Opinion
A165635
11-29-2023
LUIS CACERES et al. Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Francisco City &County Super. Ct. No. CGC-20-582176)
MARGULIES, ACTING P. J.
Plaintiff Luis Caceres was struck and injured by a vehicle while crossing the street at the intersection of San Jose Avenue and Niagara Avenue in San Francisco. Caceres and his wife, plaintiff Kimberley Caceres, sued the City and County of San Francisco (City) and others, alleging his accident was proximately caused by various defects in the intersection that rendered it a dangerous condition. The City moved successfully for summary judgment on the basis that the intersection was not a dangerous condition as a matter of law, and it was protected by design immunity. Plaintiffs contest these findings on appeal. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
San Jose Avenue, which runs north and south, contains both vehicular traffic and San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (MUNI) buses and light rail traffic. It contains an unspecified downhill grade northbound. San Jose Avenue is intersected by Niagara Avenue, which runs east and west. A separate additional lane, referred to as the "San Jose Avenue frontage road" connects to, and terminates at, the San Jose/Niagara intersection adjacent to the two San Jose Avenue northbound lanes. The San Jose/Niagara intersection is controlled by four-way stop signs and contains four marked crosswalks. The intersection does not contain any traffic control lights or pedestrian walk signals. There is a MUNI bus stop on the northwest side of the intersection.
Plaintiffs assert the Balboa Park Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station is located northwest of the intersection with both pedestrian and vehicular entrances from the intersection at issue. However, the BART station is located on the north side of Geneva Avenue, a block north and a block west of the subject intersection.
Sidewalks runs adjacent to San Jose Avenue and, as relevant to this appeal, trees are present adjacent to the southwest sidewalk furthest from the roadway.
Caceres was attempting to cross the southern crosswalk across San Jose Avenue at the time of the incident. Chi Kong Cheung, the driver of the vehicle that struck Caceres, was driving west on Niagara Avenue and came to a complete stop at the intersection stop sign. While stopped, Cheung looked left and saw the southern crosswalk and a northbound car stopped at the crosswalk on San Jose Avenue. He also looked right and saw a southbound car stopped on the opposite side of San Jose Avenue. All three cars at the intersection were stopped. Cheung waited until the car on his right was midway through the intersection on San Jose Avenue before he proceeded into the intersection to turn left. Cheung looked again to his left as he was in the process of turning onto San Jose Avenue. He was approximately two car lengths from the crosswalk. He saw a pedestrian (not Caceres) in the crosswalk, crossing San Jose Avenue toward Niagara Avenue.
After the pedestrian cleared the crosswalk, Cheung continued his lefthand turn. Cheung subsequently struck Caceres while he was crossing San Jose Avenue. Cheung acknowledged there was nothing blocking his view of the crosswalk at the time of the incident. He did not know if Caceres was in the pedestrian crosswalk or in the shaded or sunny part of the crosswalk because he did not see him before hitting him. Cheung stated the sun was in his eyes when he struck Caceres.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City, alleging causes of action for premises liability, dangerous condition of public property, and loss of consortium. As relevant to this appeal, the complaint alleged the City "designed, engineered, constructed, inspected, owned, stripped [sic] and signed, failed to stripe and sign, operated, controlled, and/or maintained the roadway upon which this collision occurred .... The conditions at the location of the collision site were such that a pedestrian using the crosswalk with due care . . . would not perceive the dangerous condition and that the conditions would lead a reasonable pedestrian using the crosswalk with due care to feel they were safe, be unaware of the dangerous condition and the risks that it caused, and therefore create a trap for unwary pedestrians such as [Caceres]." Plaintiffs alleged the allegedly dangerous condition was created by the City, and the City had constructive notice of the condition prior to the incident.
The complaint also alleged general negligence and negligent operation of a motor vehicle against the driver, Cheung. However, Cheung settled the claims against him, and he is not a party to this appeal.
