Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary writ. Gary Vincent, Temporary Judge. Super. Ct. No. RIJ114731 (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Petitions denied.
Patricia Nance for Petitioner C.R.
David Goldstein for Petitioner V.R.
No appearance for Respondent.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, Prabhath. D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
KING J.
In these petitions for writ relief, parents ask us to vacate the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for their four children. They assert that continuances of various hearings in violation of section 352 did not allow them adequate time to complete their case plans. In addition, they contend that the juvenile court erred in its findings that they had failed to participate in their case plans and that there was a substantial risk of detriment if their children were returned to their care. We disagree and, accordingly, we deny the petitions.
Mother has not filed a separate petition but joins in father’s arguments.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 1, 2006, the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services removed the four children from their parents’ custody based on allegations of domestic violence between parents, physical abuse of the minors by both parents, and father’s involvement with illegal drugs. On April 25, 2007, the juvenile court in Los Angeles County found the allegations of the petition to be true.
On June 26, 2007, the matter was transferred to Riverside County where parents reside. The Juvenile Court of Riverside County accepted the case and on October 30, 2007, the juvenile court took disposition and ordered that parents receive family reunification services under the supervision of the Department of Public Social Services (the department). Parents’ appeal from that order is pending in this court, case No. E044432.
Mother’s case plan required her to participate in general counseling, a parenting education program, and a psychological exam. In addition to these programs, father was required to participate in a substance abuse program and submit to random drug testing.
Parents have continued to deny the allegations and resisted attempts to arrange for psychological evaluations. Edward Ryan, Ph.D., spoke to father on November 29, 2007, to schedule appointments for the evaluations. He described father as being very angry and telling him the social workers were lying. Father refused to undergo a psychological evaluation. Dr. Ryan advised the department that he would make no further attempts to contact parents.
On January 10, 2008, parents met with Dr. Suiter. Mother complained afterwards to the social worker that Dr. Suiter did not want to hear what they had to say, and told them that he would give the department what they wanted because he was being paid by it. Mother called her attorney and reported what happened.
Dr. Suiter’s version of events was quite different. He reported that parents had the mind-set that there was no basis for the allegations against them, and that during the meeting they only wanted to complain that the social workers were perjuring themselves. When Dr. Suiter indicated that his role was not to assess the department but to evaluate them, parents replied that there was nothing to evaluate. Parents stated that their case was on appeal and that they would be vindicated.
Both parents initially attended individual counseling sessions, making some progress, but in April 2008, mother told her counselor that they would no longer be participating in therapy.
Father refused to cooperate with the department’s requests for random drug tests or enroll in a substance abuse program. Mother informed the department that father intended to test through his own private doctor.
Mother complained that it was difficult for them to travel to attend parenting classes because of her medical condition and because father worked full time. In order to accommodate them, an in-home parenting program was provided by Family Support Services. An in-home parenting advocate was to meet with them every Monday in their home beginning on February 4, 2008. However, the advocate discontinued services after only a few sessions, reporting that parents only wanted to discuss their grievances with the department and the relative caregivers. She stated that parents became upset when she would not answer their question whether she approved of homosexuality. When the advocate attempted to redirect their attention to the handbook, mother told her that they were “just doing this because our lawyer told us to.� Parents became combative and made irrational statements, and the tension in the room became palpable according to the advocate. The advocate was concerned because the oldest child was sitting in the room during this session. The other two sessions were much the same, with parents rehashing their grievances. Father ended the third visit by telling the advocate to leave the house because it was a “waste of time� and that they were only taking the counseling and parenting classes because their attorney had advised them to do so. The advocate expressed relief that she will not have to be exposed to this “toxic environment� again.
Thereafter, mother contacted the director of the in-home parenting program to request another instructor. When told that another advocate would not be provided, mother stated that she is more qualified than they are and asserted they are “perfect parents.�
Parents’ visitation with their children was positive overall. The eldest daughter initially stated she would like to stay at her foster home, but was worried her mother would be angry with her. Indeed, parents were heard yelling at her over the phone when they heard this, and two days later the daughter informed the social worker that she changed her mind and wanted an extended visit. The second eldest child is hesitant about returning home if things will “be the same as before.�
On June 5, 2008, the juvenile court found that parents had received reasonable services but they had not complied with their case plan. It concluded that the children could not be returned home, terminated services, and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court pointed out that parents were offered “out of the shoot services across the board� in Los Angeles County. It stated, “Two years later, six months beyond the statutory limit, these parents are still dinking around. They are doing nothing, nothing to completion.�
DISCUSSION
Parents object that the juvenile court granted numerous continuances in this case which resulted in a 17-month delay between the detention hearing on June 1, 2006, and the disposition order on October 30, 2007. The continuances violated section 352 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.550, and, according to parents, deprived then of an adequate opportunity to engage in, participate in, and benefit from the court ordered case plan of October 30, 2007.
It is not necessary to chronicle the complete procedural history of this case; it is sufficient to note that many of the continuances were at the request of one or both parents, and that they acquiesced in all but one of them. More importantly, parents were not prejudiced by the delays. As the juvenile court noted, parents had received services from the inception of the case in June 2006 in Los Angeles County.
It is clear from our review of the record that parents’ failure to complete their case plans was not the shortage of time but their own short-sighted attitude. They were more focused on appealing the case rather than participating in and complying with the services provided them. They have taken a confrontational and hostile attitude toward the department and all service providers. The record provides ample support that parents failed to participate in their case plans. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) Their failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie evidence that return of the minors would be detrimental. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
We are not addressing the merits of their appeal with these writ petitions.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J., RICHLI J.