Philadelphia and against Plaintiff Daniel Callison.
4. The Clerk is directed to statistically close this matter.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of March, 2003, it is hereby ORDERED that in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment be entered in favor of Defendant, City of Philadelphia, and against Plaintiff, David Callison.It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court statistically close this matter.