Opinion
No. CV 11-6007139 S
October 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a decision on the plaintiff's motion to strike, dated August 25, 2011. The plaintiff has moved to strike both counts of the plaintiffs' counterclaim, which allege claims for unjust enrichment and emotional distress.
I.
The plaintiff, Teresa Caballero, commenced this action against the defendants, Wilmar Valverde and Margarita Valverde, alleging nonpayment of wages for housekeeping and babysitting services that she performed, and additional counts sounding in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed an answer and a two-count counterclaim. In the first count, the defendants allege that the plaintiff was unjustly enriched because, during the approximately three years that she resided in their home, she did not pay rent, and she was provided with food, transportation and medical treatment, all of which she refused to repay to their detriment. In the second count, sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendants allege that the plaintiff falsely accused their twelve-year-old son of "rubbing against her in an inappropriate manner," causing them severe emotional distress and mental anguish. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants' counterclaim on the ground that each count fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The defendants objected. The court heard oral argument at the short calendar on September 26, 2011.
II.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, CT Page 21425 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] plaintiff can [move to strike] a . . . counterclaim." Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1978). "[A] counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action . . . A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Lax, 113 Conn.App. 646, 649, 969 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 907, 973 A.2d 103 (2009). "[I]f facts provable in the [pleading] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130, 2 A.3d 859 (2010). A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 694, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).
III.
The plaintiff first argues that the motion to strike should be granted as to the counterclaim's first count alleging unjust enrichment. The plaintiff claims that the defendants' conclusory allegations do not state how the plaintiff's actions were detrimental to the defendants and lack any indication that the plaintiff received a benefit contrary to equity and good conscience. The defendants counter that they have pleaded facts sufficient to withstand a motion to strike.
Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must plead and prove (1) that the defendant was benefitted, (2) that the defendant unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment. Breen v. Judge, 124 Conn.App. 147, 158-59, 4 A.3d 326 (2010). Here, the defendants allege that the plaintiff received the benefits of housing, food, medical expenses and transportation, and that they have been detrimentally harmed by the plaintiff's failure to pay. The defendants have alleged sufficient facts which, if proven, would support a claim of unjust enrichment. The motion to strike the first count of the counterclaim is denied.
IV.
The plaintiff next argues that the motion to strike should be granted as to the counterclaim's second count alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argues that the defendants cannot rely on conclusory assertions in their counterclaim that the plaintiff's "untrue statements . . . constitute extreme and outrageous conduct," and that allegedly untrue statements about the inappropriate behavior of the defendants' son was not so atrocious as to exceed all bounds tolerated by a decent society. The defendants argue in response that "clearly a false assertion of inappropriate contact of a sexual nature against a child would be labeled outrageous by a parent."
"In order for [a party] to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442-43, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).
As to the second element, "[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! . . . Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 443.
"Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine . . . Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury . . . [Therefore], [i]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint . . . set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact-finding, but rather is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 568-69, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).
The plaintiff argues that making a false statement generally does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. See Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn.App. 230, 232, 22 A.3d 697 (2011) (false accusations of "outbursts and irrational behavior" in workplace not extreme and outrageous); Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 73 Conn.App. 576, 577, 808 A.2d 1149 (2002) (falsely accusing employee of serious misconduct and of endangering patient's life not extreme and outrageous), cert. denied, 279 Conn. 903, 901 A.2d 1225 (2006).
The content and context of the alleged false statements are material considerations, however. In some circumstances, courts have held that reasonable minds could differ as to whether false allegations of sexual harassment rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. See Zulawski v. Stand, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 05 000203 (July 14, 2006, Hartmere, J.) ( 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 646) (denying summary judgment when minor plaintiff alleged school principal falsely accused her of sexually harassing group of boys, resulting in her suspension from school); Baricko v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA, Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Number CV 97 0395642 (December 26, 2000, Zoarski, J.T.R.) (denying summary judgment when plaintiff's supervisor fabricated false sexual harassment allegations from other employees for purpose of discrediting plaintiff). But see Kontos v. Laurel House, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket Number CV 06 5001408 (January 17, 2007, Adams, J.) ( 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 709, 710-11) (granting motion to strike intentional infliction of emotional distress count premised on false allegations of sexual harassment). Factors that these courts considered to be relevant included whether the defendant was in a position of authority; Zulawski v. Stancil, supra, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 648 (conduct by school principal, using authority of his position over student); cf. 1 Restatement (Second), Torts, § 46 comment (e), p. 74 (1965) ("extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other . . ."); and whether there was an element of public humiliation or ridicule. Kontos v. Laurel House, Inc., supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 711 (stating relevance of this element in employee termination context); cf. Campbell v. Plymouth, 74 Conn.App. 67, 79, 811 A.2d 243 (2002) (same). In the context of levying false accusations of unlawful behavior generally, our courts have noted that "the cases distinguish between situations where a person merely accuses another of fraudulent or dishonest activity as opposed, for example, to actively encouraging or trying to bring about a false prosecution." Deutsche Bank v. Lichtenfels, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 4003402 (June 17, 2009, Corradino, J.) ( 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 133, 137).
The court subsequently granted summary judgment on the same count when defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that the allegations of harassment were not, in fact, fabricated. Baricko v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA, Co., Superior Court, judicial districts of New Haven, Docket Number CV 97 0395642 (December 19, 2002, Zoarski, J.T.R.).
In the present case, the defendants allege that the plaintiff made a false accusation that their son "rubb[ed] against her in an inappropriate manner." Such an accusation undoubtedly would be distressing to a parent. Whether such distress is actionable depends on whether the counterclaim sets forth behavior that a reasonable fact finder could conclude constitutes conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. Our courts have found a few contexts in which reasonable minds could differ as to whether a false accusation rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, but none of those factors are present here. For example, the plaintiff was not the employer or otherwise alleged to have been in a position of authority over the defendants, nor is it alleged that the false accusation was made publicly or in the course of encouraging a false prosecution. That the plaintiff falsely accused the defendants' son of "inappropriate," even sexual, behavior is not an allegation of conduct that fits the criteria required to establish a claim against the plaintiff premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because the court, in the exercise of its gatekeeping role, has concluded that the defendants have not alleged conduct that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme and outrageous, it need not consider the alternate argument raised by the plaintiff in support of her motion.
V.
The plaintiff's motion to strike count one of the counterclaim is denied. The motion to strike count two of the counterclaim is granted.