Opinion
03-CV-6481L.
July 6, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Donald James Buttermilk, appearing pro se, commenced this action by filing what he styles as a "Complaint in the Nature of Mandamus" against the Village of Mount Morris, New York and M.W. Brado, an officer with the Mount Morris Police Department. Defendants have moved for summary judgment.
Although the exact nature of plaintiff's allegations and claims is difficult to understand, the gist of them seems to be that Officer Brado issued two traffic tickets to plaintiff. Plaintiff apparently alleges that there is no factual basis for the issuance of the tickets, and that Brado, "if he really exists," Complaint at 14, lacked authority to issue them. Plaintiff also seems to contend (for reasons that are also unclear) that requiring him to respond to the tickets would deny him due process of law. He states that his "right of action has its foundations in the Holy Scriptures Word of God," Complaint at 11, specifically the Books of Exodus, Deuteronomy, Proverbs, and 1 Samuel. Id. He seeks a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief, but again it is difficult to discern the precise nature of the relief sought.
Defendants' motion is granted. It appears that plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to enjoin, or otherwise interfere with, an ongoing state court proceeding. The general rule is that federal courts should abstain from doing so, absent some exceptional circumstances, which have not been shown or alleged to exist here. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). If plaintiff contends that the tickets are false or otherwise defective, his remedy lies in the state courts in the first instance.
In addition, to the extent that plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus, it has long been established that lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief against state officials. See, e.g., Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1988); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973); Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969). The statute that confers mandamus authority on federal district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is limited by its terms to actions "to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty."
Aa to plaintiff's charges against Officer Brado, I also find that Brado is entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The defense of qualified immunity "shields government actors from liability if they did not violate clearly established law, or if it was objectively reasonable for such actors to believe that their actions did not violate clearly established law." Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 907 (2003). Here, it is not even apparent to the Court how Brado is alleged to have violated plaintiff's clearly established rights. Plaintiff's claims against Brado are dismissed on this ground as well.
I note that plaintiff has also filed several (mostly indecipherable) motions for various relief, none of which have any merit. Those motions are denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket #22) is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiff's "Motion for Determination of Attorney Representative Capacity, [etc.]" (Docket #18), motion to strike (Docket #26), and motion for sanctions (Docket #38), are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.