The City filed a motion for summary judgment. The City argued plaintiffs failed to allege any defect inherent in the crosswalk. Rather, the City asserted the accident was caused by Cheung being temporarily unable to see due to the sun. The City further asserted it was entitled to design immunity even if the crosswalk constituted a dangerous condition.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion. They first asserted the City failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the intersection was not a dangerous condition. Plaintiffs argued Caceres's injuries were proximately caused by the unusual and dangerous design of the intersection, as evidenced by the intersection's collision history and citizen complaints, and the City was aware of that danger. Plaintiffs also argued the City failed to establish a defense of design immunity because the plan relied upon by the City did not reflect the actual design or construction of the intersection.
In support of their opposition, plaintiffs submitted expert declarations from Tate Kubose, Ph.D., a cognitive psychologist, and William Kunzman, P.E., a traffic engineer. Kubose noted the intersection involved "a relatively large number of areas from which potential vehicular traffic may approach," pedestrian traffic, MUNI vehicles, and potential visibility issues, all of which required drivers to "scan in several locations, potentially multiple times." Kubose explained, "Given limitations in the human visual and attentional systems, it is not possible to monitor all of these areas simultaneously and/or continuously" and "hazards may appear at a previously scanned location while the driver or pedestrian is scanning other areas." He stated "the relatively high attentional and memory demand is also a function of the utilization of stop signs, as opposed to traffic signals," which creates ambiguity for both drivers and pedestrians about who may be entering the intersection or traversing the roadway. Kubose thus concluded, "The visual, attentional, and cognitive demands associated with traversing the incident intersection at the time of the incident were a likely contributing factor to the collision between Mr. Caceres and Mr. Cheung."
Kunzman's declaration noted the intersection had "a high volume of pedestrian, car traffic, bus traffic, and light rail traffic," "with traffic entering and exiting from fifteen points." Kunzman concluded, "[T]he features of the intersection and the surrounding area created a dangerous condition . . . including: high pedestrian; high bus and other road vehicle traffic; high light rail traffic; and a visually confusing multi-leg intersection." He further stated cars turning left onto southbound San Jose Avenue "had multiple visual obstructions," such as "passing vehicular traffic and MUNI [light rail vehicles]." Kunzman noted various challenges for drivers, including looking for vehicular and pedestrian traffic, shadows from trees on a portion of the crosswalk, a sloped grade to San Jose Avenue, the San Jose Avenue frontage road connecting to the south side of the intersection, and the curved feature of Niagara Avenue west of San Jose Avenue. Kunzman further noted none of the documents submitted by the City in connection with its motion considered the BART "Kiss and Ride" area, the parking lot, or other visual distractions or traffic engineering factors when assessing pedestrian safety or the intersection's design.
The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court identified the following undisputed facts: (1) Caceres was crossing San Jose Avenue in the southern crosswalk when he was hit by Cheung's vehicle; (2) Cheung had driven through the intersection at issue over 100 times; (3) the sun was in Cheung's eyes when he hit Caceres; (4) Cheung did not see Caceres before the collision; (5) Caceres was in the crosswalk when he was struck; and (6) the features of the intersection were documented in a plan entitled" 'San Jose Avenue Ocean Avenue to Alemany Blvd. Traffic Striping File STR 3921-22,'" which was drawn and approved by City engineers.
Based on these facts, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument and concluded they "cannot show that there was a dangerous condition of public property, or that any such condition, rather than harmful conduct by a third party, caused his injuries." The court noted plaintiffs failed to allege any physical defects, and the lack of a traffic control light did not create a dangerous condition.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the record did not draw a causal link between the sun being in Cheung's eyes and his collision with Caceres. They further argued Cheung's testimony about the confusing nature of the intersection was accidentally omitted from their opposition papers. Specifically, plaintiffs referenced Cheung's statements that there "were a lot of cars around [the time of the incident] at that intersection" and "a lot . . . going on around that area." Finally, plaintiffs asserted they erroneously responded" 'Undisputed'" to the City's material fact which read, "The sun was in Mr. Cheung's eyes when he struck the pedestrian (Caceres)." They now assert the proper response was," 'Undisputed in part, disputed in part that Mr. Cheung testified that the sun was in his eyes as he entered the intersection not when he struck [Caceres]."
The court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The court noted plaintiffs failed to present new or different facts, circumstances, or law justifying reconsideration. The court also concluded the fact that "a claim might have been litigated differently" did not demonstrate" 'inadvertence or excusable neglect on the part of counsel.'" Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment because the design of the intersection, combined with enhanced dangers on the adjacent property, created a question of fact as to whether the intersection constituted a dangerous condition. They further assert the City had notice of the dangers associated with the intersection. Finally, plaintiffs argue the City failed to carry its initial burden of proving design immunity.
