Opinion
4:20-cv-00238
2023-04-26
Duante BULLOCK, Plaintiff, v. Helen MILLER, in her official capacity as Chair of the Iowa Board of Parole; the Iowa Board of Parole; Sean Crawford, Individually and in his official capacity as Associate Warden of Treatment with the Iowa Department of Corrections; Beth Skinner, in her official capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections; and the Iowa Department of Corrections, Jointly and severally, Defendants.
Blake Parker, Parker Law Office PLLC, Waukee, IA, for Plaintiff. John R. Lundquist, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Helen Miller, Iowa Board of Parole. Andrew Duffelmeyer, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, Nicholas E. Siefert, Iowa Department of Justice, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Sean Crawford, Beth Skinner, Iowa Department of Corrections.
Blake Parker, Parker Law Office PLLC, Waukee, IA, for Plaintiff. John R. Lundquist, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Helen Miller, Iowa Board of Parole. Andrew Duffelmeyer, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, Nicholas E. Siefert, Iowa Department of Justice, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants Sean Crawford, Beth Skinner, Iowa Department of Corrections. ORDER ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 28, 29. Defendants Sean Crawford, Beth Skinner, and the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) jointly filed their Motion, ECF No. 28, and are collectively referred to as Defendant IDOC. Defendants Helen Miller and the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) also jointly filed their Motion, ECF No. 29, and are collectively referred to as Defendant IBOP. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants' Motions. ECF No. 32. Defendants replied. ECF Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36. Plaintiff submitted supplemental authority on the issue of mootness, ECF No. 47, as raised by Defendant IDOC in its Motion, ECF No. 28. The Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motions. See ECF No. 48. At the conclusion of oral argument, the parties moved for entry of a stay of proceedings due to the potentially dispositive effect of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Brown v. Precythe, 14 F.4th 808 (8th Cir. 2021), vacated, 46 F.4th 879 (8th Cir. 2022). See ECF No. 49. Following the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision on August 30, 2022, see Brown, 46 F.4th 879, Plaintiff moved to lift the stay in this case and requested additional briefing on the impact of Brown on his pending claims, see ECF Nos. 52, 53. The Court lifted its stay and the parties have submitted supplemental briefing responsive to the holding in Brown. See ECF Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58. The matter is fully submitted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was originally sentenced to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole for crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old, including first-degree kidnapping, in violation of Iowa Code section 710.2; second-degree sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3; and first-degree burglary, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.3. See ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 22-24; State v. Bullock, No. FECR001942 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Apr. 5, 2002); State v. Bullock, No. FECR002831 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Aug. 15, 2003). He has since been resentenced to an indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of parole, in accordance with State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013), and State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014), which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional given the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). See ECF No. 20 ¶ 26. Plaintiff is currently serving his prison sentence at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. See Offender Info., Iowa Dep't of Corrections, https://doc.iowa.gov/offender/view/1147686 (last visited Apr. 24, 2023).
The Court takes judicial notice of the IDOC website, which identifies Plaintiff as currently serving his prison term at the Fort Dodge, Iowa Correctional Facility. At the time of his First Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Newton, Iowa Correctional Facility. ECF No. 20 ¶ 12.
Plaintiff previously filed a civil-rights complaint in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the IBOP violated his guarantee of due process and his rights against cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions by denying him release on parole in 2015, 2016, and 2017. See Bullock v. Hodges, No. 4:17-cv-00192, ECF No. 14 at 2-4 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 28, 2018). Plaintiff argued the IBOP implemented policies and procedures that failed to provide him a meaningful opportunity for parole eligibility, in contravention of Graham and analogous state caselaw. See id., ECF Nos. 8, 12. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the IBOP refused to enroll him in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP), which is a requirement prior to consideration for release on parole by the IBOP. See id., ECF No. 8. The merits of his argument were never decided because the action was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust his administrative appeal remedy with the IBOP. See id., ECF No. 14 at 6.
