Opinion
No. 08-01-00467-CR
March 20, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 409th District Court of El Paso County, Texas.
Before Panel No. 2: BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant was charged by indictment for the offense of capital murder. This is an appeal from a jury conviction for the lessor-included offense of criminally negligent homicide. The court assessed punishment at two (2) years' confinement in a Texas State Jail Facility and a $10,000 fine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
The record in the instant case shows that on the morning of November 16, 1997, two hunters found an abandoned infant wrapped in a white towel behind some brush near an unpaved levee road located in the outskirts of El Paso near Canutillo, Texas. Both hunters testified that the first freeze of the year had occurred overnight. The infant was cold and unresponsive to the touch. The two men drove their truck for help. They flagged down Stephen Haack, a deputy with the El Paso County Sheriff's Department. Haack followed the two men back to the infant's location. When Haack opened the white towel, he found her in a fetal position with part of the umbilical cord attached, and covered in afterbirth. There were no signs of life. The infant had what appeared to be human hair clutched in her hand. The infant was taken to the El Paso County Medical Examiner's office for an autopsy. On January 12, Detective James Reuter of the El Paso County Sheriff's Department, received a call from an individual who indicated that Appellant might be a suspect in the case. The next day Reuter and Detective Onesimo Esparza went to Marisa Escobar's trailer home where Appellant was staying. Inside the trailer in a bedroom, they observed apparent blood stains on the wall and a door frame and some stains on the carpet that appeared as if someone tried to clean the carpet with bleach. Several hours later, Bustillos and Victor Romero, Appellant's boyfriend, arrived at the trailer. Both consented to go to the police station. At the station, Appellant gave the following statement: I became pregnant with my boyfriend's child around February 1997. I was living with my father, Manuel, and my stepmother Clara Escalera. Also living there, at 110 Ashtray Road, were my stepmother's children. My brother Danny, would come and visit now and then. I moved to my sister's house at 7840 Kiely Road #25, sometime in late August 1997. I moved there because she was also expecting a baby and to help take care of her two other boys. On 09-20-97, the whole family attended my brother Manny's wedding. During the wedding reception, my father Manuel, had been drinking and started crying. My brother Manny told me that someone had told my father that I was pregnant. My boyfriend, Ismael Romero, knew I was pregnant. On 11-15-97, I was at my sister's house by myself. My sister and her husband and the children went to visit some relatives in Juarez. I called Ismael. Ismael came to my sister's house around 5:00 p.m. He stayed for about fifteen minutes, then left. He told me that if I needed anything to call him. I had felt bad all day long. After Ismael left I went and took a shower. I had taken some painkillers earlier. After my shower I went into the bedroom next to the bathroom and laid down on the bed. I was having a lot (sic) of pain. I got up from the bed and stood. The baby just came out, and fell to the floor. I just stood there shocked. Initially, the baby was crying. I had a towel wrapped around me from the shower. I picked the baby up from the floor and wrapped the baby in the towel. I then placed the baby on the bed. When I placed the baby on the bed she was not crying any longer. I sat on the bed for awhile next to the baby. I didn't know what to do. I remembered my brother in law (sic) Jesus telling me that the car was there if I needed it. I got dressed. I cleaned the baby alittle (sic). I carried the baby to the car and placed the baby on the front seat. The baby was still and not moving. I drove off from my sister's and really do not know where I went. I remember crossing a bridge and then turned left right after the bridge. I drove down that road a little then made a U-turn and stopped the car. I got out of the car and carried the baby across a ditch and placed the baby in some brush. I went to the car and sat there awhile. I was very dizzy and that started in the afternoon. I was still dizzy. I went back to my sister's house. I stayed outside for a little while. I then went inside the trailer and sat on the couch where I sleep. I was bleeding quite a lot (sic). I went to the restroom and threw-up (sic). I sat there for awhile. I tried to clean up the bedroom before I left the trailer. I then went into the first room. I had a small puppy that Ismael gave me. I let him out and he went to the couch where I sleep. I went to the couch and later fell asleep. Later, my sister and her husband came home. I had locked the door. I heard them knock, I got up and opened the door. I sat on the couch with my nephews for a few minutes and talked with them. I told my sister as she was walking toward the back of the trailer that I had gotten sick and threw-up (sic) blood in the room. Neither my sister or her husband questioned what I told them. I never told them that I was pregnant. I really didn't show very much throughout my pregnancy. As a result of this statement, Reuter placed Appellant under arrest for the murder of the abandoned infant. Three medical experts testified at trial. The first expert to testify was Dr. Juan Contin, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on the infant. Contin testified that the cause of death was hypothermia due to cold weather exposure. Contin stated, "The child was exposed to a low temperature and I concluded that the cause of death was hypothermia." Contin also stated that the infant was alive after her birth because he found air in her stomach and intestines. He testified that a newborn child wrapped in a towel and left out in the freezing night would become unconscious fairly quickly. Contin speculated that it would take from one-half hour to an hour to die. If the infant were wet, death could occur sooner. When Contin was cross-examined, he agreed with the defense that the infant could have died of hypothermia inside an unheated mobile home. With hypothermia, death would be accelerated in freezing temperatures if the infant was wet and if the infant had been wrapped in a wet towel. Dr. Harry Wilson, a pediatric pathologist, assisted Dr. Contin with the autopsy. Wilson prepared some slides from the infant's brain tissue. When he viewed the slides microscopically, he found the presence of red neurons in her brain. Wilson stated that these neurons develop when damaged brain nerve cells degenerate as a result of lack of oxygen to the brain. If a person is alive while this