Opinion
Case No. 20040561-CA.
Filed September 10, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Sandy Department The Honorable Elizabeth A. Lindsley.
Jeffrey J. Noland, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Carol L. Verdoia, and John M. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
C.A. appeals the termination of his parental rights with respect to J.J. He asserts that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) failed to provide reasonable efforts in preserving familial ties by failing to evaluate a kinship placement with C.A.'s father, and that termination of his parental rights was not warranted because there was no finding of severe abuse or neglect. He provides no legal support for either of these allegations of error.
"Reasonable efforts" is a standard applied only to reunification services provided pursuant to Utah Code section 78-3a-311. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-311 (2002). "If the court determines that reunification services are appropriate, it shall order that [DCFS] make reasonable efforts to provide services to the child and the child's parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family, for a specified period of time."Id. § 78-3a-311(2)(c)(i) (2002). Only if reunification services were ordered must a court make a finding regarding whether DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide those services before terminating parental rights on particular grounds. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3)(a) (2002). C.A. did not receive any court-ordered reunification services, and thus was not entitled to any finding regarding reasonable efforts of DCFS incident to the termination of his parental rights.
Furthermore, because one of the grounds on which C.A.'s parental rights were terminated was abandonment, C.A. was not entitled to any finding regarding reasonable efforts, even if services had been provided. See id. Section 407 provides the grounds for termination of parental rights, any one of which will be sufficient to support such termination. See id. § 78-3a-407(1) (providing a court may terminate parental rights "if it finds any one of the following" grounds); In re F.C. III, 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 790 (mem.) (noting any one of the grounds listed in section 78-3a-407(1) is sufficient "by itself" to terminate parental rights). The statute further requires that, if reunification services were ordered, the trial court find that DCFS made "reasonable efforts" to provide the services before the court can terminate a parent's rights under subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3)(a). Abandonment is not among the grounds listed as requiring a finding of reasonable efforts. Therefore, the court was not required to enter a finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services to C.A. before terminating his parental rights.
In addition, C.A. was not entitled to any particular kinship placement, nor would such a placement impact termination proceedings. Kinship placements may receive a preference in certain circumstances, but the preferences are limited in time and scope to temporary placements after removal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-307(5)(a) (2002). The parents must cooperate with DCFS to assist them in identifying possible placements by providing information regarding relatives "within five working days." Id. The consideration of relatives for kinship placement does not guarantee that a child will be placed with relatives.See id. Finally, any preferential consideration for a kinship placement expires 120 days from the date of the shelter hearing.See id. § 78-3a-307(8)(a). Kinship placements have no application to termination proceedings. See In re D.N., 2003 UT App 262, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 194 (limiting section 78-3a-307 to placement of a child after shelter hearing).
C.A. also asserts the court erred in terminating his parental rights where there was no finding of severe abuse or neglect. However, given the numerous grounds supporting termination of C.A.'s parental rights, there was no requirement for the trial court to make a finding of severe abuse or neglect. The trial court found that C.A. had abandoned J.J., failed to remedy the circumstances that caused J.J. to be in an out-of-home placement, had failed in parental adjustment, and made only token efforts to support or communicate with J.J. These four grounds for termination, each individually sufficient to terminate C.A.'s parental rights, make a finding of severe abuse or neglect unnecessary.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge.
I DISSENT: William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.