Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott

17 Citing cases

  1. Johnson v. Federal L. Ins. Co.

    276 N.W. 595 (Iowa 1937)   Cited 3 times

    "`Moreover, the reinstatement was not the making of a new contract, for no new or different terms were agreed upon. It was simply the cancellation of a forfeiture, whereupon the contract was restored and recognized as binding by the company.' Goodwin v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Assn., 97 Iowa 226, 238, 66 N.W. 157, 160, 32 L.R.A. 473, 59 Am. St. Rep. 411. "See, also, Lindsey v. Western Mut. Aid Soc., 84 Iowa 734, 741, 50 N.W. 29; Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott (C.C.A.), 17 F.2d 4; Cason v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 67 Colo. 199, 184 P. 296, 6 A.L.R. 1395; Eicks v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 300 Mo. 279, 253 S.W. 1029; 32 Corpus Juris 1144." We quote from the case of Business Men's Assurance Co., v. Scott (C.C.A.), 17 F.2d 4, 6; Id. 275 U.S. 531, 48 S. Ct. 28, 72 L. Ed. 410, 98 A.L.R. 345, as follows:

  2. Ettman v. Federal Life Ins. Co.

    137 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1943)   Cited 13 times

    In the absence of compelling authority, this Court will not rule, intimate or agree that the statute applies to the policy in suit. See Business Men's Assur. Co. of America v. Scott, 8 Cir., 17 F.2d 4, 6; McReynolds v. New York Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 122 F.2d 895, 899. The insured can not complain of the trial court's having applied the Misrepresentation Statute to his case, since that gave him the benefit of a more favorable rule relating to the materiality of the statements made by him in his application than he was entitled to under his policy.

  3. McReynolds v. New York Life Ins. Co.

    122 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1941)   Cited 4 times

    Under that construction of the statute, the beneficiary of an insured under an accident policy who committed suicide while insane, is in as good a position as, but in no better position than, the beneficiary of an insured whose death was caused accidentally and involuntarily by the same means. Under the construction contended for by the appellant, a policy which insured only against death from a stroke of lightning would have to be construed as covering death caused by any violent means which an insured might use in doing away with himself, provided he was insane at the time. The difficulty of making a suicide statute such as that here involved — which is entirely appropriate to straight life insurance — fit policies of limited coverage against death by accident, is well illustrated by the present controversy and was pointed out by this Court in Business Men's Assurance Co. v. Scott, 17 F.2d 4, in which we expressed the view that the Colorado Suicide Statute was never originally intended by the legislature of that State to apply to accident policies carrying death benefits, because of its inappropriateness to such insurance. At the time that case was decided, the Supreme Court of Colorado had ruled that the statute applied to such policies, but it had not determined whether the statute required them to cover suicide committed by the insured while sane.

  4. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie

    114 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1940)   Cited 9 times
    In State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mackechnie, 114 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1940), the insured bus was owned by the director of a college choir.

    Under a contract for reinstatement, all provisions of the former contract are restored and continued in force under the new contract. Wastun v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 12 F.2d 422; Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott, 8 Cir., 17 F.2d 4. The application certainly indicates an intent to reinstate the suspended policy as strongly as it indicates an intent to have issued a new policy. With such possible interpretations, an ambiguity existed, and hence, the written instrument was open to explanation by parol evidence.

  5. Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co.

    94 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1938)   Cited 13 times

    If there was no valid reinstatement of this lapsed policy, it remained a lapsed policy. It is true, as the defendants contend, that a reinstated policy is not a new contract; it is an old contract which has been restored (Business Men's Assurance Co. v. Scott, 8 Cir., 17 F.2d 4; Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 70 F.2d 976); but the agreement whereby a lapsed policy is reinstated and restored is a new agreement (Wastun v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 12 F.2d 422, 425). With reference to the effect of the incontestable clause upon a reinstated policy, Prof. Vance, in his work on Insurance, 2d Ed., has this to say (page 825):

  6. Tatum v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

    75 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1935)   Cited 11 times
    In Tatum v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 75 F.2d 476, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, had under consideration a policy similar to those considered here.