A. Summary Judgment
"[A] motion for summary judgment in a dangerous condition case' "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." '" (Thimon v. City of Newark (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 745, 755 (Thimon).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must present evidence that either "conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff's cause of action" or "show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain," evidence needed to establish at least one element of the claim. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853-854.) If the defendant meets this burden, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
"We review the record de novo, 'liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.'" (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 832.)
B. Relevant Statutory Framework
Our colleagues in Division Two summarized the relevant statutory framework in Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 745:" 'Section 835 . . . of the [Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.; the Act)] . . . prescribes the conditions under which a public entity may be held liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. [Citation.] Section 835 provides that a public entity may be held liable for such injuries "if the plaintiff establishes [(1)] that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, [(2)] that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, [and] [(3)] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred." In addition, the plaintiff must establish [(4)] that either: (a) "[a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his [or her] employment created the dangerous condition. . .," or (b) "[t]he public entity had . . . notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition."' [Citation.]
" 'The Act defines a" '[d]angerous condition'" as "a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." ([Gov. Code,] § 830.) Public property is in a dangerous condition within the meaning of [Government Code] section 835 if it "is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself."' [Citation.] 'But public property has also been considered to be in a dangerous condition "because of the design or location of the improvement, the interrelationship of its structural or natural features, or the presence of latent hazards associated with its normal use."' [Citation.] 'A dangerous condition of public property can come in several forms and may be based on an "amalgam" of factors.' [Citation.] 'A condition is not dangerous "if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial, or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used." ([Gov. Code,] § 830.2.)' [Citation.]
"The fact that [a third party's] negligence was a proximate cause of [a plaintiff's] injury does not preclude a finding of dangerous condition. '[I]f a condition of public property "creates a substantial risk of injury even when the property is used with due care" [citation], a public entity "gains no immunity from liability simply because, in a particular case, the dangerous condition of its property combines with a third party's negligent conduct to inflict injury."' [Citation.] When a third party's conduct is the immediate cause of a plaintiff's harm, the question becomes whether the dangerous condition 'increased or intensified' the risk of injury from the third party's conduct. [Citations.]
"On the other hand, a public entity is not required to assume that third parties . . . will act negligently or recklessly. 'As one court has observed, any property can be dangerous if used in a sufficiently improper manner. For this reason, a public entity is only required to provide roads that are safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use. [Citation.] "If [] it can be shown that the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not 'dangerous' within the meaning of [Government Code,] section 830, subdivision (a)."' [Citation.]
" 'Ordinarily, the existence of a dangerous condition is a question of fact, but whether there is a dangerous condition may be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. [Citation.] "[I]t is for the court to determine whether, as a matter of law, a given defect is not dangerous. This is to guarantee that cities do not become insurers against the injuries arising from trivial defects."' [Citation.] Moreover, 'expert opinions on whether a given condition constitutes a dangerous condition of public property are not determinative: "[T]he fact that a witness can be found to opine that such a condition constitutes a significant risk and a dangerous condition does not eliminate this court's statutory task pursuant to [Government Code] section 830.2, of independently evaluating the circumstances." '" (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 753-755.) C. Dangerous Condition
Plaintiffs assert the trial court failed to consider all of the various physical characteristics they identified as contributing to a dangerous condition. As a result, they contend, the trial court erroneously focused exclusively on the lack of a traffic light and ignored the "amalgam of defects that amount[ed] to a dangerous condition."
