Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County, No. SCV-2414679
Haerle, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brabetz, Inc. (Brabetz) appeals from a judgment requiring it to pay damages in the amount of $140,286.23 and attorney fees to its former landlord CA-The Lakes Limited Partnership (CA-The Lakes). Brabetz contends the judgment must be reversed because the present action is barred by a prior unlawful detainer action. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
II STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 19, 2003, Brabetz entered into a written agreement to lease office space in a building located on Capricorn Way in Santa Rosa for a term through January 20, 2009 (the lease agreement). Thereafter (the record does not disclose when) CA-The Lakes purchased the Capricorn Way property and was assigned rights under the lease agreement.
In the spring of 2007, Brabetz failed to pay rent due under the lease agreement. CA-The Lakes filed an unlawful detainer action against Brabetz which resulted in a July 31, 2007, judgment in its favor. CA-The Lakes was awarded possession of the premises, $19,832.23 for damages incurred up to the date of entry of judgment, attorney fees and costs.
On September 11, 2007, CA-The Lakes filed its complaint in the present action, alleging breach of the lease agreement and seeking damages for unpaid rent and other monies owed from August 1, 2007, through the balance of the lease term. Trial commenced September 16, 2008, before the Honorable Robert S. Boyd.
On November 20, 2008, the trial court filed a statement of decision pursuant to which it made numerous findings of law, each separately supported by findings of fact. The court found, among other things that (1) Brabetz breached the lease agreement, (2) CA-The Lakes was entitled to recover damages incurred after Brabetz was evicted from the premises, and (3) CA-The Lakes made a good faith effort to attempt to find a tenant to lease the premises for the balance of the lease term. The court also made findings of fact and law to support the following damages awards: (1) $102,929.70 for the period from the date of the judgment in the unlawful detainer action through the date of trial in the present action, (2) $6,009.50, as interest on damages through the date of trial; (3) $31,347.03 for losses from the date of trial to the scheduled expiration date of the lease term. The court also found that CA-The Lakes was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement.
Judgment was entered November 20, 2008.
III. DISCUSSION
Brabetz contends that the judgment must be reversed because the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Brabetz invokes the rule that “a valid final judgment in favor of the plaintiff merges any claim of the same cause of action in the judgment, and precludes the plaintiff from maintaining any later suit on the same cause of action.” (Quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mel Rapton, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 901, 907.) Purporting to apply this rule here, Brabetz maintains that CA-The Lakes already litigated its breach of contract claim against Brabetz in the unlawful detainer action and that it cannot now “split” that cause of action by seeking additional contract damages in this case.
The trial court rejected Brabetz’s contention that res judicata bars the present action for the following reason: “The fact that an unlawful detainer judgment has previously been entered for possession of the premises and rent and damages incurred up to the date of the unlawful detainer trial does not bar recovery of the damages which arise after the unlawful detainer trial. (Danner v. Jarrett (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 164 [Danner].) In Danner, the landlord was awarded both possession and rent and damages in an unlawful detainer action and yet subsequently recovered damages in a second action against the tenant pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.2. The court’s decision in Danner is consistent with Code of Civil Procedure section 1174.5 which provides that ‘A judgment in unlawful detainer declaring the forfeiture of the lease or agreement under which real property is held shall not relieve the lessee from liability pursuant to section 1951.2 of the Civil Code.’ (Quoted in Danner, at p. 167.)”
We agree with the trial court’s sound reasoning and adopt it here. Danner, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 164, a case decided by this court, establishes that an unlawful detainer action does not bar a subsequent action to recover damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.2 (section 1951.2).
Brabetz’s argument rests on its unsubstantiated premise that the unlawful detainer action and an action for damages recoverable under section 1951.2 are the same cause of action. The first action adjudicates the right to possession of the premises and to recover damages through the date of the unlawful detainer trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).) The second action seeks damages for a separate breach of the lease agreement, i.e., after the date of the trial in the unlawful detainer action. These damages are expressly authorized by statute (§ 1951.2) but are not recoverable in an unlawful detainer action, where the damages are limited “to those occasioned by the detention itself and which occur during the detention up to the time of trial.” (Roberts v. Redlich (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 566, 569; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).) When the “second action is on a different cause of action, as where there are successive breaches of an obligation... there is no merger.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 404, pp. 1038-1039.).
Brabetz concedes that “the simple act of pursuing an Unlawful Detainer action does not, in and of itself, bar pursuit of a subsequent breach of contract cause of action seeking damages described in California Civil Code § 1951.2.” It argues, however, that the prior action in this case was not a “typical” unlawful detainer action. Although the basis for this assertion is unclear, it appears that Brabetz believes that the unlawful detainer action against it was atypical because it was not limited to the issue of possession, but also awarded damages for unpaid rent up to the time of entry of judgment. Brabetz ignores, however, that such damages are recoverable in the typical unlawful detainer action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).)
Finally, Brabetz contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes CA-The Lakes from disputing that the present action is barred. According to Brabetz, “[i]n the instant matter, as ill-advised as it might have been, the Respondent requested and received a ruling that its earlier Unlawful Detainer action was Res Judicata as to its contract action before the trial court.” In its appellate brief, Brabetz fails provide any reference to the record where CA-The Lakes made any such argument or received any such ruling.
However, at oral argument before this court, Brabetz’s counsel directed our attention to CA-The Lakes’s trial brief. There, CA-The Lakes argued that “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar defendant from now asserting that defendant did not breach the lease.” This argument simply cannot be construed as a request for a ruling that the present action was barred. Rather CA-The Lakes made the very different claim that the collateral estoppel aspect of the res judicata doctrine precluded Brabetz from attempting to show that it did not breach the lease agreement.
Brabetz seeks a tactical advantage solely because the words “res judicata” were used in the trial court. It intimates that, by invoking the doctrine, CA The-Lakes necessarily conceded that its own claim was barred by the unlawful detainer action. However, Brabetz simply ignores that “res judicata does not merely bar relitigation of identical claims or causes of action. Instead, in its collateral estoppel aspect, the doctrine may also preclude a party to prior litigation from redisputing issues therein decided against him, even when those issues bear on different claims raised in a later case.” (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828.) In the present case, to the extent CA-The Lakes invoked the res judicata doctrine, it clearly relied solely on the collateral estoppel aspect of the doctrine.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.