Opinion
03-22-00083-CV
07-12-2023
Caddo Mills Independent School District and Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education, Appellants v. Steven Sumrow, Appellee
FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-20-001907, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Jones [*]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOODFIN JONES, JUSTICE
After the superintendent of Caddo Mills Independent School District (the District) reassigned appellee Steven Sumrow from his position as the District's Athletic Director to a teaching position, Sumrow challenged the reassignment pursuant to the District's grievance procedure. The District's board of trustees voted to deny his complaint, and the state's Commissioner of Education affirmed the District's decision. See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a)(2)(A). Sumrow filed suit in the district court of Travis County seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's order. See id. § 7.057(d). The trial court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The District and Commissioner perfected this appeal. We will reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment affirming the Commissioner's order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the 2017-18 school year, Sumrow was employed by the District under a term contract and was assigned to a position as the District's Athletic Director. In February 2018, before the end of the 2017-18 school year, the District offered to renew Sumrow's employment contract. Sumrow accepted the offer and executed a two-year Term Contract for the school years 2018-19 and 2019-20. Among the contract's terms and conditions were the following:
Although Sumrow's previous term contracts are not part of the administrative record, the Commissioner noted in its decision that, in an appeal against a school district brought pursuant to Texas Education Code Section 7.057, the evidence in the local record is everything considered by the school board in making its decision; that Sumrow referenced his fifteen-year employment as Athletic Director under term contracts at each level of the grievance process and at the hearing before the board of trustees; and that this fact could have been readily controverted but was not. Moreover, no party disputes that Sumrow was employed by the District under a term contract for the 2017-18 school year.
1. Position. The District agrees to employ Steve Sumrow as a Certified Administrator.
3.1 Certification and Licensure Requirement. You agree to provide, before your start date each school year, the certification, service records, licenses, and other records and information required by state and federal law, the Texas Education Agency (TEA), the State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC), or the District. You agree to maintain any applicable certification, permit or licensure requirements throughout the term of the Contract. If you fail to fulfill the requirements necessary to extend a temporary or emergency permit, or if your certification or permit expires, is cancelled, is relinquished, is suspended, or is revoked, the District may provide you with notice that this Contact is void pursuant to Texas Education Code section 21.0031.
5.3 Assignment/Reassignment. You understand that the District has the right to assign or reassign you to positions, duties, or additional duties and to make changes in responsibilities, work, or transfers, at any time during this Contract.
6.1 Salary. The District shall pay you according to the compensation plan adopted by the Board each school year....
As in previous years, the District initially assigned Sumrow to the position of the District's Athletic Director for the 2018-19 school year. In January 2019, however, the superintendent notified Sumrow that his assignment was changed from Athletic Director to a teacher at the District's Disciplinary Alternative Education Center (DAEC). The notice informed Sumrow that his salary for the remainder of the 2018-19 school year would continue at $93,966.00, the level it had been during his assignment as Athletic Director, but that for the 2019-20 school year his salary would be commensurate with his assignment as a teacher at DAEC.
Sumrow challenged the change in assignment from Athletic Director to teacher pursuant to the District's three-level grievance procedure. When his grievance was denied at level one by the superintendent and at level two by the District's board of trustees, Sumrow filed a petition for review with the Commissioner. See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a)(2)(A) (granting right to appeal to Commissioner of Education to person aggrieved by decision of school district board of trustees that violates "school laws of this state" or violates provision of written employment contract if violation causes monetary harm to employee). Sumrow's petition to the Commissioner included the following two complaints:
• The District "did not give any notice to [him] of any proposal to nonrenew his contract at any time," and, consequently, "was required to employ him during the 2018-2019 school year in the same professional capacity as that in which he served during the 2017-2018 school year." Sumrow alleged that changing his assignment from Athletic Director to teacher violated his right under Texas Education Code Section 21.206 to "be employed in the same professional capacity for the 2018-2019 school year."
• Assigning him to a position "with considerably less authority and duties and responsibilities, and at a lower position on the district's salary schedule" constituted a demotion in violation of Sumrow's written employment contract.
After a hearing, the Commissioner determined that the District did not violate either the school laws of the state or any provision of Sumrow's written employment contract with the District and dismissed his appeal. Sumrow then filed this suit for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. See id. § 7.057(d) (granting right to judicial review to person aggrieved by decision of Commissioner of Education).
In his petition in the trial court, Sumrow raised the same two complaints he had asserted in his petition for review before the Commissioner: (1) a violation of Section 21.206 of the Education Code, and (2) a violation of the terms of his contract. In a subsequent trial brief, however, Sumrow represented to the court that "[t]he sole issue in this administrative appeal is whether Mr. Sumrow's reassignment from the position of Athletic Director to teacher at the alternative school breached his contract of employment as a 'Certified Administrator.'"