1. Characteristics of Intersection
The characteristics identified by plaintiffs in their separate statement fall into four main categories. First, plaintiffs assert the intersection was heavily used by vehicle and pedestrian traffic (e.g., (1) the intersection is a major traffic hub with a high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic; (2) San Jose Avenue has both vehicle traffic and MUNI light rail traffic; (3) the Balboa BART station is on the west side of the street with pedestrian and vehicular access points and an adjacent parking lot; (4) MUNI buses run southbound on San Jose Avenue; and (5) pedestrians accessed San Jose Avenue from a bus island north of the intersection). Second, plaintiffs contend the intersection was not controlled with proper traffic signals (e.g., (1) no traffic control or pedestrian walk signal lights were present at the intersection; and (2) all roadways connecting to the intersection had stop signs but the driveway to the parking lot did not have a stop sign). Third, plaintiffs assert the intersection contained various features that inhibited drivers' sightlines (e.g., (1) San Jose Avenue has parking in both directions; (2) shadows were cast on some portion of the roadway by a large overhanging tree; (3) the downhill grade of San Jose Avenue northbound resulted in restricted sightlines; and (4) the curve in the kiss-and-ride lanes connecting to the west side of the intersection restricted visibility). Fourth, plaintiffs assert the physical layout of the intersection creates confusion (e.g., (1) the intersection is "multi-leg" with traffic entering and exiting from 15 points, creating numerous" 'conflict points'" where a collision could occur; (2) drivers are required to look in various directions for vehicular, pedestrian, and MUNI traffic; and (3) confusion from a jog in the east side curb line of San Jose Avenue as it crosses Niagara Avenue).
We note the Balboa BART station is not adjacent to the intersection at issue but rather is located over a block away on the north side of Geneva Avenue.
The first group of factors identified by plaintiffs relates to the busyness of the road, as used by vehicles and pedestrians. However, "heavy use of any given paved road alone does not invoke the application of Government Code section 835." (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 (Mittenhuber).) In Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, the court rejected the theory that the volume and speed of vehicular traffic in combination with heavy pedestrian use created a dangerous condition. (Id. at p. 440.) It likewise declined to conclude the presence of surrounding features that increased the number of pedestrians, such as bus stops, a park, and a school, resulted in a dangerous condition. (Id. at p. 441.) Rather, the appellate court explained the plaintiff had made no allegation that some "physical characteristics" of the street such as "blind corners, obscured sightlines, elevation variances, or any other unusual condition . . . made the road unsafe when used by motorists and pedestrians exercising due care," and the plaintiff had not cited to any authority "that a dangerous condition exists absent such factors." (Id. at pp. 440-441.)
Likewise, plaintiffs' discussion of the lack of traffic control lights or pedestrian cross signals does not evidence a dangerous condition. Courts have uniformly concluded" '[a] four-way stop is not an inherently dangerous condition when used with due care by the general public. The only risk of harm was from a motorist who failed to exercise due care by obeying the de facto stop signs. The City is not liable for that conduct.'" (Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1190; see also Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351 ["The lack of a traffic signal at the intersection does not constitute proof of a dangerous condition."]; Gov. Code, § 830.4 ["A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code"].)
Next, plaintiff alleges various visual impairments from parking, shadows, the curved kiss-and-ride lanes, and the downward grade of San Jose Avenue. While plaintiffs identify various features of the intersection, they fail to identify how they create"' "substantial risk of injury when such property . . . was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used." '" (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.) In other words, plaintiffs do not explain how these elements impact the visibility of pedestrians at the intersection such that they create a substantial risk of injury. (Accord, Mittenhuber, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 7 ["An ordinary, natural topographical condition is not a dangerous condition of property" unless "it constitutes a deceptive condition or trap for even those who use the property with due care"].) For example, a vehicle stopped at the intersection would see the pedestrian crosswalk in front of, not behind, any parked vehicles. Likewise, the record does not demonstrate the curve in the kiss-and-ride lanes or the slope of San Jose Avenue would impede stopped vehicles from seeing any pedestrians at the intersection. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the intersection does not constitute a dangerous condition.
2. Amalgam of Factors
Plaintiffs also rely on Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749 (Cole) to assert a combination of factors may result in a dangerous condition. They offer declarations from two experts, who concluded the configuration of the intersection requires drivers to process a large amount of information that renders the intersection dangerous.