Plaintiff now returns to federal court having fully exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing the IBOP denials of his release on parole in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, and receiving a final decision. See ECF No. 20 ¶ 6; ECF No. 29-2 ¶ 17; Iowa Admin. Code § 205-15.3; Iowa Code chapter 17A. Plaintiff, in his First Amended Complaint, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants under § 1983 for their alleged deprivation of his federal right against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment (Counts One and Five); analogous state right against cruel and unusual punishment under article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution (Counts Two and Six); federal due-process right under the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts Three and Seven); and analogous state due-process right under article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution (Counts Four and Eight). ECF No. 20.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants' procedures as applied to him, which he alleges stand in the way of his realistic and meaningful opportunity to be released on parole. He claims the IDOC deprived him of SOTP—which he received in February 2021—leading to the "catch 22" of being denied parole by Defendant IBOP for lack of SOTP completion. Plaintiff also challenges the October 2019 SOTP criteria developed by the IDOC for placing juvenile lifers in SOTP, which was used to deny him earlier SOTP participation. See ECF No. 32-5 at 91 (recommending several requirements, including having served ten years with no major reports for past twenty-four months). Next, Plaintiff asserts that the IDOC has deprived him of a tentative discharge date (TDD), which is required before he may become eligible for a federal Second Chance Pell Grant or college coursework at Iowa Central Community College, and other vocational opportunities allegedly needed to demonstrate his maturity and rehabilitation. According to Plaintiff, the IDOC consistently relies on criteria—e.g., requiring a TDD before getting on the SOTP waitlist—which he will never be able to obtain as a juvenile lifer. Plaintiff also alleges that he has been unjustly deprived of earned-time credit as a result, which generally reduces an inmate's determinate prison term. See Iowa Code § 903A.2.
Plaintiff further challenges IDOC policy number OP-SOP-04 as applied to him. He claims the IDOC has failed to respond to his requests for a civil-commitment hearing under policy number OP-SOP-04 and the Sexually Violent Predator Act, Iowa Code chapter 229A. He thus argues OP-SOP-04 is arbitrary, capricious, and lacks enforceable standards. Plaintiff claims that enforcement of OP-SOP-04 stands in the way of the IBOP granting him gradual release.
" 'Sexually violent predator' means a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility." Iowa Code § 229A.2 (2019). Civil commitment under chapter 229A is a separate civil proceeding requiring the involvement of a county prosecutor and multidisciplinary team. See § 229A.4. Proceedings are usually commenced near a person's anticipated release date. Id.
Finally, he argues the above opportunities are all necessary to his realistic and meaningful opportunity to be released on parole. And according to Plaintiff, Defendants have unreasonably delayed or withheld the above opportunities from him, which he believes is cruel and unusual punishment without any legitimate penological purpose. He argues that, to make matters worse, Defendant IBOP has provided him zero transparency, as well as zero opportunity for personal participation in or adequate notice of annual parole-review proceedings. He also believes the IBOP has failed to adequately consider his youth, maturity, and lack of realistic access to rehabilitative programming in denying him parole.
Plaintiff acknowledges in supplemental briefing that Brown disposes of his federal claims grounded in the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under Counts Three and Seven. See ECF No. 57 at 3. In Brown, the Eighth Circuit concluded "inmates have no liberty interest in release from prison before expiration of their valid sentences." 46 F.4th at 890 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)); Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). And "[w]ithout a cognizable liberty interest, the inmates' due process claim necessarily fails." Id. Thus, the Court grants Defendants' Motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal due-process claims under Counts Three and Seven.
Notably, the plaintiffs in Brown were juvenile homicide offenders resentenced in accordance with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), but nothing expressly limits the holding in Brown to a specific class of juvenile offenders. Thus, the Court assumes that the constitutional analysis in Brown equally applies to juvenile nonhomicide offenders resentenced in accordance with Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
Yet, Plaintiff contends that his state and federal cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims (Counts One, Two, Five, and Six) and his state due-process claims (Counts Four and Eight) remain viable despite the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Brown. Plaintiff argues that Defendants must be enjoined from precluding him from any meaningful opportunity to obtain release. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief from the Court ordering that Defendants' policies and practices have denied him a meaningful opportunity for release on parole, in violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff further demands an order stating that Defendant IDOC must provide him a meaningful opportunity for reclassification review or a civil-commitment hearing so that he may qualify for release, and Defendants must also implement policies and procedures guaranteeing him that right.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have contemporaneously filed Motions for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 with respect to all claims against them. ECF Nos. 28, 29. Rule 56(a) provides, "A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Rule 56(a) mandates the entry of summary judgment upon a motion after there has been adequate time for discovery "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A factual dispute is "genuine" when the evidence provided "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. At the summary judgment stage, genuine disputes of material fact must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).
"The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any." Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once this burden is met, "the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). When the nonmoving party alleges a factual dispute, but the dispute proves to be irrelevant to the merits of the case, summary judgment may be granted. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment, "the court does not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue." Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, a court's focus is on whether there are any genuine disputes concerning material facts for the finder of fact to determine at trial. Morris, 512 F.3d at 1018; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. ANALYSIS
Incarcerated individuals may bring actions for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging state parole procedures or prison policies as violative of the U.S. Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Here, to prevail under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants deprived him of a federal right under the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants have raised qualified and sovereign immunity defenses in their joint answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint but do not address immunity in briefing on their summary-judgment motions.
