Opinion
C.A. No. CPU5-13-000418
09-09-2013
Kissiah Burvig and George Stevens, Appellants, Defendants-Below, v. Cheryl Thompson, Appellee, Plaintiff-Below.
Tasha M. Stevens, Esq. Fuqua, Yori & Willard, P.A. 26 The Circle P O Box 250 Georgetown, DE 19947 Attorney for Appellants Victoria J. Hoffman, Esq. Legal Services Corp. of Delaware 24A Hiawatha Lane Dover, DE 19904 Attorney for Appellee
Tasha M. Stevens, Esq.
Fuqua, Yori & Willard, P.A.
26 The Circle
P O Box 250
Georgetown, DE 19947
Attorney for Appellants Victoria J. Hoffman, Esq.
Legal Services Corp. of Delaware
24A Hiawatha Lane
Dover, DE 19904
Attorney for Appellee
DECISION ON APPEAL OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Appellants, Defendants-Below, Kissiah Burvig and George Stevens, have appealed the Justice of the Peace Court's decision denying Appellant George Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment that was entered against him in that court pursuant to Ney v. Polite, 399 A.2d 527 (Del. 1979). After a careful review of the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court along with that Court's record and the parties' arguments, the Justice of the Peace Court's decision denying Appellant Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellee, Cheryl Thompson, originally filed a Landlord-Tenant action in Justice of the Peace Court against the appellants, Kissiah Burvig and George Stevens, for summary possession of a rental unit. Appellant George Stevens ("Stevens") filed a counterclaim for wrongful ouster. A trial date was scheduled for the parties' claims. The appellants failed to appear for trial at the time scheduled and a default judgment was entered against them in favor of the appellee. Additionally, Stevens' counterclaim was dismissed for his failure to appear to pursue it. Approximately one hour later, the appellants appeared for the trial.
Stevens then filed a timely motion to vacate the default judgment that was entered against him. In support of his motion, he stated that he failed to appear at trial on time because of car trouble and that he should have a chance to be heard on the merits of his defense and claim. The Justice of the Peace Court denied the motion to vacate the default judgment on the grounds that the conduct that permitted the default judgment to be taken did not constitute "excusable neglect." The Justice of the Peace Court noted that Stevens had arrived more than an hour late for trial and made no attempt to contact the court on the morning of the trial to advise it of any delay due to car trouble. The Justice of the Peace Court determined that a reasonably prudent person in Stevens' position would have contacted the court to inform it of the issues with his car and that he was delayed. The appellants have now appealed the denial of Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him to this Court. They contend that the Justice of the Peace Court abused its discretion when denying the motion to vacate the default judgment.
At argument on his appeal to this Court, Stevens indicated that he contacted Kissiah Burvig to let her know that he was running late. However, it never occurred to him to contact the trial court in order to advise it that he was delayed.
KISSIAH BURVIG'S APPEAL
Although a default judgment was entered against Appellant Kissiah Burvig in Justice of the Peace Court along with Appellant George Stevens, Appellant Kissiah Burvig never joined in Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment that was entered against him. Since she never filed a motion to vacate the judgment that was entered against her, she has no standing to appeal the Justice of the Peace Court's decision to deny Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment that was entered against him. Therefore, her appeal of the Justice of the Peace Court's decision must be dismissed.
GEORGE STEVENS' APPEAL
Scope of Review
When considering Appellant George Stevens' appeal, this Court is limited in its scope of review and may only review the Justice of the Peace Court's decision denying the motion to vacate default judgment. Therefore, the pertinent issue on appeal is whether the Justice of the Peace Court made an "arbitrary and capricious" decision when it denied Stevens' motion. "The Delaware Supreme Court has held that on appeal from a denial of a motion to vacate ... review is limited to the decision denying the motion and does not bring review of the case for trial de novo." Thus, review in these proceedings is limited only to the issue of whether the Justice of the Peace Court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.
Ney v. Polite, 399 A.2d 527, 528-529 (Del. 1979).
Pitts v. White, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. 1954).
Hurd v. Smith, 2009 WL 1610516, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. June 10, 2009) (citing Ney, 399 A.2d at 529 (Del. 1979)).
Pitts, 109 A.2d at 788.
Discussion
Justice of the Peace Civil Rule 55 provides that the Justice of the Peace Court may enter default judgment against a party who has failed to appear. Additionally, the court may vacate the default judgment pursuant to Justice of the Peace Civil Rule 60(b). However, the party moving to vacate a default judgment must establish three elements before the motion will be granted:
(1) excusable neglect in the conduct that allowed the default judgment to be taken; (2) a meritorious defense to the action that would allow a different outcome to the litigation if the matter was heard on its merits; and (3) a showing that substantial prejudice will not be suffered by the Plaintiff if the motion is granted.
Perry v. Wilson, 2009 WL 1964787, at *1 (Del. Super.) (quoting Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Baldwin Line Constr. Co., 2004 WL 838610, at *1 (Del. Super.)).
Any party desiring to vacate a default judgment must first prove "excusable neglect" before the court will consider the second two elements. If no excusable neglect is found, the court need not consider the remaining prongs. "Excusable neglect" is defined as "that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances."
Id.
Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 n.4 (Del. 1977) (citing Cohen v. Brandywine Raceway Ass'n, 238 A.2d 320, 325 (Del. Super. 1968)).
Stevens did not provide the Justice of the Peace Court with excusable neglect in his conduct that permitted the default to be entered against him. Therefore, that court did not need to go beyond the first prong of the test. Stevens had a cell phone on his person and used it to call his co-defendant, Ms. Burvig, to advise her of his car trouble, but, failed to alert the Justice of the Peace Court that he would be late for trial. Stevens' failure to alert the Justice of the Peace Court was not the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. A reasonably prudent person would have either called the court himself or asked the co-defendant to call the court to advise it of his car issues and that he would be late.
Since Stevens' conduct in permitting the default judgment to be entered against him did not constitute "excusable neglect," the Justice of the Peace Court was not required to inquire about the remaining two prongs of the test to vacate a default judgment. Furthermore, even though the vacation of default judgments under Rule 60(b) are afforded a liberal construction, reflecting the public policy favoring a trial on the merits, that policy is not enough to overcome Stevens' lack of excusable neglect. Due to his neglect, his opposing party had left the courthouse and would have had to appear at a later date for trial. If Stevens had simply called the Justice of the Peace Court to advise it of his transportation issues, his opposing party could have waited at the court for trial.
Id. at 1135-36.
There is substantial Delaware case law indicating a preference of the courts that cases are to be resolved on the merits. However, the courts must also consider the integrity of the judicial process, as well as the finality of judgments, when considering Rule 60(b) motions. The public policy of resolving this case on the merits is not strong enough to overcome those additional considerations.
Wilson v. Montague, 19 A.3d 302, 2011 WL 1661561, at *2 (Del. 2011)
Id.
On review, this Court must review the Justice of the Peace Court's decision in this case pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard. More specifically, it must consider whether the Justice of the Peace Court's denial of Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him was based on "conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness."
Ney v. Polite, 399 A.2d 527, 529 (Del. 1979).
Id. --------
In this case, the Justice of the Peace Court used sound reasoning when it denied Stevens' motion to vacate the default judgment. The court applied the appropriate legal analysis and came to the conclusion that Stevens did not exhibit excusable neglect. The record below demonstrates that the Justice of the Peace Court reached a reasonable conclusion in denying Stevens' motion. Therefore, this Court finds that there was no abuse of discretion by the Justice of the Peace Court and that court's decision denying Stevens' motion is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of SEPTEMBER, 2013.
/s/_________
CHARLES W. WELCH
JUDGE