Sumrow argued that he had been employed as a "Certified Administrator" under term contracts with the District for fifteen years, during each of which he had been assigned to the position of the District's Athletic Director. He asserted that during the 2018-19 school year, the District "suddenly claimed that he could not serve in the position of Athletic Director because he was not a 'Certified Administrator'; i.e., he did not have an administrator's certificate." Relying on the then-effective regulations promulgated by the State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC), Sumrow argued that his teacher's certificate was all that was required for him to be assigned as Athletic Director. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 231.643(d) (since repealed) (Tex. Bd. for Educator Certification, Administrators and Other Instructional and Professional Support Personnel) (providing that "[a]n assignment for Athletic Director is allowed with a teacher certificate"). Thus, Sumrow asserts, he met the qualifications to be employed as a "Certified Administrator" as his contract required, and the District violated that contract when it removed him as Athletic Director and assigned him to a teacher position.
The District countered that the term "Certified Administrator" in Sumrow's employment contract means a person who holds an administrator certificate and, because he did not have an administrator certificate, Sumrow could not continue employment as a "Certified Administrator." The District asserted that, because there was no "Certified Administrator" position that Sumrow had the certification to hold, it assigned him to a position that he did have the proper certification for-a teacher position. Regarding Sumrow's argument that the SBEC rules permit a person holding a teacher certificate to have an Athletic Director assignment, the District pointed to the Commissioner's determination that "[a] school district has the authority to require administrator certification for the Athletic Director position."
After a hearing, the trial court reversed the Commissioner's order and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The court's Final Judgment recited as its sole finding that "the Commissioner of Education's construction of the employment contract between Steven Sumrow and Caddo Mills Independent School District was erroneous as a matter of law, arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence." The District and the Commissioner perfected this appeal, contending that the Commissioner properly determined that the District's assignment of Sumrow to the position of DAEC teacher did not constitute a violation of his employment contract.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Our review of the Commissioner's decision is governed by the substantial-evidence rule set forth in Section 2001.174 of the Texas Government Code. See Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.174; Poole v. Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist., 344 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, no pet.) (concluding that substantial-evidence standard of review applies to scope of judicial review of Commissioner decisions). Review under the substantial-evidence rule is highly deferential to the agency's decision. See North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Riou, 598 S.W.3d 243, 251 (Tex. 2020) ("Review under the substantial-evidence rule is highly deferential-the issue is not whether the agency's decision is correct, but whether the record demonstrates a reasonable basis for it."). "At its core, the substantial evidence rule is a reasonableness test or a rational basis test." Id. at 251 n.30 (quoting City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994)). Thus, the evidence "may preponderate against the decision of the agency and nonetheless amount to substantial evidence." Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dall., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). This rule precludes courts from "usurping the agency's adjudicative authority even though the court would have struck a different balance." Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251 (quoting Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1988)). We apply this analysis without granting deference to the trial court's judgment. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). We presume the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions are supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on the contestant to demonstrate otherwise. See Charter Med.-Dall., 665 S.W.2d at 453. Ultimately, we are concerned not with the correctness of the agency's decision, but its reasonableness. See Harrison v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, No. 03-18-00229-CV, 2020 WL 370886, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Did the District's actions violate Section 21.206?
It appears that Sumrow abandoned his Section 21.206 argument in the trial court by representing to the court that the "sole issue" was whether his reassignment by the District violated his contract. In its judgment, the trial court made no finding as to any violation of Section 21.206 or other state law. Even if Sumrow did not abandon the Section 21.206 issue, however, the argument fails, as discussed below.
Sumrow argued to the Commissioner that his reassignment by the District was improper because the DAEC position to which he was reassigned was not in the same "professional capacity" as Athletic Director. He relied on Texas Education Code Section 21.206, which is part of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act (TCNA). See Tex. Educ. Code §§ 21.201.211. Before the Legislature enacted the TCNA, a school district could choose not to renew a teacher's term contract for the following year without providing any reason. See Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 856 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. 1993). Contract renewal decisions were left to the "unfettered discretion of school districts." Id. The TCNA, which the Legislature enacted in 1981, provides for automatic renewal of a teacher's term contract unless the employing district provides the teacher with notice of the preestablished reasons for nonrenewal and a hearing. See id. (citing Tex. Educ. Code §§ 21.201-.211). Specifically, Section 21.206(a) provides that, not later than the 10th day before the last day of instruction in a school year, the school district's board of trustees must notify any teacher whose contract is about to expire "whether the board proposes to renew or not renew the contract." Tex. Educ. Code § 21.206(a). The board's failure to provide a teacher with notification of renewal or nonrenewal "constitutes an election to employ the teacher in the same professional capacity for the following school year." Id. § 21.206(b).
Sumrow's reliance on Section 21.206 and the TCNA is misplaced. The administrative record shows that the District did not breach a duty to provide Sumrow with notice of nonrenewal of his term contract before it expired at the end of the 2018 school year because the District did in fact renew his contract for the 2018-19 school year-an offer that Sumrow accepted, resulting in the execution of a new Term Contract for the next two school years. In school-law lingo, the District did not "nonrenew" Sumrow's contract.
