Opinion
No. 1-670 / 00-2067.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, DAVID A. LESTER, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision denying her claims for benefits for an alleged work injury to her back. AFFIRMED.
Mark S. Soldat, Algona, for appellant.
Chris J. Scheldrup and Thomas D. Wolle of Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
The petitioner, Carol Cacek, appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision denying her claim for benefits for an alleged work injury to her back. She contends that the district court used the wrong standard in determining that substantial evidence supported the commissioner's decision and erred in treating the substantial evidence ground for judicial review as if it were the same as the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable ground for review. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Carol Cacek began working as a nurse for the Emmetsburg Care Center in 1994. On January 10, 1996, while off work, Cacek felt a sharp pain in her lower back. She went to work later that night. On January 12, 1996, Cacek sought medical treatment. She informed the Care Center of her visit to the doctor, but she did not think her injury was work related. Cacek's condition worsened, and an MRI revealed a herniated disc.
In September 1996, Cacek underwent surgery on her back. Dr. Follows performed the surgery. He opined that Cacek's back injury was work related. The Care Center claims this opinion was based on an improper job description. Dr. Donohue, the designated doctor of the Care Center for back injuries, indicated that Cacek's back condition was not work related.
Cacek filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for a cumulative injury against the Care Center and its insurance carrier. A deputy workers' compensation commissioner filed an arbitration decision determining that Cacek failed to prove she sustained a cumulative work injury. On Cacek's appeal, the chief deputy workers' compensation commissioner affirmed the arbitration decision.
Cacek filed a petition for judicial review challenging the chief deputy commissioner's decision. The district court affirmed the agency's decision. The court concluded that the chief deputy commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record when viewed as a whole.
Cacek filed a motion to enlarge pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The district court denied the motion. It concluded that it properly determined substantial evidence supported the chief deputy commissioner's decision. The court also found that, on the basis of that determination, it was logical that the commissioner's ruling was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Cacek appeals.
II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A. Scope and standard of review. As a preliminary matter, Cacek maintains the trial court applied the wrong substantial evidence standard. She argues that the trial court allegedly found that there was some evidence in the record supporting the chief deputy's decision that "a reasonable person would find . . . adequate. . . ." She asserts it was necessary to adjudge whether, on balance, the detracting evidence in the record outweighed the supporting evidence. She also argues the 1998 statutory amendments to Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1997) clarified, and did not amend, the substantial evidence standard, and that the trial court erred in indicating otherwise.
We agree with Cacek that the statutory amendments to section 17A.19(8) clarified what was already the law, namely that a reviewing court must consider all the record evidence. Iowa Health Sys. Agency, Inc. v. Wade, 327 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Iowa 1982). We agree that the Administrative Procedure Act requires a district court on judicial review to examine the agency record as a whole. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f). The trial court erred to the extent that it indicated the 1998 amendments may have amended rather than clarified existing law.
The court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action . . . if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is any of the following: . . . Based upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole. For purposes of this paragraph, the following terms have the following meanings: . . . `When that record is viewed as a whole' means that the adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to support a particular finding of fact must be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it, including any determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses and the agency's explanation of why the relevant evidence in the record supports its material findings of fact.
1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1202, § 24 (codified at Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f) (2001)).
We conclude the district court used the proper substantial evidence standard. The court stated that
an agency's findings must be supported by substantial evidence in the record when that record is viewed as a whole. . . . In determining whether there is substantial evidence, the court must consider all of the evidence in the record, including both that which contradicts the agency decision and that which supports the agency decision.
(Citations omitted). The trial court concluded in its ruling on judicial review that "the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record when that record is viewed as a whole." The court noted this was a "close case." In its ruling on Cacek's Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion, the court stated that
each and every item [of detracting evidence] referenced in [Cacek's] motion is part of the record in this case, a record which the court reviewed and studied in its entirety. Therefore, the court has already considered and reviewed all of the evidence, which [Cacek] again asks it to address.
The trial considered all the evidence in the record, including that supporting and detracting from the agency's decision. Thus, we conclude Cacek's argument that the trial court applied an incorrect substantial evidence standard is without merit, except to the extent that the trial court indicated the 1998 statutory amendments may amend rather than clarify the substantial evidence standard.
The standard by which we review decisions of administrative agencies is well-settled. We review an agency's decision for errors of law and do not exercise a de novo review. Kostelac v. Feldman's, Inc., 497 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 1993). When we review findings of the workers' compensation commissioner, those findings carry the effect of a jury verdict. Id. We will reverse an agency's findings only if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine that substantial evidence does not support them. Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the conclusion at issue. Kostelac, 497 N.W.2d at 856. The mere fact that we could draw inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence does not mean that substantial evidence does not support the commissioner's determination. Id. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether it supports the findings the commissioner actually made. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at 271.
B. Merits. The deputy commissioner concluded that Cacek failed to prove that she sustained a cumulative work injury, which arose out of and in the course of her employment. The chief deputy commissioner also determined that Cacek failed to prove that she suffered a work-related injury. The district court affirmed on judicial review. Cacek contends the trial court erred by affirming the chief deputy commissioner's decision that Cacek did not carry her burden to prove a work injury. We disagree.
Claimants have the burden of proving that an injury "arose out of" and "in the course of" their employment. Iowa Code § 85.3(1); Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000). The phrase "arise out of" requires a showing of a causal connection between the injury and employment. Id.
On our review of the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the chief deputy commissioner's decision. The deputy commissioner relied on the following evidence: Cacek's symptoms began at home while she was washing dishes; she was diagnosed with a disc problem before July 24, 1996; and she fabricated how her injury occurred to Dr. Donovan (that she was injured while standing at work). The chief deputy commissioner relied on the following evidence in affirming: Cacek testified she did not experience pain in the right leg or buttocks prior to seeing a doctor on June 14, 1996, but office notes from two doctors indicate that she had a history of pain in her right buttock; Dr. Follows consistently referred to her job as a certified nursing assistant; and Dr. Donohoe did not think Cacek's disc herniation was related to any particular work activity or work injury. The evidence regarding Cacek's job duties was conflicting. According to Cacek, her job involved various physical activities generally performed by a nurse's aide, including the lifting of patients. The Care Center claimed Cacek's job was a supervisory position.
We acknowledge that the evidence underlying these factual findings was conflicting. However, we are mindful of our standard of review. Assessing the weight of evidence is within the exclusive domain of the agency fact finder, Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993), and courts are not allowed to reassess the weight of the evidence upon judicial review. Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 602 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We find that although the evidence may support different findings, it also supports the findings the commissioner actually made. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
III. ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.
On appeal, Cacek contends the trial court erred in treating the substantial evidence ground for judicial review as if it was the same as the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable ground for judicial review. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(g). The trial court concluded that "based on its finding that the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence, it is only logical that the agency's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
Our supreme court has stated that "[s]ection 17A.19(8)(g) is not the correct standard for review of an agency decision in a contested case. . . ." Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at 273. In applying this holding, we conclude that Cacek's argument on appeal is without merit, as she has no right to relief under section 17A.19(8)(g). We affirm.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency decision. We determine that section 17A.19(8)(g) is not applicable to this contested case filed
prior to the 1998 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.