Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-3273, SECTION "N"
April 12, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement. The Court has reviewed the Defendant's Motion and Plaintiff's Opposition, including affidavits and exhibits. In addition, the Court has considered the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint. Based on the following reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This matter was submitted without oral argument.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jacqueline Burrell, brought this action against her former employer, the United States Postal Service (USPS) seeking damages under Title VII for gender-based discrimination and retaliatory-based discrimination. The Plaintiff was originally hired by the USPS on February 24, 1979, as a part-time employee. See Complaint at 1; Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 2. After a period of time, the Plaintiff was hired as a full-time employee and progressed through the ranks of the USPS to a supervisory position. See id.
In the Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint, she asserted several other claims, including that the Defendant violated her civil rights by denying her freedom of speech and violated The Whistleblower Act. These claims were previously dismissed, leaving only the Title VII claims.
In 1992, the USPS went through a restructuring plan, which also included a reduction in the workforce. See Complaint at 2; Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 2. As a result of the restructuring, the Plaintiff's position with the USPS was eliminated. See id. In the ensuing months, the Plaintiff had a series of meetings with personnel employees from the USPS in order to find a replacement position. The parties were unable to reach an agreement to place the Plaintiff in a position both that she desired and that suited her skill and abilities. See id at 3. Failing to reach an agreement, the USPS ultimately assigned the Plaintiff to the position of postmaster of Innis, Louisiana. See Amended Complaint at 17; Def. Mot to Dismiss at 2. The Plaintiff notified the USPS that she could not and would not report to her new assignment because of the distance between Innis and the Plaintiff's home in New Orleans. See id. Upon failing to report to her new assignment, the Plaintiff was considered absent without leave and was eventually discharged from employment with the USPS. See id.; Mot. to Dismiss at 2. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims are inactionable as a matter of law.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a Court reviews evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all justifiable inferences in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
The initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, the moving party does not have the burden of negating or disproving matters on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial. Therefore, the moving party is only required to demonstrate that there is absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. See id. at 325. If the moving party meets this requirement, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. This standard necessitates that the non-moving party demonstrate "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson at 477.
B. Analysis of the Plaintiff's Claims:
In construing the Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Compliant liberally, it appears that she has four claims on which she seeks relief. The Plaintiff's first two claims stem from the Defendant's reorganization and subsequent elimination of her maintenance supervisor job, beginning in 1992. The Plaintiff contends that during the period she was being considered for new positions, the Defendant discriminated against her based on her gender by allowing a less qualified male employee to take a position that she desired. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that during that same period, the Defendant refused to place her in a position that she desired in retaliation for her filing of EEO complaints. The other two claims stem from the Plaintiff's assignment to the position of Postmaster of Innis, Louisiana in 1996. The Plaintiff alleges that the decision to assign her to this position was also in retaliation for filing EEO complaints. Finally, the Plaintiff contends that her eventual removal from employment with the Defendant in 1997 was also a product of retaliation for her prior EEO complaints. Each of these claims is evaluated separately below.
1. Gender-Based Discrimination:
Claims of gender-based discrimination are evaluated under a three-part burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973). The first part of this analysis requires a Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) the Plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) the Plaintiff was qualified for the position sought; (3) the Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others who were similarly situated to the Plaintiff and not within her protected class were treated more favorably. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir., 1997).
Once the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Defendant will satisfy this second-step of the analysis by producing evidence, which, "taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). If the Defendant satisfies this prong, there is no longer a mandatory inference of discrimination and the analysis shifts to the third-stage of the burden-shifting framework. See id. at 510-11. In this stage, the Plaintiff has a "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate" that the Defendant's reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination. See id. at 507-8. In order to substantiate a claim of pretext, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that discrimination was at the heart of the employer's decision. See Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 937 (2001).
