Opinion
3:23-cv-01528-JR
02-28-2024
REBECCA BURTON, an individual, MICHAEL HARPEL, an individual, JINA LEHMAN, an individual, GALINA LOPUGA, an individual, LORI SAHLIN, an individual, and LUDMYLA PANOV, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. LEGACY HEALTH, a corporation, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOLIE A. RUSSO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant Legacy Health (“Legacy”) moves to partially dismiss plaintiffs Rebecca Burton, Michael Harpel, Jina Lehman, Galina Lopuga, Lori Sahlin, and Ludmyla Panov's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, Legacy's motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
Legacy, a non-profit organization located in Portland, Oregon, employed plaintiffs at various healthcare facilities. This case centers on Legacy's denial of Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's religious exception requests surrounding the COVID-19 vaccine.
Legacy does not challenge Harpel and Panov's claims, each of whom relied on the use of aborted fetal cells in the vaccine's development in seeking a religious exception. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 2 n.1 (doc. 4); see also Keene v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 2023 WL 3451687, *2-3 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) (reversing the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction premised on a Title VII claim where the plaintiffs - i.e., “Christians who believe in the sanctity of life” - cited the use of fetal cell lines in requesting a religious exception) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
In August 2021, at the height of the pandemic, Governor Brown sought to limit the spread of the potentially deadly coronavirus in the state's healthcare facilities by issuing an executive order requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18, 2021. Johnson v. Brown, 567 F.Supp.3d 1230, 1238 (D. Or. 2021); see also Johnson v. Brown, 614 F.Supp.3d 776, 782 (D. Or. 2022) (“[t]he decision to require vaccination among critical populations, such as healthcare workers and providers and education workers and volunteers, is a rational way to further the State's interest in protecting everyone's health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic”). The rules effectuating Governor Brown's vaccine mandate were promulgated by the Oregon Health Authority. In accordance with those rules, Legacy required all of its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by September 30, 2021. Compl. ¶ 4 (doc. 1).
I. Plaintiff Burton
Burton “was employed as a Registered Nurse for almost three years at Legacy Meridian Park Hospital.” Id. at ¶ 6. Towards the end of that period, she “took a position in the Medical Specialties Unit, where she worked mainly with COVID-19 patients.” Id.
On August 23, 2021, Burton applied for a religious exemption based on her “strongly held Christian beliefs that prevented her from being able to take the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. at ¶ 7.
Burton's “coworkers would make unkind and judgmental comments about patients who were not vaccinated, and pressured [her] to get the vaccine,” which “made her feel disrespected and judged.” Id. at ¶ 9.
II. Plaintiff Lehman
Lehman “was employed for approximately four years as a Staff Registered Nurse at Legacy Mount Hood Medical Center,” wherein “she had direct contact with patients, both in the hospital and outpatient setting.” Id. at ¶ 15.
On August 30, 2021, she filed a request for a religious exception due to her “deeply held Christian beliefs.” Id. at ¶ 16.
Lehman was also “subjected to a hostile work environment, where doctors and anesthesiologists made cruel and hateful comments about unvaccinated staff and patients.” Id. As a result, she “felt [the need] to keep her vaccination status hidden” and “began to dread going to work.” Id.
III. Plaintiff Lopuga
Lopuga “worked as a Food Service Worker in the Food and Nutrition Department . . . for approximately four years.” Id. at ¶ 19.
On August 27, 2021, Lopuga sought a religious exemption “due to her deeply held Christian beliefs.” Id. at ¶ 20.
IV. Plaintiff Sahlin
“Sahlin worked for approximately seventeen years as a Registered Nurse at Legacy Meridian Park Medical Center . . . in the Imaging Department as the Imaging Coordinator.” Id. at ¶ 22.
On August 24, 2021, she “applied for a religious exception to the vaccine mandate . . . due to her deeply held Christian beliefs.” Id. at ¶ 23. Specifically, Sahlin “believes that she was created perfectly by God and lives her faith by placing her trust in God.” Id. “She was saddened beyond words that she, and all the other unvaccinated employees at Legacy, after working throughout the pandemic, suddenly became a threat and went from heroes to perceived murderers,” and “Legacy later allowed COVID-19 positive employees to work due to the shortage of staff.” Id.
V. Proceedings Before This Court
On October 17, 2023, plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit asserting claims for religious discrimination against Legacy under Title VII and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(a). On December 26, 2023, Legacy filed the present motion to dismiss. Briefing was completed in regard to that motion on February 20, 2024.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where the plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the court must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1983). Regardless, bare assertions that amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a claim “are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009). Rather, to state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
Legacy contends dismissal with prejudice is warranted as to Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's claims because they “have not pled facts sufficient to show that they had religious beliefs that conflicted with Legacy's vaccination policy.” Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 6 (doc. 4).
Title VII and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(a) both make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual in the terms and conditions of employment because of religion. “Claims brought under [Oregon law] are analyzed under the same framework as claims brought under Title VII.” El v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 2616397, *3 (D. Or. May 22, 2020).
To establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination based on a failure-to-accommodate, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she “had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty”; (2) she “informed [her] employer of the belief and conflict”; and (3) “the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected [her] to an adverse employment action because of [her] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Petersonv. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff “makes out a prima facie failure-to-accommodate case, the burden then shifts to [the defendant] to show that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Concerning the first prima facie element, Title VII defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Nevertheless, “Title VII does not protect secular preferences.” Id. at 682.