As an initial matter, we note "expert opinions on whether a given condition constitutes a dangerous condition of public property are not determinative: '[T]he fact that a witness can be found to opine that such a condition constitutes a significant risk and a dangerous condition does not eliminate this court's statutory task, pursuant to [Government Code] section 830.2, of independently evaluating the circumstances.'" (Sun v. City of Oakland, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189; see also Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)
We find Cole distinguishable from the present situation. In Cole, the plaintiff parked in a gravel strip between a park and a roadway. (Cole, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.) It was common practice for people to park in that graveled area. (Id. at p. 755.) An individual drove off the road into the graveled area and hit the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 754.) The plaintiff presented evidence that prior to the incident, traffic had stopped next to the graveled area to wait for another vehicle to make a left-hand turn, and it was common practice for drivers to enter the graveled area to bypass stopped vehicles. (Id. at pp. 754-755.)
The court noted ample evidence supported the plaintiff's theory that the configuration of road and adjacent gravel area, together, induced drivers to leave the roadway to bypass traffic. (Cole, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Likewise, the court found the plaintiff presented "ample evidence that the graveled area was located and configured in a manner that encouraged its use for parking by visitors to the park." (Id. at p. 760.) The court thus concluded the physical characteristics of the property induced drivers to engage in dangerous behavior-i.e., drive off the roadway-and cause the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
Here, however, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the various features of the intersection cause drivers to regularly utilize the intersection in an improper or dangerous manner. For example, plaintiffs do not assert drivers had to enter the intersection before being able to observe oncoming traffic or pedestrians, or otherwise deviate from standard driving practices to navigate the intersection. While their experts argue the intersection was busy with multiple points of entry and other vehicles "potentially obscuring" a driver's view of pedestrians, these are features of numerous intersections in any city environment. Likewise, their experts speculate the features discussed above create "confusion," and" 'it may be unclear to drivers and pedestrians which direction is first or next in the queue.'" But they do not present evidence that drivers regularly enter the intersection out of turn or are unable to look for pedestrians while entering or exiting the intersection.
Plaintiffs assert three alleged vehicle/pedestrian collisions at the intersection over the past 10 years demonstrate that the intersection is dangerous. However, "[i]t is well-settled that before evidence of previous accidents may be admitted to prove the existence of a dangerous condition, it must first be shown that the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially similar to the one in question. [Citation.] . . . [¶] While there must be substantial similarity to offer other accident evidence for any purpose, a stricter degree of substantial similarity is required when other accident evidence is offered to show a dangerous condition ...." (Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1072.)
Plaintiffs argue these incidents are "sufficiently similar . . . because they all involve injuries to . . . pedestrians attempting to cross at the very same intersection." However, the prior accident evidence shows, in two cases, that the accidents were plainly not substantially similar, while in the other case, there is insufficient information about the nature of the accident to demonstrate substantial similarity to the circumstances of the present collision. Two of the incidents occurred when pedestrians were crossing Niagara Avenue, not San Jose Avenue (one pedestrian was stopped but heading south; the other was heading north with unknown movement), and one of those occurred in the dark while it was raining. The one remaining incident involving a southbound driver-not a westbound driver as present here-turning left and failing to yield to a pedestrian who was crossing San Jose Avenue in the eastbound direction. Even assuming this third incident is potentially analogous, plaintiffs fail to identify many pertinent factors demonstrating substantial similarity. For example, the summary of the incident does not specify whether the pedestrian or the driver or both did or did not act with due care, where the pedestrian and driver were located in the intersection, and whether there were any obstructions present at the time of the collision. Finally, plaintiffs repeatedly reference a collision that occurred in 2003. But that incident occurred prior to the installation of the intersection's stop signs in 2004. Accordingly, this accident history does not support a finding of a dangerous condition.
Contrary to plaintiffs' position, we find the present matter more analogous to Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 745. In Thimon, a vehicle hit a minor while she was crossing the street in a crosswalk. (Id. at p. 748.) The driver, who was driving under the posted speed limit, stated he did not see the minor "due to glare from the morning sun." (Ibid.) The minor sued the City of Newark, asserting the intersection constituted a dangerous condition because of the number of lanes and the fact that the intersection "lacked 'stop signs,' 'traffic signals,' a 'blinking yellow arterial to warn drivers of the impending crosswalk[,]' and 'pedestrian actuated mechanisms to alert a driver of a pedestrian's use of the crosswalk.'" (Ibid.) The minor argued the city "failed to make a prima facie showing that there was no dangerous condition." (Id. at p. 756.) Specifically, the minor asserted the city" '[c]herry-picked factual items which, on an individualized basis may support summary judgment under a particular authority' but failing to negate 'the "amalgam" or combination of features . . . pled.'" (Ibid.)