The Defendant agrees that the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint satisfies the first three elements of meeting a prima facie gender-based discrimination case. See Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9. The Plaintiff is female (satisfying the protected group element), asserts that she was qualified to move into another supervisory position with the USPS that she desired (satisfying the requirement of being qualified for the position sought), and that she did not receive the position (meeting the adverse employment action requirement). See Amended Complaint at 4-10. However, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff cannot meet the fourth element of establishing a prima facie discrimination complaint. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9. Under this element, the Plaintiff is required to show that the Defendant treated a similarly situated individual, not within her protected class, more favorably than she was treated. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In order to demonstrate that the Plaintiff was similarly situated to an employee that was treated more favorably, the Plaintiff must show that she is "nearly identical" to the employee in question. See Williams v. Trader Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir, 2000). To defeat summary judgment, the Plaintiff must produce evidence from which a fact-finder reasonably could conclude that "nearly identical" employees not within plaintiff's protected class were treated more favorably than the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has not met this requirement although she alleges that a male co-worker, who held the same job position as she did, received a more favorable reassignment than she did, she provides no evidence that she was in a "nearly identical" situation to this employee with regard to positions held and length of service. In addition, the Plaintiff provides no evidence that this male employee had a record that was "nearly identical" to the Plaintiffs with regard to suspensions and discipline. Accordingly, the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim, and the Court need not examine the second and third prongs of the burden shifting analysis.
The Plaintiff was suspended from her job as a Personnel Assistant and reassigned after she was determined to have copied an official document for personal use and failed to cooperate in the investigation. After the Plaintiff was reassigned as a Supervisor in Building Maintenance, she was again suspended after physically assaulting another employee.
2. Retaliatory Discrimination
The Plaintiff's three other claims are based on her assertion that she was discriminated against in retaliation for her prior protected activities under Title VII. In the Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff states that she suffered adverse employment action as a result of a series of EEO complaints that she had filed. See Amended Complaint at 4-10. The filing of EEO complaints is protected action and Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on this ground. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2001). A retaliatory discrimination complaint is evaluated in a similar manner to the burden shifting analysis used in the context of gender-based discrimination. See Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1121 (5th Cir., 1998). Under the first part of the burden shifting analysis, the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) the Plaintiff had engaged in activity protected under Title VII, (2) that the Defendant took adverse employment action against the Plaintiff, and (3) there is a causal connection between the Plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse employment action by the Defendant. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997). Once the Plaintiff meets the first prong, the burden shifts to the Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action against the Plaintiff See id. If the Defendant meets this prong, the Plaintiff is then given an opportunity to demonstrate that the proferred reason is pretext for retaliation. See id.
The Defendant agrees that the Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint demonstrate that she filed a series of EEO complaints (engaging in activity protected by Title VII) and that she was not appointed to the position that she desired, and further that she was eventually terminated from employment with the Defendant (satisfying the adverse employment action requirement). The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination because she cannot show a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 11. However, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the Plaintiff's retaliation claim solely as it relates to the Plaintiff's termination from the USPS. Although claims other retaliatory discrimination (i.e., failure to be appointed to the position that she desired following the reorganization and her appointment to postmaster of Innis) are reflected in the Plaintiff's pleadings, the Defendant's motion does not address them. Accordingly, the Court will address the retaliatory discrimination claim only as it relates to the Plaintiff's termination from employment with the USPS.
In reference to this retaliatory discrimination claim, the Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing any connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The Plaintiff acknowledges and concedes that her protected activity and her adverse employment action were separated by several years and that there were several other reasons for her adverse employment action, including her difficulty working with some USPS personnel. Given the Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate facts from which a fact-finder reasonably could infer a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action, even at the prima facie stage, the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim, and the Court need not examine the remainder of the burden shifting mechanism.
Although the Defendant did not address in its motion the other two retaliatory discrimination claims, the Court has serious concern as to whether the Plaintiff can meet the prima facie burden of showing retaliatory discrimination on these claims. Those issues, however, remain for another day.
III CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, in that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff's (1) gender-based discrimination claim and (2) retaliatory discrimination claim based on termination; and DENIED IN PART, in that it is denied to the extent that it seeks to dismiss plaintiff's retaliatory discrimination claim based on appointment to a new position following reorganization and appointment to the position of postmaster of Innis.