Specific to COVID-19 vaccination mandates, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has provided guidance to employers navigating claimed religious exemptions, explaining that, “although Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on religion, an employee's request for an exemption from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate can be denied on the ground that the employee's belief is not truly religious in nature[.]'” Doe v. SanDiego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021). The EEOC's guidance notes objections that “are purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or any other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible effects of the vaccine)” are not protected by Title VII. What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, EEOC (Oct. 25, 2021), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws#L. “However, overlap between a religious and political view does not place it outside the scope of Title VII's religious protections, as long as the view is part of a comprehensive religious belief system and is not simply an isolated teaching.” Id.
Federal district courts have grappled with the contours of the first prima facie element. Title VII broadly defines religion and “American courts are loath to tell a person that his interpretation of his faith is a wrong one.” Hittle v. City of Stockton, 2022 WL 616722, *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022), aff'd, 76 F.4th 877 (9th Cir. 2023). At the same time, courts have generally been hesitant to find broad statements of religious opposition sufficient to state a viable claim. See Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023) (courts are not required to “take plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value”); see also Kather v. Asante Health Sys., 2023 WL 4865533, *5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023) (“vague expressions of sincerely held Christian beliefs alone cannot serve as a blanket excuse for avoiding all unwanted employment obligations” and a “‘threadbare reference' to religious beliefs is insufficient at the motion to dismiss stage”).
Here, Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's claims fall into the latter category. To the extent the complaint's allegations invoke their Christian faith, plaintiffs failed to identify any religious tenet or teaching that conflicts with Legacy's policy. SeeRogers v. Neb. Urb. Indian Health Coal., Inc., 2023 WL 2990720, *5 (D. Neb. Apr. 18, 2023) (dismissing a Title VII claim where the plaintiff did “not articulate or describe any particular beliefs that she maintains [or] provide even a perfunctory explanation as to how her beliefs conflict with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine”); see also Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, 2023 WL 7612395, *4-6 (D. Or. Oct. 23), adopted as clarified by 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023) (“[g]eneral references to Christianity do not meet even a ‘fairly minimal' burden at the pleading stage, as such allegations are conclusory and fail to plausibly to suggest that a plaintiff's anti-vaccination beliefs are in fact religious”); DeVito v. Legacy Health, 2014 WL 687943, *3 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2024) (“courts appear to be in agreement that a general allegation of religious conflict without identifying a conflicting belief is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”).
As denoted herein, Burton, Lehman, and Lopuga's claims rely solely on their “deeply held Christian beliefs.” Compl. ¶¶ 7, 16, 20 (doc. 1). Sahlin identified her Christian faith as well as her belief “that she was created perfectly by God.” Id. at ¶ 23. Thus, although Sahlin provides some additional context for her claim, there remains insufficient factual information to determine whether a conflict exists. See Kather, 2023 WL 4865533 at *5 (allegations “that hint at religious beliefs but do not specify how those beliefs conflict with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine” fail to state a claim); see also Petermann v. Aspirus, Inc., 2023 WL 2662899, *2 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2023) (“a religious belief that the body is a temple of God is not in itself inconsistent with receiving a vaccine . . . The important question [is] whether the employee's belief that the vaccine qualifies as mistreatment is itself based in religion”).
The precedent on which plaintiffs rely is distinguishable. See, e.g., Pls.' Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 7 (doc. 9). Namely, neither Cleveland v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc. (Case No. 6:23-cv-01046-MK), Nichols v. PeaceHealth (6:23-cv-01460-MK), nor Dozier v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc. (6:23-cv-01080-MK) concerned religious exception requests that were denied. Moreover, the Findings and Recommendation in each of those cases has not yet been adopted.
In sum, plaintiffs' complaint simply neglects to provide any details about Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's religious beliefs - either via the inclusion of well-plead facts or their actual exemption requests. Yet precedent makes clear that “[a]n employee cannot shirk his duties to try to accommodate himself or to cooperate with his employer in reaching an accommodation by a mere recalcitrant citation of religious precepts.” Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1977). Stated differently, while the applicable pleading standard is fairly minimal, the employee nonetheless bears the burden of establishing that “she informed her employer of the [bona fide religious] belief and conflict.” Tiano, 139 F.3d at 681.
Despite the complaint's deficiencies, the Court declines to dismiss Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs have not yet had opportunity to address these pleading deficiencies and the Court cannot conclude, at least at this stage in the proceedings, that they are incurable as a matter of law, especially given the other allegations of potential wrongdoing.
To the extent plaintiffs move to amend via their response brief, their request is procedurally improper. Pls.' Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 7-8 (doc. 9); see also LR 7-1(b) (“[m]otions may not be combined with any response, reply, or other pleading”); LR 15-1 (any motion to amend “must describe the proposed changes” and include as an exhibit “[a] copy of the proposed amended [that shows] how the amended pleading differs from the operative or superseded pleading”).
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated herein, Legacy's Motion to Dismiss (doc. 4) should be granted in part as to Burton, Lehman, Lopuga, and Sahlin's claims. Legacy's request for oral argument is denied as unnecessary. Any motion to amend the complaint must be filed within 30 days of the District Judge's order.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this recommendation.