damage is occurring, the damaged nerve cells become red neurons. If the subject dies immediately after the damage occurs, red neurons would not develop. Wilson testified that in the case of an infant, the child would have to be alive for a minimum of four hours for the red neurons to develop. Wilson testified that it was possible that the infant suffered some type of asphyxiation before she was exposed to the cold thereby causing the nerve cell degeneration. The presence of red neurons indicated that the infant was alive for at least four hours in the deprived oxygen state for the red neurons to develop. Wilson also testified that the glycogen stores found in the infant's liver had just begun to show depletion. This process begins four hours after an infant is born. Therefore, Wilson estimated that given the development of red neurons, and the state of the glycogen depletion, the infant had lived approximately four hours after birth. He also stated that the infant's hypothermia could have been reversed if she had received prompt medical care. During rebuttal testimony for the State, Wilson provided a presentation in the courtroom where he examined the slides microscopically, and pointed out the presence of the red neurons. During the defense presentation, Dr. Contin was called to the stand as a defense witness. Contin testified that he reviewed slides of the infant's brain tissue two days prior to his testimony, and he did not see any red neurons. During cross-examination, he stated that he had no greater ability than any other doctor to identify red neurons. Appellant called Dr. Corine Stern as a defense witness. She testified that she was the chief medical examiner for El Paso County. She reviewed Dr. Contin's autopsy report and reviewed the slides that had been made from the infant's brain tissue. Stern stated that she did not see the presence of red neurons. She testified that there was no forensic basis in quantifying the amount of glycogen depletion in the liver in order to determine a time of death for an infant. Stern testified that the cause of death could not be definitely determined. She stated that the infant could have died from natural causes from being born unattended. Stern also testified that the infant could have died from hypothermia as a result of being born in a cold trailer. She stated that an infant can die of hypothermia at room temperature unless protective measures are taken. Stern was called again by the defense as a rebuttal witness. She reiterated that she disagreed with Dr. Wilson's testimony concerning the presence of red neurons. Stern stated that she detected the presence of dying neurons in the infant's brain tissue. However, Stern testified that dying neurons should not be confused with red neurons. She also related that it takes ten to twenty-four hours to see red neurons after an hypoxic event in the brain. Prior to the commencement of the voir dire, Appellant filed an election to have the jury assess punishment. At the charge conference prior to commencement of the punishment stage of trial, Appellant moved to change her election and to proceed to the court for punishment in order to allow Appellant to be eligible for community supervision. The State objected to the change of election and the court denied Appellant's motion. Appellant objected to this denial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel as well as due process and equal protection grounds. The court overruled these objections. After the jury returned its punishment verdict of two (2) years' state jail confinement and a $10,000 fine, Appellant was sentenced. Subsequent to the sentencing, Appellant filed a motion requesting suspension of her sentence. The court held that it had the authority to suspend a jury's sentence in a state jail felony and scheduled a hearing regarding the issue of community supervision. At this hearing, Appellant presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist who gave the opinion that Appellant did not exhibit indications that she was a threat to the community or a danger to society. After hearing the evidence, the court denied Appellant's motion requesting suspension of the sentence.II. DISCUSSION
Appellant presents two issues on appeal. First, she asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. Secondly, she maintains that Article 42.12 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we are constrained to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense, as alleged in the application paragraph of the charge to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). More particularly, sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Our role is not to ascertain whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990); Dwyer v. State, 836 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). We do not resolve any conflict in fact, weigh any evidence or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, and thus, the fact-finding results of a criminal jury trial are given great deference. Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 650-52 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Leyva v. State, 840 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd); Bennett v. State, 831 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.). Instead, our only duty is to determine if both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421-22. In so doing, we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843, (quoting Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988)). The trier of fact, not the appellate court, is free to accept or reject all or any portion of any witness's testimony. Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 897 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd). When conducting a review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence, but we do not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Levario, 964 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.). We review the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 832, 118 S.Ct. 100, 139 L.Ed.2d 54 (1997). A defendant challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence may allege that the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or in a case where the defendant has offered contrary evidence, she may argue that the finding of guilt is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Although we are authorized to set aside the fact finder's determination under either of these two circumstances, our review must employ appropriate deference and should not intrude upon the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any evidence presented at trial. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. We are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because we feel that a different result is more reasonable. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. The application paragraph in the court's charge to the jury provided:Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 15th day of November 1997 in El Paso County, Texas, the Defendant, Norma Bustillos, did then and there with criminal negligence, by omission, cause the death of JANE DOE, by failing to provide food, shelter, medical care, or protection to JANE DOE, by failing to provide food, shelter, medical care, under section 151.003 of the Texas Family Code, and the Defendant was then and there the parent of JANE DOE, and said JANE DOE was then and there a child younger than six years of age, then you will find the defendant guilty of Criminal Negligent Homicide.In accordance with the statutory definition, the trial court instructed the jury that "criminal negligence" means:
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding her conduct or the result of her conduct when she ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's stand point.Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 1994). The jury was also instructed that: Section 151.003 of the Family Code provides, in part, that a parent of a child has the following rights and duties: The Duty to provide, care, protection, food, shelter, and medical care. The duty of a parent to support his or her child exists while the child is an unemancipated minor and continues as long as the child is fully enrolled in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma until the end of the school year in which the child graduates. In understanding what the State was required to prove in this case, a comparison of "criminal negligence" with "recklessness" is useful. Criminal negligence is a lesser culpable mental state than recklessness. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(c), (d) (Vernon 1994); see Conroy v. State, 843 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). Criminal negligence involves inattentive risk creation; the actor ought to be aware of the risk surrounding her conduct or the results thereof. Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); Todd v. State, 911 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.). Reckless conduct involves conscious risk creation; that is, the actor is aware of the risk surrounding her conduct or the results thereof, but consciously disregards that risk. Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 814-15. At the heart of reckless conduct is conscious disregard of the risk created by the actor's conduct; the key to criminal negligence is found in the failure of the actor to perceive the risk. Id. at 815. Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies upon circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 815. In most instances, it must be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 815; Fuentes v. State, 880 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, pet. ref'd). The issue of whether criminal negligence is shown, that is, whether one should be aware of a requisite risk, is a conclusion to be drawn through inference from all the circumstances by the trier of fact. Dillon, 574 S.W.2d at 94; Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 815. Initially, we note that at the charge conference, Appellant did not object to the inclusion of the lessor-included offense of criminally negligent homicide in the charge to the jury. If a defendant requests or does not object to the submission of a lesser-included offense and accepts the benefits of such a charge, she is estopped from challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Lee, 818 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Otting v. State, 8 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). In effect, an Appellant cannot induce the court to submit an instruction on a lesser included offense or enjoy the benefits of such an instruction by failing to object to its submission and then attack, as legally or factually insufficient, a subsequent finding of guilt. Otting, 8 S.W.3d at 686-87; Reaves v. State, 970 S.W.2d 111, 118 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); see Tamez. v. State, 865 S.W.2d 518, 519-20 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd). Therefore, we hold that Appellant, by not objecting to submission of the lesser charge to the jury, waived her first issue challenging the legal and factual insufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for criminally negligent homicide. Appellant's first issue is overruled. In her second issue, Appellant maintains that Article 42.12(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.05(b) (Vernon 1994), provides that an offense under the criminally negligent homicide statute is a state jail felony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003) does not allow a jury to recommend that a person found guilty of a state jail felony be placed on community supervision. However, the trial court may, if it so desires, still place a state jail felon on community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 15(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Appellant maintains that this sentencing scheme violated her right to equal protection as a jury may recommend probation with regard to other non-state-jail offenses. Appellant asserts that there is no rational basis for this distinction. If a statutory classification does not interfere with a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose to survive an equal protection challenge. Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 850, 121 S.Ct. 125, 148 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Those attacking the rationality of a legislative classification have the burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support it. Anderer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). We apply a highly deferential standard of review to equal protection claims of this nature. Id. This standard is extremely respectful of legislative determinations and essentially means that a court will not invalidate a statute unless the statute draws distinctions that simply make no sense. Id. The court in Anderer, (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)), stated:
[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.Anderer, 47 S.W.3d at 66. An equal protection assertion identical to the claim in this case was made in Anderer. The State maintained that state jail felonies are unique and there was a rational basis in the Legislature's decision to limit the discretion solely to judges, who, unlike juries, are familiar with the terms of community supervision, the availability of rehabilitative programs for state jail inmates, as well as other aspects of the state jail felony system. Id. The court agreed and held that the State had indicated a rational basis for the state jail sentencing scheme; therefore, there was no equal protection violation. Id. at 67. Appellant urges us to ignore the holding in Anderer because the stated rational makes no sense in that judges will always be more familiar with the nuances of community supervision with regard to any offense. Appellant also asserts that the sentencing options available for such offenses as sexual abuse of a child and driving while intoxicated are much more complicated than the sentencing options available for a state jail felony. However, we find that we do not reach the merits of Appellant's contention. Appellant must show that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional as to her, in her situation. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2223-24, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); Parent v. State, 621 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); McDonald v. State, 863 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.); Townsend v. State, 725 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd); Hypke v. State, 720 S.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). In this case, the issue of community supervision was fully considered by the court. As such, Appellant has not demonstrated that the statute is unconstitutional as it was applied to her, and therefore she has no standing to challenge its constitutionality. See Hypke, 720 S.W.2d at 159. Accordingly, Appellant's second issue is overruled. Having overruled each of Appellant's issues on review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
While I concur with the judgment in this cause, I write separately to express deep reservations as to the procedural fairness of the sentencing scheme articulated in Article 42.12 with respect to the availability of community supervision for defendants convicted of state jail felonies. On appeal Appellant raises a serious concern as to the fundamental fairness of statutory provisions which permit a judge, but not a jury to recommend community provision in state jail felony cases. For the following reasons, I find the state jail felony sentencing scheme troubling. Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides to every defendant a statutory right to elect the judge or the jury to assess punishment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 2(b) (Vernon 1981 Supp. 2003). While the defendant's right is not a constitutional right, her ability to exercise that right should nevertheless not be rendered meaningless by subjecting her to arbitrary limitations once she has made a jury election. The sentencing scheme for state jail felonies under Article 42.12 can produce in certain circumstances, as here, an election between a jury or judge that more reflects trial strategy and chance than the full exercise of a defendant's afforded rights. To this extent, the scheme challenges notions of procedural due process and due course of law and unfortunately creates unintended and perverse incentives within our criminal justice system. Procedures for state jail felony community supervision are governed by Article 42.12 sec; 15 Texas, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 15(a) provides:
"[O]n conviction of a state jail felony punished under Section 12.35(a), Penal Code, the judge may suspend the imposition of the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision or may order the sentence to be executed. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 15(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).In all felony cases except state jail felony cases, a jury assessing punishment may recommend that its sentence be suspended and that the defendant be placed on community supervision. If the jury makes this recommendation in the verdict, the judge must suspend the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 4(a), (d)(2), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2003). A defendant convicted of a state jail felony offense may have the right to elect a jury to assess punishment, but knowing that the jury cannot recommend probation for this type of felony, will most certainly elect the judge to assess punishment because the judge may suspend the sentence and place her on community supervision, thereby the defendant foregoes her right to a jury assessment. In the present case, Appellant was indicted with capital murder, but the jury convicted her of the lesser-included, state jail felony offense of criminally negligent homicide. Prior to the punishment phase of her trial, Appellant filed a motion to change her jury election and proceed to the court for punishment so that she would remain eligible for community supervision. The court denied Appellant's motion and the jury sentenced Appellant to two (2) years' imprisonment. Appellant filed a motion requesting suspension of her sentence. The court held it had authority to suspend the jury's sentence in a state jail felony and after a hearing on community supervision, the court denied Appellant's motion. Though Appellant had a right to have the jury assess punishment under Article 37.07, Section 2(b), Appellant apparently attempted to forgo that right because Article 42.12, Section 15(a) alters the jury's ability to recommend probation for state jail felonies, while retaining the jury's ability to make such a recommendation for other felonies of greater severity. I have yet to be persuaded that there exists a rational justification for such a distinction in state jail felony sentencing. Although this Court has disposed of Appellant's second issue on standing grounds, Appellant's challenge clearly calls into question whether the statute as enacted falls within the bounds of due process and due course of law in Texas.
Section 15(a) does not expressly state whether the judge has authority to suspend jury-imposed as well as judge-imposed sentences, however, the plain reading of this statute suggests that the judge's authority to suspend applies in both circumstances. See e.g., Rhodes v. State, 997 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (applying Article 42.12, Section 15(a) in a state jail felony case in which the jury had assessed punishment).
The Anderer court noted this dilemma when it remarked that "an effect of this statutory scheme is that a state jail felon who may be entitled to probation from a judge, is absolutely prohibited from seeking probation from a jury. The end result, [Appellant] states that a defendant who wishes to elect the jury in punishment in a state jail felony where the use of a deadly weapon is alleged, is put in the position of arguing in the guilt/innocence phase that he is not guilty of a state jail felony, but, at the same time, arguing that if the jury does find him guilty, to find him guilty of using a deadly weapon as well so that he may be eligible for probation in punishment." Anderer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).