The Section 21.206(b) requirement to employ a teacher in the "same professional capacity" for the following school year applies only when a contract is about to expire and timely notice of nonrenewal is not given. See id. § 21.206(a), (b); Grounds, 856 S.W.2d at 420 (recognizing that TCNA was specifically designed "to give teachers due process rights when a school district decides not to renew the teacher's contract of employment"); see also Martinez v. Rio Grande City Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 040-R3-03-2018, 2018 WL 4931938, at *3 (Comm'r Educ. Sep. 17, 2018) ("[T]he requirement to employ a teacher in the same professional capacity is triggered only when a contract is about to expire and timely notice of proposed nonrenewal is not given."). Accordingly, the District did not violate Section 21.206.
Did the District's actions violate Sumrow's contract?
As quoted above, Sumrow's contract expressly provided that he was employed as a "Certified Administrator" and that he would "maintain any applicable certification" through the term of his employment contract. Whether state law or regulation requires an athletic director to be a "certified administrator" is inconsequential here because Sumrow's contract required him to have and maintain that certification. It is undisputed that Sumrow held a teacher certificate but did not hold an administrator certificate. According to the District, it reassigned Sumrow to a teacher position because of his lack of administrator certification. Both parties spend a substantial part of their appellate briefs arguing about whether the District had the right to reassign him based on his lack of certification as an administrator. And it is true that Sumrow may have been in violation of a basic requirement of his contract. At the end of the day, however, that issue is immaterial.
As quoted above, section 5.3 of Sumrow's contract expressly provided that "the District has the right to assign or reassign you to positions, duties, or additional duties and to make changes in responsibilities, work, or transfers, at any time during this Contract." The contract contained no restrictions on the District's right to reassign him. Nor did the contract specify what his position or salary would be. Thus, the renewed contract's own terms permitted the District to reassign Sumrow to a new position even if the salary was lower. Therefore, the Commissioner's determination that the District's reassignment of Sumrow was permitted by the terms of the contract is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the reassignment, which occurred in January 2019, did not result in any reduction in salary for the remainder of the 2018-19 school year, although it did result in a reduction for the 2019-20 school year. With regard to the 2019-20 school year salary reduction, however, Sumrow was notified of the reduction in his salary long before the end of the 2018-19 school year. This was sufficient notice to comply with the requirement that a school district must inform a teacher of a reduction in pay before the teacher loses the right to unilaterally resign from an employment contract. See Ector Cnty. TSTNA/NEA v. Alanis, No. 03-02-00056-CV, 2002 WL 31386061, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 24, 2002, pet. denied) (op., not designated for publication) (noting that school district may not reduce teacher's salary "after a teacher may no longer unilaterally resign from a contract"); see also Brajenovich v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 021-R10-1106, 2009 WL 10662215, at *2 (Comm'r Educ. Jan. 1, 2009) ("[T]eacher pay can be reduced but . . . districts are required to inform teachers of reductions in pay before teachers lose the right to unilaterally resign from their contracts."); Hughes v. Lancaster Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 048-R3-0112 (Comm'r Educ. Aug. 30, 2013) (available at https://tealprod.tea.state.tx.us/Tea.Lhad.Web/ ("A school district may reduce a teacher's total salary if the teacher is given notice of the salary reduction at a time when the teacher can unilaterally withdraw from the teaching contract.")).
Teachers may unilaterally resign from their employment contract up until 45 days before the start of the next school year. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.210(a) ("A teacher employed under a term contract with a school district may relinquish the teaching position and leave the employment of the district at the end of a school year without penalty by filing a written resignation with the board of trustees or the board's designee not later than the 45th day before the first day of instruction of the following school year.").
Here, the Commissioner determined that Sumrow was provided with sufficient and timely notice of the reduction of his salary for the 2019-20 school year such that it did not constitute a violation of any school laws or his contract. We hold that the Commissioner's determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record, which indicates that Sumrow was notified at the time of his reassignment in January 2019 that his salary for the 2019-20 school year would be commensurate with his assignment as a teacher at DAEC. We also hold that the Commissioner's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. See Texas Comm'n on Env't Quality v. Friends of Dry Comal Creek, ____ S.W.3d ____, 2023 WL 2733426, at *6 (Tex. App.- Austin Mar. 31, 2023, no pet. h.) (discussing when agency's action that is found to be supported by substantial evidence may nonetheless be arbitrary and capricious).
CONCLUSION
Having held that the Commissioner's determination that the District did not violate the terms of Sumrow's contract or the school laws of the state was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment affirming the Commissioner's order.
CONCURRING OPINION
Gisela D. Triana, Justice
I agree with the Court's analysis and its conclusion that the language of the contract requires us to affirm the Commissioner's order. I write separately to express my view that the school district's abrupt change in its course of dealing with an educator who had been employed by the district for 15 years in the same position, absent any cause, is the type of unfair surprise that borders on being unconscionable. While there may be legitimate reasons justifying the inclusion of the term allowing reassignment, the school district's execution of the reassignment here, which it attempted to justify by requiring an additional certification that had not previously been required, is disturbing.
[*] Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code § 74.003(b).