Opinion
Case No. 3:22-cv-00081-JMK
2023-02-16
Charles E. BURNETT, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL BANK OF BELIZE, Defendant.
Kenneth P. Jacobus, Kenneth P. Jacobus, P.C., Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff. Juan Carlos Basombrio, Pro Hac Vice, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Costa Mesa, CA, Michael A. Grisham, Dorsey & Whitney, LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant.
Kenneth P. Jacobus, Kenneth P. Jacobus, P.C., Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff. Juan Carlos Basombrio, Pro Hac Vice, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Costa Mesa, CA, Michael A. Grisham, Dorsey & Whitney, LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
JOSHUA M. KINDRED, United States District Judge
Before the Court at Docket 11, Defendant Central Bank of Belize (the "Central Bank") moves to dismiss Plaintiff Charles E. Burnett's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff responded at Docket 22, to which Defendant replied at Docket 23. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings suit against the Central Bank alleging a cause of action "similar to breach of contract or conversion." Plaintiff alleges that the "Belize Court" awarded him $881,000 pursuant to a judgment from "Justice Anthony More." Plaintiff claims he received a "copy of a certification from the Belize Court Office" and a "certificate from [his] attorney" confirming his ownership of this sum. In "late 2020," the money allegedly was transferred from a local bank in Belize to the Central Bank of Belize "for the sole purpose of transferring these funds to Charles E. Burnett in Alaska."
Docket 22 at 3.
Docket 1 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff does not identify the alleged lawsuit that resulted in a judgment in his favor.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiff claims that he sent "funds for payment of land taxes and other charges" made by the Central Bank, totaling $8,882.58, to a private address in Belize City, Belize. There, a woman named Kristen Woodye picked up the funds. Plaintiff alleges that Woodye took the funds to the Central Bank, which were then delivered to a man named "Bruce" or "given to someone in the Bank who she believed was her cousin, a Mr. Boneye." Plaintiff was told that the fees were "necessary payments in order to have his funds transferred to him in Alaska." In May 2021, Plaintiff claims to have received a certificate from the Central Bank certifying that $986,862.87 was in route to his bank account in Alaska. However, the Central Bank has "not initiated the funds transfer or paid Charles E. Burnett the funds to which he is entitled." Plaintiff brings this suit to recover these funds plus interest and attorney fees.
Plaintiff's Complaint is unclear whether additional amounts were sent to the address in Belize. Compare id. at ¶ 8 with id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiff attaches four exhibits to his Complaint. Exhibit A is the letter Plaintiff received from "justice Antony more" of the "Belize court office," stating that Plaintiff "is the sole recipient of $881,000 USD" and explaining that the "[Financial Investigations Unit] screen will clear and funds will be forward after the case is concluded." Exhibit B is a letter purported to be from "Mr auguelle representative of Mr Charles E spud Burnett" stating that "the claments money's is in the courts until FIU and central Bank of Belize completed there presses of this quantity of funds." Exhibit C is a note, purported to be from the Central Bank, stating that Plaintiff is the recipient of the funds and "assurance that all payments has bin made to Belize central banking is in rout to Alaska USA." Exhibit D is a photo, too blurry for the Court to decipher, of a document allegedly "from the Central Bank of Belize tying a payment of $984,648.54 US to the 'coal' payment."
Docket 1-1 (quotations unaltered).
Docket 1-2 (quotations unaltered).
Docket 1-3 (quotation unaltered).
Docket 1-4 (quotation unaltered). Plaintiff does not explain to what the "coal" payment refers. Defendant clarifies in its Motion—and Plaintiff does not contest—that this is appears to be a photograph of an application for foreign exchange from the front desk of the Central Bank. See Docket 11 at 18 (describing content of form); Docket 11-14.
Plaintiff first filed this lawsuit on June 14, 2021, before the Honorable Judge H. Russel Holland. Judge Holland dismissed the complaint without prejudice after Plaintiff failed to oppose Defendant's motion to dismiss, despite being given three extensions of time to respond. Plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and stay proceedings, stating that additional time was needed for the Belizean Financial Investigation Unit ("FIU") to complete its investigation into the matter. Plaintiff's counsel argued that "we need the investigation completed in order to establish what really took place." The Court denied the motion, noting that it
Burnett v. Central Bank of Belize, Case No. 3:21-cv-00144-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 24, 2022), Docket 39.
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate, Case No. 3:21-cv-00144-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 24, 2022), Docket 40 at 2.
