Opinion
Case No. C2-00-41342
October 31, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs assert sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as various state law claims arising from their employment with defendant Sofa Express. Defendant Sofa Express moves for summary judgment on several grounds, including plaintiffs failure to file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). For the reasons that follow the Court grants defendant's summary judgment motion as to plaintiffs' Title VII claims, but denies it as to plaintiffs' state law claims which the Court will remand to state court.
I. Facts
Inasmuch as the Court finds that plaintiffs' Title VII claims are subject to dismissal as a result of plaintiffs' failure to file a charge with the EEOC, a detailed statement of the facts is unnecessary. Plaintiffs are two women who worked for defendant Sofa Express. They allege that during their employment they were subjected to improper, unsolicited sexual advances and unwanted touching by other employees of Sofa Express. Plaintiffs complained. Although Sofa Express took action against the alleged harassers, plaintiffs contend that Sofa Express demoted and harassed them for reporting the misconduct. They also maintain that defendants accused plaintiffs of making false accusations.
As to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, plaintiffs did not attach an EEOC right-to-sue letter to their complaint, and the complaint does not allege that plaintiffs ever filed a charge with the EEOC. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant Sofa Express includes failure to exhaust administrative remedies as its first ground for dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII claims. Plaintiffs, however, fail to respond to the argument in their memorandum in opposition. In their depositions, both plaintiffs conceled that they had not filed any charges with the EEOC or the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC"). Cossin Dep. at 6; Burns Dep. at 7. Plaintiffs have not advanced any reason for their failure to file charges with the EEOC or OCRC.
Burns acknowledged that she had not filed a charge with "the EERC or EEOC." In context, it is apparent that "EERC" was meant to be OCRC.
II. Summary Judgment
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The Court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be not required to believe. Id. Stated otherwise, the Court must credit evidence favoring the nomnoving party as well as evidence favorable to the moving party that is uncontroverted or unimpeached, if it comes from disinterested witnesses. Id.
Reeves involved a motion judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 rather than summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Nonetheless standards applied to both kinds of motions are substantially the same. One notable difference is that in ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court, having heard the evidence at trial, views the entire record, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, whereas in ruling on a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party has the duty to point out those portions of the record upon which it relies in asserting a genuine issue of material fact, and the court need not comb the paper record for the benefit of the nonmoving party. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and Matsushita have effected "a decided change in summary judgment practice," ushering in a "new era" in summary judgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The court in Street identified a number of important principles applicable in new era summary judgment practice. For example, complex cases and cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at 1479.
Additionally, in responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant' s denial of a disputed fact, but must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.'" Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257). The nonmoving party must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the summary judgment motion. Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely "`show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).
Moreover, "[t]he trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 1479-80. That is, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. Failure to File Timely Charge
To satisfy the prerequisites to an employment discrimination action, a claimant must: (1) file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC; and (2) receive and act upon the EEOC's notice of right to sue. See Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989).
As to the first requirement, Title VII requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC before bringing suit in federal court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000). The applicable statute of limitations begins to run from the date of "the alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Title VII has a dual statute of limitations:
Usually, if the alleged discrimination occurred more than 180 days prior to the plaintiff's filing of an EEOC charge, claims implicating these actions are barred. However, if the alleged unlawful practice occurs in a "deferral state," in this case Ohio, which has enacted its own laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, the plaintiff must file suit within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.Alexander, 177 F.3d at 407 (citation omitted). The alleged unlawful employment practices in this case occurred in Ohio, a deferral state, and thus the 300-day period in which to file an EEOC charge under Title VII applies if the charge is filed with the OCRC. Id. Thus, to exhaust administrative remedies, the plaintiffs must have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or with the state agency within 300 days. See Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 951 (2001).
After a charge of discrimination is filed, the EEOC must investigate the complaint in order to determine whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC determines that the complaint has a reasonable basis, it will issue a right-to-sue letter to the plaintiff. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b). If the EEOC does not issue a right-to-sue letter within 180 days after the charge of discrimination is filed, the plaintiff may request such a letter. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a). A person must possess a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in order to file suit under Title VII. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999).
Because exhaustion requirements pursuant to Title VII are not jurisdictional prerequisites, they are subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Equitable tolling relief should be granted only sparingly. Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2000). In determining whether the equitable tolling of the EEOC filing period is appropriate in a given case, the following five factors, among others, may apply:
1) Jack of notice of the filing requirement;
2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement;
3) diligence in pursuing one's rights;
4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and
5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement for filing his claim.Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998).
Here, it is uncontroverted that plaintiffs never filed any charge with the EEOC or OCRC. Furthermore, plaintiffs make no argument, let alone provide a factual basis, to support waiver, estoppel, or the tolling of the exhaustion requirements. Defendant raised the defense in its answer, and therefore waiver does not apply. No factual bases for estoppel or equitable tolling appear in the record. As a result, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs' Title VII claims.
IV. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs also advance several state law claims. The only basis for removal of this case was federal subject matter jurisdiction. Diversity of citizenship does not appear on the face of the complaint, and the Court will not assume facts not appearing in the pleadings to support diversity. Having dismissed the claims that form the basis for this Court's jurisdiction, the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims, and will remand plaintiffs' state law claims to the Franklin County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., 201 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2000).
V. Disposition
Based on the above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion of defendant Sofa Express for summary judgment (Doc. 29).
The Clerk shall enter a final judgment in favor of defendants, and against plaintiffs, dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII claims with prejudice, and remanding plaintiffs' state law claims to the Franklin County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas.
The Clerk shall remove Doc. 29 from the Court's pending motions list.