    In the only decisions in which the point has arisen this has been the result. Business Men's Assurance Co. v. Scott, 17 F.2d 4 (C.C.A. 8); Mutual L.I. Co. v. Lovejoy, 201 Ala. 337, 78 So. 299, L.R.A. 1918D, 860; Id., 203 Ala. 452, 83 So. 591. Those cases which allow the insured to prove fraud in procuring the reinstatement though the period of incontestability has passed, do not indeed fall in so easily with the accepted view as with our own. They may nevertheless be made to fit with it. Though the new contract be a reissue of the policy as of the date of the renewal, it would force beyond all reason the meaning of the incontestability clause to say that it barred a fraud which did not even exist when the policy became incontestable.

  7. Ætna Life Ins. v. Braukman

    70 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1934)   Cited 9 times

    " From the foregoing it appears that a case involving suicide while sane has never been presented to, or decided by, the Supreme Court of Colorado. With the federal courts, in Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott, 17 F.2d 4 (C.C.A. 8), a case of suicide while insane arising in Colorado was considered, and the court there observed that the Supreme Court of Colorado had up to that time only considered cases of suicide while insane, and declined to go farther than that court had gone in construing the provisions of the statute, although the opinion contains language concerning suicide while sane which in some aspects points with favor to appellant's contention. Counsel have discussed at length a somewhat similar Missouri statute and the court decisions in relation thereto.

  8. Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    70 F.2d 976 (8th Cir. 1934)   Cited 43 times

    Under the terms of the policy, reinstatement restored the old policy and did not create a new one. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America v. Scott (C.C.A. 8) 17 F.2d 4, 6, 7; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Ziegler (Tex.Civ.App.) 250 S.W. 1115, 1116, 1117. See, also, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham et al., 93 U.S. 24, 31-33, 23 L. Ed. 789. Any other rule as applied to level premium life insurance would be legally unsound and actuarially absurd.

  9. General Casualty Surety Co. v. Kierstead

    67 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1933)   Cited 19 times
    In General Casualty Surety Co. v. Kierstead, 67 F.2d 523, 525, the Court stated the principle thus: "The condition of the policy requiring co-operation by the insured is in the nature of a condition precedent to liability on the company's part for the loss growing out of a claim with the disposition of which the insured's co-operation is demanded," but further says, "The defense is an affirmative one pleaded by the defendant, and the burden of proof was upon it.

    Where the evidence is such that the court, in the exercise of judicial discretion, would set aside an adverse verdict, then a verdict should be directed. Wheeler v. Fidelity Deposit Co. (C.C.A. 8) 63 F.2d 562; Farmers' Natl. Bank v. Missouri Livestock Commission Co. (C.C.A. 8) 53 F.2d 991; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Baehler (C.C.A. 8) 26 F.2d 26; Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott (C.C.A. 8) 17 F.2d 4; Andresen v. Kaercher (C.C.A. 8) 38 F.2d 462. We are clear that a verdict for the defendant must have been set aside as not sustained by substantial evidence.

  10. Wheeler v. Fidelity Deposit Co.

    63 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1933)   Cited 4 times

    And, even where the evidence is conflicting, if it is of so conclusive a character that the court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, would set aside a verdict in opposition to it, then it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Baehler (C.C.A. 8) 26 F.2d 26; Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott (C.C.A. 8) 17 F.2d 4; Benash v. Business Men's Assur. Co. (C.C.A. 8) 25 F.2d 423; Andresen v. Kaercher (C.C.A. 8) 38 F.2d 462. Where, as in this case, a party testifies in his own behalf, he is not entitled to go to the jury on an issue unless that portion of his own testimony which is least favorable to his contention is of such a character as will sustain a verdict in his favor on that issue.