Id. at 3.
now doubts that plaintiff has been actively investigating the circumstances giving rise to his original and first amended complaint during the four-month extension previously granted . . . . What is before the court has Rule 11(b) implications . . . . [I]t is clear that the circumstances of the plaintiff's complaint had not been investigated and developed adequately when plaintiff's complaints were filed . . . . At this point, there is no way of knowing whether a report will ever be publicly released by the Belize government and available to plaintiff justifying a complaint against the defendant bank.Judge Holland dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on March 29, 2022. Plaintiff refiled his Complaint on April 13, 2022, before the undersigned. On January 9, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Notice that Plaintiff had passed away and that Plaintiff's estate would be substituted as a party in this case.
Burnett v. Central Bank of Belize, Case No. 3:21-cv-00144-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 28, 2022), Docket 41 at 3. The Court differentiated this case from a qui tam situation, in which a government organization might investigate a matter for many months after an initial complaint is filed.
Burnett v. Central Bank of Belize, Case No. 3:21-cv-00144-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 29, 2022), Docket 42.
Docket 1 at ¶ 3 (identifying the complaint as a "refiling" of the original matter).
Docket 25.
As in the first filing, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. ("FSIA"), and in the alternative, pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine. Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, it does not reach Defendant's forum non conveniens argument or its motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
Docket 11 at 4.
Docket 11 at 6.
Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are "presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears." Defendants may challenge subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) with a facial attack, factual attack, or both. Under a facial attack, the defendant accepts plaintiff's allegations as true but asserts that they are legally insufficient to invoke jurisdiction. By contrast, a factual attack challenges the truth of allegations that would otherwise confer jurisdiction, and, in doing so, the defendant may introduce evidence outside the pleadings.
A-Z Int'l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Eggert, 953 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Here, Defendant makes a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the jurisdictional allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are false. In this situation, the Court no longer presumes Plaintiff's allegations to be true. Instead, "the plaintiff must support its jurisdictional allegations with 'competent proof' under the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary judgment context." The plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each requirement for subject-matter jurisdiction has been met.
See generally Docket 11.
Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010)).
Id.; Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)) ("Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.").
III. DISCUSSION
Foreign sovereigns enjoy presumptive immunity from lawsuits in United States courts. The FSIA, enacted in 1976, "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country." Thus, foreign states and their agencies are shielded from domestic lawsuits "unless one of the [FSIA's] express exceptions to sovereign immunity applies." The Ninth Circuit employs a burden-shifting framework to determine whether the FSIA provides subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. Because the FSIA creates a statutory presumption that a foreign state is immune from suit, the defendant bears the initial burden to "make a prima facie case that it is a foreign state." If the court determines that the defendant is a foreign state, then defendant's immunity is triggered and "the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that an exception [to the FSIA] applies." Once the plaintiff produces evidence of an exception, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to present its facial or factual attack. "[J]urisdiction exists unless the defendant demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that the claimed exception does not apply." When resolving a factual challenge to jurisdiction, "[e]ven where the material facts are disputed, the trial court may still evaluate the merits of the jurisdictional claims."
28 U.S.C. § 1604; West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he presumption under FSIA is that actions taken by foreign states or their instrumentalities are sovereign acts and thus protected from the exercise of our jurisdiction . . . .").
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27, 30, 136 S.Ct. 390, 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989)).
Id. at 394 (quotation omitted).
Packsys, S.A. de C.V. v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 899 F.3d 1081, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1087 (quoting Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 1088; see also Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1125 (describing the FSIA's burden-shifting scheme as putting "most of the weight on the plaintiff" in accordance with federal courts' presumptive lack of jurisdiction).
Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012).
Packsys, 899 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1125).
Terenkian, 694 F.3d at 1131 (citing Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140-44 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "[c]ourts are therefore regularly called upon to inquire into substantive state or federal law to resolve the threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA[ ]" and collecting cases); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ("As we have made clear, deciding whether statutory subject matter jurisdiction exists under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act entails an application of the substantive terms of the Act to determine whether one of the specified exceptions to immunity applies.").
Here, the Parties agree that the Central Bank is a "foreign state" for the purposes of the FSIA. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to offer evidence that one of the FSIA's express exceptions to immunity applies. At the onset of its analysis, the Court notes that Plaintiff's allegations regarding the Central Bank are that it received approximately $881,000 belonging to Plaintiff, transferred from a local bank; that it received approximately $8,800 from Plaintiff for "land taxes" and other fees required to transfer the $881,000 to Plaintiff's bank account in Alaska; and that it has yet to initiate transfer of those funds. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that "this action falls within the general exception to the jurisdiction immunity of a foreign state as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) in that this action deals with a commercial activity of the Central Bank of Belize." Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA (the "commercial activity exception") waives immunity for a foreign state when the action is based:
See Docket 22 at 3-4 (arguing for exception to Central Bank's immunity under FSIA); 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a),-(b) (defining a "foreign state" as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . which is a separate legal person . . . and an organ of a foreign state"); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[Defendant's presumed immunity] also applies if it is apparent from the pleadings or uncontested that the defendant is a foreign state").
See Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1125.
Docket 1 at ¶¶ 7-18; OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27, 33, 136 S.Ct. 390, 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015) (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358, 364, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993)) ("The Act's 'based upon' inquiry, we reasoned, first requires a court to 'identify the particular conduct on which the plaintiff's action is based.' ").
Docket 1 at ¶ 2.
[1] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or"Courts have construed this commercial activity provision to have three independent clauses and have used different criteria for each of the three separate clauses to assess a claimed exception." Thus, Plaintiff must offer some evidence that his action falls within one of the clauses of § 1605(a)(2).
[2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
[3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that causes a direct effect in the United States.
Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden. The five-page Opposition neither articulates which prong of § 1605(a)(2) applies to this case nor discusses the contours of the commercial activity exception. Incredibly, the only argument that Plaintiff advances is that "[r]eceiving funds and transmitting funds, for which services the Bank is being paid, is certainly a commercial activity." In lieu of legal argument, Plaintiff's counsel declares that the Belizean government is riddled with corruption (appending a screenshot of an unidentified blog post in support) and argues that the Central Bank's strategic goal to "increase confidence" in the institution somehow shows individual corruption of its officers. Even more absurd, counsel posits that Defendant's motion to dismiss "is a pretty clear indication that the Central Bank has something to hide." Counsel muses that only after Kristen Woodye is arrested and interrogated can the parties "determine" what took place:
Docket 22 at 4.
Docket 22-1.
Docket 22-2.
Docket 22 at 2. Plaintiff's opposition includes other irrelevant and unsupported facts about Belize, including that a person was shot outside Plaintiff's hotel and that the Central Bank's Board of Directors fired the then-Governor of the Bank because "[h]e must have been getting too close to the truth, which is still hidden." Id.
Perhaps Kristen was part of a scam, and never delivered any money to the Central Bank. Perhaps she was a victim of the scam herself and delivered the money to a dishonest bank employee. My personal belief is that Kristen does not have the intelligence, skills, or contacts to have created any scam by herself. After all, it involves allegedly counterfeit or forged bank, court, and land documents.In this filing, Plaintiff's counsel both acknowledges that Plaintiff was likely the victim of a scam—either at the hands of Ms. Woodye or a bank employee—and reveals that Plaintiff cannot identify any evidence or legal argument to support his jurisdictional allegations. Despite Defendant's briefing on the FSIA's burden-shifting framework and clear factual attack on jurisdiction, Plaintiff's counsel erroneously believes that "the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and extrinsic evidence presented to the Court as true."
Docket 22 at 3 n.2. The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that Kristen Woodye is or was a Central Bank employee or otherwise its agent. See Packsys, S.A. de C.V. v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 899 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2018) ("We have long held that the conduct of a foreign state's agent only triggers the commercial activity exception when the agent acts with the actual—as opposed to apparent—authority of the sovereign state.").
Docket 11 at 8, 10-24.
Docket 22 at 4 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).
In sum, when asked to offer evidence of an exception to the FSIA, Plaintiff provided: (1) conclusory statements that "the activities as described by Kristen Woodye fall within the commercial activity exception" and "[r]eceiving funds and transmitting funds, for which services the Bank is being paid, is certainly a commercial activity"; (2) an unidentified blog post about corruption in the Central Bank; (3) a "strategy map," allegedly from the Central Bank's website; and (4) an affidavit from Plaintiff's counsel reiterating Plaintiff's allegations and counsel's own beliefs as to the facts of this case. There is no other evidence—not a declaration from Kristen Woodye or even Plaintiff himself—that Plaintiff deposited funds with the Central Bank, or that the Central Bank had a legal obligation to forward other funds to Plaintiff, or even that the Central Bank failed to approve a foreign exchange transaction. Thus, the only possibly relevant evidence that the Opposition offers is Plaintiff's counsel's statements that Plaintiff stated that Kristen Woodye stated that she deposited money with the Central Bank, which, as Defendant notes, is inadmissible hearsay.
Docket 22 at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 4.
Docket 22-1.
Docket 22-2.
Docket 22-3.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that to survive a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff "must support [its] jurisdictional allegations with competent proof under the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary judgment context") (internal quotations omitted); Garcia v. Vitus Energy, LLC, 605 F.Supp.3d 1188, 1202 (D. Alaska 2022) (quoting Roness v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C18-1030-RSM, 2019 WL 2918234, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2019)) ("Inadmissible hearsay cannot be used to establish material facts on a summary judgment motion.").