Also, under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants violated his state constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment under article 1, section 17, and his right to due process under article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. Chapter 17A provides Plaintiff the exclusive means to adjudicate the constitutionality of Defendants' actions under the Iowa Constitution because there is no statutory equivalent to § 1983 under Iowa law. See § 17A.19; e.g., Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 757 (Iowa 2019); see also Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Iowa 2017). Plaintiff contends that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his analogous state constitutional claims against Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Defendant IDOC argues that summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal and state claims should be granted in its favor because the claims are not only foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Brown, but are also mooted by Plaintiff's completion of SOTP, the IDOC recommending his gradual release, and the IDOC commencing the civil-commitment process to determine if he needs additional sex-offender treatment after his prison sentence. See ECF No. 28-1; ECF No. 56; see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272, (1975) (finding action for declaratory and injunctive relief moot because inmate's harm was not realistically "capable of repetition yet evading review"). The IDOC argues that the injunctive and declaratory relief that Plaintiff seeks against it is therefore meaningless. According to the IDOC, Plaintiff's claims are also premised on the kind of expansive reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's juvenile sentencing jurisprudence that the Eighth Circuit rejected in Brown, 46 F.4th at 886. The IDOC argues that juvenile-offender sentencing law is limited to just that: sentencing. See id. And thus, according to the IDOC, Brown is dispositive as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims because the "Miller factors" have zero application or relevancy to parole proceedings. Id. Further, Defendant IDOC argues that Plaintiff does not have a state due-process right to rehabilitative services or reclassification hearings. The only privilege that Plaintiff is entitled to, according to the IDOC, is a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate his maturity and rehabilitation, which he has accomplished annually at his parole reviews.
Defendant IBOP makes similar arguments. ECF No. 29. The IBOP argues that Brown forecloses Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims because "micromanagement of the parole process is improper and unnecessary to protect [Plaintiff], and other similarly situated juvenile offenders, from cruel and unusual punishment." ECF No. 57 at 5 (citing Brown, 46 F.4th at 890). In addition, the IBOP argues that "it has no means to actually compel the IDOC to act upon [Plaintiff's specific interventions and programming] requests." ECF No. 29-1 at 16; see Belk v. State, 905 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Iowa 2017). Also, the IDOC is responsible for the provision and scheduling of offender treatment programs and interventions—not the IBOP. See Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 55 (Iowa 2021). Further, it argues Plaintiff's claims for a reclassification or civil-commitment hearing under Counts Five, Six, and Eight can only be brought against the IDOC because Plaintiff challenges IDOC policy number OP-SOP-04. In addition, the IBOP contends that Plaintiff has received all the process he is owed under article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, and in accordance with the parole-review procedures under Iowa Code section 906.5. The IBOP believes the Iowa Supreme Court has already established that its parole-review process provides juvenile offenders a realistic and meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. See Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 773; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. It also disagrees that Plaintiff has alleged an as-applied due-process challenge. But even so, it argues that Plaintiff was reasonably denied parole at each annual review since his resentencing due to several relevant factors, including his extensive disciplinary record, attitude, behavior, risk to the community, and need to complete SOTP. See, e.g., ECF No. 29-3 at 38; see also Iowa Admin. Code R. 205-8.10(1) (listing several generally applicable factors the IBOP may consider in deciding whether to grant parole).
In summary, according to Defendants, the record lacks any evidence demonstrating they have violated Plaintiff's federal or state constitutional rights. To the extent that Plaintiff's complaints are not mooted by subsequent events during the course of this litigation, Defendants contend that Brown forecloses Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims under § 1983, and state law precludes his analogous constitutional claims under article 1, sections 9 and 17. Defendants argue this case is devoid of any genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was reasonably denied parole and provided the minimum process owed to him as a juvenile offender; and thus, summary judgment on all claims should be granted in Defendants' favor.
A. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Inherent in the Eighth Amendment is a rule of proportionality: the punishment must fit the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the offender. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)). "A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense." Id. at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Thus, "the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile . . . offender." Brown, 46 F.4th at 883, 886 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455); Graham, 560 U.S. at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The remedy for a violation of a juvenile offender's right against a mandatory life sentence is the opportunity to be considered for release on parole by a state parole board. See id. at 883.
