Abuse of the qualified privilege is a determination to be made by the trier of fact. Calleon v. Miyagi and MTL, Inc., 76 Hawai'i 310, 319, 876 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1994); Vlasaty at 562, 670 P.2d 827.

However, a qualified privilege is conditional and is lost by "[(1)] excessive publication, [(2)] use of the occasion for an improper purpose, or [(3)] lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what is said." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai`i 310, 319, 876 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1994); see Kainz v. Lussier, 4 Haw. App. 400, 405, 667 P.2d 797, 802 (1983). Cross-Appellants state that a qualified privilege applied to their statements because they filed their reports pursuant to the Hospital policies, and HRS §§ 346-222 (1993) and 346-224 (1993) impose a legal duty to report all suspected incidents of patient abuse and neglect to the Department of Human Services.

See also Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Haw.) Ltd., 76 Haw. 454, 466 n. 13, 879 P.2d 1037, 1049 n. 13 (1994); Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 320 n. 6, 876 P.2d 1278, 1288 n. 6 (1994). "[R]ecovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress by one not physically injured," however, "is generally permitted only when there is 'some physical injury to . . . a person' resulting from the defendant's conduct."

Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were "unreasonable." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 321 n. 7, 876 P.2d 1278, 1289 (1994), as amended, 76 Haw. 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994); Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 467, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982); Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937, 947 (1991). An act is "unreasonable" if it is "'without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.]'" Chedester, 64 Haw. at 468, 643 P.2d at 535 (quoting Fraser v. Blue Cross Animal Hosp., 39 Haw. 370, 375 (1952)).

Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were "unreasonable." Ross, 76 Hawaii at 465, 879 P.2d 1037 (citing Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 321 n. 7, 876 P.2d 1278 (1994), as amended, 76 Hawaii 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994); Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 467, 643 P.2d 532 (1982); Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937 (1991)). "An act is unreasonable if it is without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.

Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were "unreasonable." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 321 n. 7, 876 P.2d 1278, 1289 (Sup. 1994), as amended, 76 Haw. 453, 879 P.2d 558 (Sup. 1994); Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 467, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982); Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937, 947 (1991). An act is "unreasonable" if it is " `without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.]

[r]ecovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were "unreasonable." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 321 n. 7, 876 P.2d 1278, 1289[, n. 7] (Sup. 1994), as amended, 76 Haw. 453, 879 P.2d 558 (Sup. 1994); Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 467, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982); Marshall v. University of Hawai'i, 9 Haw. App. 21, 38, 821 P.2d 937, 947 (1991). An act is "unreasonable" if it is "`without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.]

In keeping with these principles, Haw.'s appellate courts have implemented the clear and convincing standard of proof in a myriad of situations. See, e.g., Carr v. Strode, 79 Haw. 475, 904 P.2d 489 (1995) (proof to overcome presumption of paternity); State v. Miller, 79 Haw. 194, 900 P.2d 770 (1995) (proof to establish that criminal defendant is not a flight risk or danger to the community); State v. Lopez, 78 Haw. 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995) (inevitable discovery rule); Cresencia v. Kim, 10 Haw. App. 461, 878 P.2d 725 (1994) (fraud); Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 876 P.2d 1278 (1994) (punitive damages); Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 832 P.2d 259 (1992) (constructive trust); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rapp, 70 Haw. 539, 777 P.2d 710 (1989) (professional misconduct); Chan v. Chan, 7 Haw. App. 122, 748 P.2d 807 (1987) (civil contempt); Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 66 Haw. 133, 658 P.2d 312 (1983) (defamation); Woodruff v. Keale, 64 Haw. 85, 637 P.2d 760 (1981) (termination of parental rights); Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu, 2 Haw. App. 102, 626 P.2d 1175 (1981) (proof that government official acted with malice); Boteilho v. Boteilho, 58 Haw. 40, 564 P.2d 144 (1977) (oral contract for sale of real estate). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that claims based on wilful and wanton misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

§ 386-5 (1993) provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries; (b) "Donnaleah's compensable work-related injuries were properly paid" and terminated in accordance with HRS § 386-31(b), that the February 1, 1999 and April 7, 2000 Decisions of the Director demonstrated that their actions were proper, and "[i]f Donnaleah is not satisfied with the decision of the DLIR Appeals Board the proper procedural step is to seek judicial review pursuant to HRS § 386-88"; (c) CMI cannot tortiously interfere with a contract between STI and Donnaleah because "[CMI] administrates workers' compensation claims on behalf of [STI]"; (d) there is no negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress because "damages for emotional distress will rarely, if ever, be recoverable for breaches of an employment contract[,]" Francis v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 89 Haw. 234, 242, 971 P.2d 707, 715 (1999) (emphasis in the original), and the underlying wrongful negligent or intentional action required by Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Haw. 310, 320, 876 P.2d 1278, 1288 (1994), is lacking; (e) the conversion count fails "[b]ecause no tangible property is even alleged to have been converted"; (f) no violation of equal protection is alleged because "[the Galdeiras] have not alleged (1) that they are members of a racial minority or (2) that Defendants intended to discriminate on the basis of race"; (g) no RICO violation is alleged because "[t]here are no allegations in the Complaint identifying a RICO enterprise, a pattern of racketeering, or injury to [the Galdeiras'] business or property"; and (h) "[i]n the absence of any viable cause of action by Donnaleah . . ., there is no right to a derivative claim of loss of consortium for her husband." HRS § 386-5 (1993) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Nonetheless, Lalawai-Cruz's IIED claims were properly dismissed, because he has adduced no evidence to establish that the defendants committed any independent intentional conduct that was "beyond all bounds of decency." See Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai'i 310, 876 P.2d 1278, 1288, 1289 n. 7 (1994) (quoting Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982)). Finally, Lalawai-Cruz's conspiracy claims were also properly dismissed.