Although counsel's affidavit refers to the exhibits attached to the Complaint as "true copies of what they purport to be," this minor reference does little to help Plaintiff carry his burden of production. First, the documents are inadmissible. Despite counsel's naked assertion that the documents are real, none of the documents are, in fact, authenticated, nor has Plaintiff proffered any indication that they could be authenticated. Plaintiff's counsel lacks personal knowledge of the documents and the documents are not self-authenticating foreign public documents. More fundamentally, Plaintiff's Opposition does not adequately reference or address these documents. It does not attempt to explain how the documents show the Central Bank engaged in "commercial activity" under the FSIA, as opposed to denying a foreign exchange transaction (which, as Defendant highlights, is likely considered a sovereign act by the Ninth Circuit).
Docket 22-3 at ¶ 5.
See Docket 22-3 at ¶ 5 (stating both that the documents "are true copies" and that whether the documents are genuine "needs to be determined through investigation"); Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)) ("Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility, and this condition is satisfied by 'evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.' We have repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.").
See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1); id. at 773-74 ("Documents authenticated through personal knowledge must be attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.").
See Fed. R. Evid. 902(3) ("The document must be accompanied by a final certification that certifies the genuineness of the signature and official position of the signer or attester—or of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness relates to the signature or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness relating to the signature or attestation.").
See Corzo v. Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that central bank's denial of the exchange-rate application was not commercial activity, but a sovereign act); Ariz. Apple Orchards v. Guyana Pharm. Corp., 23 Fed. App'x 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that central bank's failure to release foreign currency under foreign exchange regulations was a sovereign act). Because Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of production, the Court does not reach the merits of Defendant's argument.
Plaintiff could not produce any admissible evidence or legal argument that the Central Bank engaged in "commercial activity" and, therefore, he fails to make a threshold showing that this case triggers an exception to the FSIA. The unsupported allegation that the Central Bank "receiv[ed] funds and transmit[ed] funds" is insufficient to pierce Defendant's presumptive immunity.
Docket 22 at 4.
See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs failed to carry their initial burden of offering evidence that the commercial activity exception applied when plaintiff did not present evidence that Defendant executed a contract in the United States).
Plaintiff argues that, if dismissal is warranted, the Court should dismiss without prejudice to "allow the case to be refiled after the investigation is completed." The Court will dismiss the case with prejudice and without leave to amend. Plaintiff first filed this case nearly two years ago. Since that time, Plaintiff repeatedly has asked for extensions "to complete [the FIU's] investigation of this matter" and "to determine whether his complaint against the Central Bank of Belize is well-founded." In denying Plaintiff's request for an extension to oppose the present Motion, this Court noted that
Docket 22 at 4.
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate, Case No. 3:21-cv-00144-HRH (D. Alaska Mar. 24, 2022), Docket 40 at 2.
Docket 13 at 1; Docket 19 at 1.
[P]laintiff has an obligation to ensure that his "factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (emphasis added). Mr. Burnett filed his original complaint on June 14, 2021, providing him beyond reasonable opportunity for further investigation before Defendant filed its pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff is not entitled to a one-year extension so that he may determine whether his own complaint is well-founded.The Court invited Plaintiff to supplement his briefing if the FIU's investigation unearths evidence to support his allegations. To date, Plaintiff has neither supplemented his briefing nor given the Court any indication that the investigation will reveal new information. Further, the Court is not convinced Plaintiff will refile this lawsuit in good faith. Judge Holland dismissed Plaintiff's first iteration of this case without prejudice, thereby giving Plaintiff the opportunity to refile his case once the investigation was complete. Instead of ensuring that his factual contentions had evidentiary support, Plaintiff immediately refiled this case without any change in circumstance. Now, Plaintiff asks for the opportunity to refile this Complaint a third time under the same premise. Not only is amendment unwarranted, but counsel acknowledged that refiling this lawsuit was premature and only taken "so as not to mislead the Belize authorities into believing that Mr. Burnett had abandoned his claim." The Court will not allow Plaintiff to harass the Central Bank and repeatedly disregard the orders of this Court. Because the FSIA "was meant to spare foreign states not only from liability on the merits but also from the cost and inconvenience of . . . the attendant burdens of litigation," the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint without leave to amend.
Docket 16 at 3.
On the contrary, Defendant provided substantial evidence to Plaintiff's counsel that the FIU found that Plaintiff was the victim of a scam completely unrelated to the Central Bank. See, e.g., Docket 11-11 at ¶ 21; Docket 11-15 (letter from FIU); Docket 11-5 at ¶ 3-7; cf. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The denial of Boschetto's request for discovery, which was based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts, was not an abuse of discretion.").
See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)) ("It is well-established that a court may dismiss an entire complaint with prejudice where plaintiffs have failed to plead properly after 'repeated opportunities.' ").
Docket 13 at 2.
Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden to provide evidence of an exception to the FSIA, and therefore, Defendant retains its sovereign immunity. Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, it does not reach Defendant's alternate argument under the forum non conveniens doctrine or its motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss at Docket 11 is GRANTED, and this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska.