Buras v. Peck

5 Citing cases

  1. Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co.

    285 So. 2d 863 (La. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 23 times
    In Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co., Inc., 285 So.2d 863 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973) we held that evidence of a prior traffic conviction was inadmissible in an automobile accident case, reiterating the rule announced by our predecessor court in Buras v. Peck, 83 So.2d 783 (La.App.Orl. 1955).

    The jury returned for further instructions, asking whether a finding of speeding was by itself sufficient to fix liability. Evidence of prior traffic convictions is inadmissible; Buras v. Peck, 83 So.2d 783 (La.App. 1955). Moreover, its admission is prejudicial.

  2. Lee v. K-Mart Corp.

    483 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 29 times
    In Lee v. K–Mart Corp., 483 So.2d 609, 613 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writ denied, 484 So.2d 661 (La.1986), this court held that evidence of other accidents is only relevant where such accidents are closely related in circumstances to the accident, injury or hazard at issue in the instant case.

    La.R.S. 15:495. Evidence of prior traffic convictions is inadmissible;Buras v. Peck, 83 So.2d 783 (La.App. 1955). Moreover, its admission is prejudicial.

  3. Scheer v. Pat O'Brien's Bar, Inc.

    404 So. 2d 292 (La. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Assuming that to be so, we nevertheless conclude that the evidence was inadmissible and properly excluded. In Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co., Inc., 285 So.2d 863 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973) we held that evidence of a prior traffic conviction was inadmissible in an automobile accident case, reiterating the rule announced by our predecessor court in Buras v. Peck, 83 So.2d 783 (La.App.Orl. 1955). The rationale for this rule seems to be that such a prior conviction has no bearing on the witness credibility and is irrelevant to the issue of the witness's negligence in the case being tried.

  4. Sikes v. McLean Trucking Co.

    383 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 43 times
    In Sikes v. McLean Trucking Co., 383 So.2d 111 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980) the court recognized that this statute does not apply to civil cases but held that the same rule applies based on "the weight of this state's jurisprudence."

    The judge in the present case was not in error, therefore, in allowing evidence of past convictions of driving while intoxicated to be used for impeachment purposes. Buras v. Peck, 83 So.2d 783 (La.App. Orleans 1955); Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co., Inc., 285 So.2d 863 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1973).Fusilier v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 235 So.2d 618 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1970); Middleton v. Consolidated Underwriters, 185 So.2d 307 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1966); Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S. A., 321 So.2d 868 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1975).

  5. Angeron v. Guzzino

    140 So. 2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 5 times

    [2, 3] Plaintiff's son was clearly under a duty to stop knowing that he was on the inferior highway and also because of the presence of the stop signs which commanded him to yield the right of way. The obligation of stopping includes the duty of ascertaining that the intended left turn could be negotiated safely. White v. Glass, La. App., 78 So.2d 57; Porter, for and on Behalf of Porter v. DeBoisblanc, La. App., 64 So.2d 864; Buras v. Peck, La. App., 83 So.2d 783; Carlson v. Fidelity Mutual Ins. Co., La. App., 88 So.2d 461; Gerrets v. Reed, La. App., 99 So.2d 408. Angeron did not fulfill his continuing duty to exercise care and caution and failed to yield the right of way to the approaching Ford which he should have seen. Had he seen the Ford unquestionably he would have realized it was so close as to make his entry onto the highway extremely dangerous. [4, 5] The doctrine of preemption of an intersection also relied upon by plaintiff herein is without application under the facts and circumstances of this case.