Opinion
15-P-920
04-27-2016
ANDREW A. CAFFREY, JR. v. U.S. TRUST & another, coexecutors.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a hearing, a judge denied the plaintiff, Andrew A. Caffrey, Jr.'s, petition seeking attorney's fees under G. L. c. 215, § 39A, for work he had previously performed as counsel for the defendant estate. On appeal, Caffrey asserts that the judge erred as a matter of law in: (1) finding and ruling that Caffrey was entitled to $16,263.65 of the $24,088.65 Caffrey claimed the estate owed; and (2) denying Caffrey's claim for prejudgment interest, as well as fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the action. We affirm.
"At any time during the administration of an estate, and irrespective of the pendency of a particular proceeding, the probate court shall have power to hear an application for, and fix and determine, the compensation and expenses of an attorney for services rendered to the estate or to its representative or to a devisee, legatee, distributee or any other person interested therein." G. L. c. 215, § 39A, inserted by St. 1947, c. 536.
Because there was no written fee agreement, the fees were apparently awarded on quantum meruit grounds.
1. Attorney's fees. Caffrey first argues that the judge "unduly minimized" some relevant factors in determining whether Caffrey's fee was fair and reasonable, and instead gratuitously focused on his time spent on work for the estate and the lack of documentation to support awarding approximately two-thirds of the fees Caffrey sought. Furthermore, he asserts that the judge "adopted a conservative principle of reimbursement inappropriate in the circumstances," and made a clearly erroneous finding that the executors had asked for an itemization in 2005. We disagree.
A probate judge "has broad discretion to determine an appropriate award of fees . . . to an attorney for services rendered to an estate." Matter of the Estate of Rosen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 801 (2014). "The question of what is fair and reasonable compensation for legal services rendered is one of fact for a trial judge to decide." Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18, 23 (1986). Here, the judge considered many of the factors pertinent in assessing a reasonable fee, and did not rely solely on the number of hours Caffrey spent working on the estate, or the lack of documentation thereof. See Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 284 Mass. 563, 569 (1933). With regard to the many pertinent factors to be considered in determining appropriate compensation, no one factor is decisive; rather, "[t]he weight to be given to each of them will vary according to the nature of the services rendered in the particular instance under examination." Mulhern v. Roach, supra at 24-25, quoting from McLaughlin v. Old Colony Trust Co., 313 Mass. 329, 335 (1943). Indeed, the judge's findings discuss Caffrey's time spent on the estate, but they also consider his reasonable hourly rate, the limited work remaining for the estate following Caffrey's discharge, and that his services were "not usual and customary[,] but rather more complicated than a simple estate."
"[M]any considerations are pertinent, including the ability and reputation of the attorney, the demand for his services by others, the amount and importance of the matter involved, the time spent, the prices usually charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same neighborhood, the amount of money or the value of the property affected by controversy, and the results secured." Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 284 Mass. 563, 569 (1933).
Caffrey did not submit an itemized bill until 2011, when ordered to do so by another Probate Court judge. The bill, which was reconstructed by Caffrey from his file, sought payment for 120 hours of work at an hourly rate of $190-$200, totaling $24,088.65, the same amount as his original bill.
With regard to Caffrey's claim that the judge's finding of a demand for itemization in 2005 was clearly erroneous, the record supports the finding in the form of a letter to Caffrey from the estate's attorney expressing concern that his fee request did not include "detailed contemporaneous itemizing." Accordingly, the finding is not clearly erroneous, and the judge's findings support the award of a reduced fee. The judge did not abuse his "broad discretion." Matter of the Estate of Rosen, supra.
2. Prejudgment interest. Caffrey also claims that the judge erred when he failed to award prejudgment interest on the fee award, claiming that interest is required by application of G. L. c. 231, § 6C. We disagree. In this instance, Caffrey filed his suit under G. L. c. 215, § 39A, which governs counsel fees in the probate court. Because neither § 39A itself, nor any case law decided under the statute provides for prejudgment interest on an award of attorney's fees, we decline to interpret § 39A as requiring such interest here. Furthermore, G. L. c. 231, § 6C, affords interest in actions based on contractual obligations; this is not a contract action. In any event, even if the action were based on a valid contract, the probate court lacks jurisdiction over such claims. See G. L. c. 215, §§ 2-3. Therefore, Caffrey is not entitled to any prejudgment interest on his award of attorney's fees.
3. Fees and costs. Finally, Caffrey claims the judge erred in refusing to award attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this matter pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 45, which permits costs and expenses "in the discretion of the court . . . as justice and equity may require." We disagree. As the judge possesses a broad degree of discretion in such matters, his decision "may be presumed to be right and ordinarily ought not to be disturbed." Matter of the Estate of King, 455 Mass. 796, 805 (2010), quoting from Smith v. Smith, 361 Mass. 733, 738 (1972) ("[T]he words [of § 45], and standard, still pay homage to the usual American rule against an automatic award of fees to the prevailing party, and require a reason, grounded in equity, why an award shifting fees should be made"). Given the discretionary nature of § 45, nothing in the record suggests the judge erred in refusing Caffrey's claim.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Meade & Carhart, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: April 27, 2016.