In nearly every situation, "administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief may be sought." C Street Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989) (quoting O'Neill v. Starobin, 364 A.2d 149, 153 (D.C. 1976) (citations omitted)). "This rule insures that the agency has an opportunity to develop a factual record and to apply its expertise to the issues."
[Also], were we to allow parties to circumvent agency procedures for appeal, the effectiveness of agency rules might be undermined." C Street Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989) (citing McKart, supra, 395 U.S. at 195, 89 S.Ct. at 1663). It is not unusual for parties to seek to circumvent the exhaustion doctrine, see, e.g., Cox v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 414, 415, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("attempt to avoid the exhaustion requirement by styling the case as an action to 'enforce' the hearing officer's decision"), and such efforts are sometimes successful.
Regular mail did not fulfill that obligation. The "section" referred to (§ 45-2526) sets forth the hearing procedures by which claims of illegal rent are adjudicated, see C Street Tenants v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989).See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth ed. 1979) (defining "certified mail" as a "[f]orm of mail similar to registered mail by which sender may require return receipt from addressee").
"[A]dministrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief may be sought." C Street Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989) (quoting O' Neill v. Starobin, 364 A.2d 149, 153 (D.C. 1976)). However, "the exhaustion requirement is not in general jurisdictional in nature, but rather must be applied in accord with its purposes."
If, on the other hand, the petition is viewed as seeking review of the Rent Administrator's decision of May 22, 1992, then, according to HHLP, this court lacks authority to entertain it because that decision was not first appealed to the Commission. See C Street Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989). Although HHLP has focused on the merits before advancing its jurisdictional contentions, we address the jurisdictional issues first.
We believe the Council must have intended the same review process for all Certificate of Need issues, including exhaustion of administrative remedies followed by direct review of contested cases by this court. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (agency should have first chance to apply its expertise); Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 485 (D.C. 1989) (same); Bender v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 562 A.2d 1205, 1208 (D.C. 1989) (same); C Street Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 552 A.2d 524, 525 (D.C. 1989) (same); K. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26:1 (2d ed. 1983). We conclude, therefore, that the same administrative appeal and review process should apply whether a health care facility seeks a Certificate or attempts to close a service without a Certificate (involving no capital expenditures).