Our colleagues in Division Two rejected this argument. The court found the city met its prima facie burden based on evidence that the intersection did not obstruct a driver's view of a pedestrian, the crosswalk was marked with white lines and signs warning of pedestrians, the driver was aware of the sun's glare, police found the driver violated the Vehicle Code by failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk and traveling at an unsafe speed, and the lack of prior collisions at the crosswalk. (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.)
As relevant here, the Thimon court rejected the minor's argument that the city failed to address the combination of all features together. (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) The court noted the complaint challenged numerous features of the intersection, and defendants facing such a "kitchensink approach" may properly address why each alleged factor, whether alone or in combination with others, did not constitute a dangerous condition. (Id. at p. 758.) The court found the city carried its burden by addressing each allegedly dangerous feature and presenting a study concluding a traffic signal was not warranted. (Ibid.)
Here, the City likewise met its burden. As discussed above, the record does not indicate any of the features constitute a dangerous condition. The lack of any substantially analogous collision history at the intersection further supports this conclusion, and a senior engineer with the City submitted a declaration stating the "collision history does not warrant the installation of a traffic signal under state or local traffic engineering guidelines." Accordingly, the City adequately refuted plaintiffs' position that an amalgam of features at the intersection constituted a dangerous condition.
3. Causation
Even assuming the intersection constituted a dangerous condition, the issue of causation is dispositive. Plaintiffs fail to raise a triable issue regarding whether such condition proximately caused Caceres's injuries. To establish causation, plaintiffs must show that a physical condition of the City's property was a" 'substantial factor'" in bringing about Caceres's harm. (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 312.) A plaintiff may prove causation through direct and circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (Ibid.) But we cannot draw inferences" 'from thin air.'" (Ibid.)
For example, the Thimon court explained, in light of the driver's negligence, that the minor must demonstrate how the city's "painting of lines to demarcate the crosswalk along with installing signs warning motorists of the pedestrian crossing 'increased or intensified' the risk of injury to pedestrians crossing at that location." (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) The court found she failed to do so. (Ibid.) Notably, the court rejected her argument that the crosswalk amounted to a" 'trap'" because "undisputed evidence shows the conditions [the minor] claims are dangerous were apparent to pedestrians." (Id. at p. 761.)
Here, Cheung stated he was familiar with the intersection having driven through it over 100 times. On the day of the incident, he stated there were two other vehicles at the intersection: one stopped at the stop sign heading southbound on San Jose Avenue, and one stopped at the stop sign heading northbound on San Jose Avenue. Cheung did not state there were any vehicles entering or exiting the parking lot, the San Jose Avenue frontage road, or the kiss-and-ride area. Cheung did not express any confusion about when it was his turn to proceed into the intersection. Rather, he stated he waited for the southbound vehicle to drive, and then he entered the intersection at his turn. He likewise stated he was able to fully see the southern crosswalk of the intersection, and his view was not obstructed in any way. He was able to again check to his left, including the crosswalk, when he was in the intersection and approximately two car lengths from the crosswalk. Despite this, Cheung stated he did not see Caceres before hitting him, and the only distraction he identified at the time he struck Caceres was that the sun was in his eyes. Accordingly, nothing in the record indicates any aspect of the intersection was a contributing factor to the incident.
Because plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact as to whether the intersection constituted a dangerous condition or was a substantial factor in the collision, we need not reach plaintiffs' arguments that the Vision Zero initiative establishes foreseeability and notice of the dangerous condition. Nor do we need to address the parties' dispute regarding whether the City is entitled to design immunity.
We thus conclude as a matter of law that plaintiffs cannot show that the complained of physical characteristics of the intersection, separately or in combination, constituted a dangerous condition or was a substantial factor in the collision. The record indicates Cheung had, or by the exercise of due care would have had, an unobstructed view of Caceres in the crosswalk. His failure to yield to him, rather than a dangerous condition of the intersection, was the legal cause of Caceres's unfortunate injuries.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court's order granting the City and County of San Francisco's motion for summary judgment is affirmed. The City may recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
WE CONCUR: BANKE, J. GETTY, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.