Opinion
C094217
03-24-2022
In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. K.C., Defendant and Appellant. BUTTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 21DP00083
MAURO, J.
K.C. is married to the half-brother of the minor's mother, S.K. (mother). K.C. appeals from the juvenile court's order denying her request for appointment of counsel after transfer of the case from Siskiyou County. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) We will affirm the juvenile court's order.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
To put K.C.'s contention in context, we take judicial notice of the record in her related pending appeal, case No. C093887, from orders issued by the juvenile court in Siskiyou County prior to transfer of the case to Butte County. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Mother had an extensive child welfare history and reportedly did not feel she could provide for the minor. Because K.C. was willing to care for the minor, mother stated she intended for the minor to live with K.C. and the half-brother D.C. K.C. arrived at the hospital shortly after the minor was born and was permitted to take the minor pursuant to a safety plan prohibiting D.C. from living in the family home due to his substance abuse, mental health concerns, and criminal history. The probate court in Siskiyou County subsequently issued an ex parte order appointing K.C. the temporary guardian of the minor, but a social worker informed K.C. that the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) would not support K.C.'s request for guardianship and would be seeking to place the minor into protective custody.
At a detention hearing, the juvenile court in Siskiyou County appointed counsel for K.C. Later, at a continuation of the hearing, K.C. said she considered herself to be the minor's mother. She said she had been told that if the father was unknown and she treated the minor as her own she could complete a voluntary declaration of parentage (VDOP) form. She obtained a VDOP form, had mother's signature notarized, and mailed the signed form to the Department of Child Support Services. K.C. said there was an upcoming hearing on her request for guardianship and she hoped to become the minor's permanent guardian. But the juvenile court ordered the minor detained, finding among other things that continuance of the minor in the home of K.C. was contrary to the minor's welfare.
Daniel R. (Daniel) came forward and said he was the biological father of the minor. He appeared at the contested jurisdiction hearing and testified that he recently signed a VDOP. Over K.C.'s objection, the juvenile court declared Daniel the presumed father and appointed counsel for him. Mother and Daniel indicated their willingness to participate in reunification services and mother requested that the case be transferred to her home county of Butte in order for her to participate in services and that the minor be placed in an ICWA-approved home.
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
When the social worker informed K.C. of the intent to transfer the case to Butte County, K.C. expressed her concern that the minor would be placed in another county and stated," 'I have paperwork of Daniel and [mother] giving me full custody.'" K.C. continued," 'I am [the minor's] legal parent and so is [mother] but she and Daniel have both given us full custody in the guardianship and in the custody case as well. I have been in [the minor's] life since before she was born. My husband and I are doing all we can to bring her back home.'" K.C. and D.C. requested that the minor be returned to their care.
The social worker spoke with a representative of mother's tribe, who requested that the case be transferred to Butte County and that mother and Daniel be given reunification services. The Agency recommended the same and noted that, in the event reunification efforts failed, the permanent plan was "adoption or a Tribal Customary Adoption with a tribal member." The proposed case plan included services for mother and Daniel but not for K.C.
At the continuation of the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court noted the temporary guardianship had terminated, so K.C. no longer had the rights of a guardian. The juvenile court also determined K.C.'s VDOP was not valid and that the law did not support K.C.'s argument that she was a legal parent. The juvenile court denied K.C.'s request to vacate its prior finding that Daniel was a presumed father.
The juvenile court turned next to jurisdiction and disposition and allowed K.C. and her counsel to cross-examine witnesses and provide the testimony of D.C. Counsel for K.C. was also permitted to present argument. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent of the court and adopted the Agency's recommended findings and orders as modified on the record.
K.C. filed a request for de facto parent status, and the matter was set for hearing on March 22, 2021. In the meantime, the court ordered the State of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records, to correct the minor's birth certificate by removing K.C.'s name and reflecting only mother's name under the "Name of Parent" portion of the certificate, and providing the minor's correct full name, date of birth, and place of birth.
On March 22, 2021, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the parties' request to transfer the matter to Butte County and on K.C.'s request for de facto parent status. K.C. was present with her legal counsel. The juvenile court ordered the case transferred, including the de facto parent request.
On May 27, 2021, the juvenile court in Butte County conducted a transfer-in hearing. Present at the hearing was mother, the Butte County Department of Employment and Social Services (Department), the social worker, counsel for the Mooretown Rancheria Tribe, K.C., and D.C. K.C. informed the juvenile court of her understanding that her de facto parent request was still pending, and she requested appointment of counsel. The juvenile court said it was not required to appoint counsel for a de facto parent but had the discretion to do so. The juvenile court continued K.C.'s requests for appointment of counsel and de facto parent status and accepted transfer-in of the case from Siskiyou County.
At the continued hearing on June 17, 2021, the Department and counsel for all parties and the tribe objected to K.C.'s request for de facto parent status and the juvenile court continued the matter for a contested hearing. K.C. again requested appointment of counsel, and the juvenile court denied the request.
On September 8, 2021, K.C. filed a request for judicial notice of (1) the juvenile court's August 31, 2021 minute order arising from the continued contested hearing, and (2) K.C.'s notice of appeal from the August 31, 2021 order. The request for judicial notice is hereby denied.
DISCUSSION
K.C. contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her request for appointment of counsel. She claims she is the minor's parent and guardian entitled to appointed counsel. She adds that even if we conclude she is not the minor's parent or guardian, the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her request for appointed counsel given the unique circumstances of this case.
Section 317 provides: "When it appears to the court that a parent or guardian of the child is presently financially unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, and the child has been placed in out-of-home care, or the petitioning agency is recommending that the child be placed in out-of-home care, the court shall appoint counsel for the parent or guardian, unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in this section." (§ 317, subd. (b).)
K.C. acknowledges that she was not a de facto parent at the time the juvenile court denied her request for counsel, and that the juvenile court had discretion to grant or deny appointed counsel in any event. (In re A.F. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 692, 705; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(a).) She nevertheless argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it declined to appoint counsel because she had previously been the minor's guardian, she continued to have a relationship with the minor even after detention, and the orders denying her legal relationship to the minor were under appellate review.
The appellate record does not show that such arguments were presented to the juvenile court in this case."' "An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1398; see also In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558.) Under the circumstances, and in any event, K.C. has not established that the juvenile court in this case abused its discretion in denying the request for appointment of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., RENNER, J.