One of the reasons for providing juveniles who were sentenced to mandatory life terms some meaningful pathway to parole eligibility is so that they may also be eligible to participate in rehabilitative programs available to them while incarcerated. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Graham, noting that "[i]n some prisons, . . . the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of development [of maturity, self-worth, and human potential] . . . . [In fact] it is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole consideration." 560 U.S. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011. And for that reason, the Supreme Court held that "[a] categorical rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to an offender's crime is reinforced by the prison term." Id. Rehabilitative programming gives juvenile offenders a "chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, [and a] chance for reconciliation with society." Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Parole eligibility recognizes that juveniles have the "capacity for change and limited moral culpability" and guarantees them "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 74-75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Likewise, rehabilitation is the "penological goal that forms the basis of parole systems." Graham, 560 U.S. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Miller adopted the individualized review standard for juvenile offenders in Roper and Graham and mandated it for all juvenile offenders at sentencing. See 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. As part of this individualized review, "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty." Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Generally, this includes a youthful offender's life history, age, level of maturity, and potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 483, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Miller factors apply to all juvenile offenders facing a sentence of life in prison, regardless of the category of their offense, because "youth and its attendant characteristics" are not crime-specific. Id. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Notably, "parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence." Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011. "While age does not excuse behavior, a sentencing court should account for age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant." United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
After sentencing, individual states are responsible for identifying "the means and mechanisms for compliance" with a juvenile offender's constitutional guarantee to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation for parole. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. However, the Eighth Amendment does not require a state "to guarantee eventual freedom." Id. State actors and agencies also generally have "significant leeway" to decide when rehabilitative programs are provided. See, e.g., Bomgaars, 967 N.W.2d at 50, 55 (holding IDOC has authority "for the control, treatment, and rehabilitation of offenders." (quoting Iowa Code § 904.102)). "The Supreme Court recognized in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, [84-85], 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), that courts are not the proper place to deal with every problem arising within a prison's walls and, therefore, that courts shall afford a substantial degree of deference to prison officials in promulgating rules and regulations." Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 977. "If a regulation or restriction imposed by prison officials infringes on the constitutional rights of one who is in the custody of the state, it is valid 'if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " Id. at 977-78 (citing Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has identified several factors for federal courts to examine in determining whether a state prison regulation or restriction is constitutionally reasonable. See id. These factors include:
1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the interest asserted; 2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the prisoner; 3) the effect the requested accommodation will have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and 4) whether there is some alternative which will accommodate the prisoner's needs with de minimis impact on the prison's asserted interests.Id. (quoting Love, 216 F.3d at 690).
Furthermore, a decision to release a juvenile offender on parole is a discretionary decision solely within the purview of the parole board and "depends on an amalgam of elements." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 99 S.Ct. 2100; see also Iowa Code § 906.3 ("The board shall determine which of those persons who have been committed to the custody of the director of the [IDOC] . . . shall be released on parole . . . . "). Some of these elements "are factual but many . . . are purely subjective appraisals by [parole] Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10, 99 S.Ct. 2100. Discretion, while difficult to define, is not arbitrary. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932). Sound discretion "takes account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case and is 'directed by the reason and conscience of the [fact finder] to a just result.' " Id. For discretion to mean anything in practice, the balance of various factors must still be reasonable and consistent with state parole procedures. In exercising discretion to release juvenile offenders, the parole review cannot be a sham, or the functional equivalent of a life sentence. See Brown, 46 F.4th at 887, 892 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
In this instance, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 56 in designating specific facts in genuine dispute that are material to his Eighth Amendment claims under § 1986 (Counts One and Five). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Plaintiff has framed his complaint as an as-applied—non-facial—challenge; thus, the disputes raised in response to Defendants' statements of facts and interrogatories are irrelevant, or moot because he received SOTP and civil-commitment considerations have commenced for him. See, e.g., ECF No. 32-3 at 3 ¶ 7 (objecting to general procedural example provided by IDOC and responding that other inmates were allowed to participate in SOTP before Plaintiff and unlike him, their misbehavior allegedly "had nothing to do with participation in SOTP"); but see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (concluding irrelevant factual disputes will not be considered).
Thus, there is nothing for the finder of fact to decide. The only federal question here pertains to the legal merits of Plaintiff's claims in light of Brown. In Brown, the Eighth Circuit declined to extend Miller's juvenile-offender mitigation factors beyond sentencing. Brown, 46 F.4th at 886 (citing Bowling v. Virginia Dep't of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2019)). Which means that within the Eighth Circuit, the Miller factors are not necessary considerations at state parole board proceedings. Id.; contra Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (disagreeing "that Graham has no applicability outside the context of a juvenile's initial sentencing"). The Eighth Circuit has further clarified that the Eighth Amendment only requires state actors and agencies to provide juvenile offenders with a realistic and meaningful opportunity for parole eligibility. Id. And a meaningful opportunity to be eligible for parole does not imply a federal court's imposition of an "elaborate set of parole procedures," or individual procedural exceptions, on a state parole-review board. Id. at 890. Thus, the requested relief Plaintiff is seeking against Defendants is not justified or required for Plaintiff's parole eligibility or review under the federal Constitution. See id. at 886.
Indeed, even if the Supreme Court's juvenile mitigation factors or unique review standard applied here, Plaintiff has received annual parole reviews, written notice of decisions, and the opportunity to be heard and to respond, which constitutes some realistic and meaningful opportunity to be considered for release on parole for Eighth Amendment purposes. See Brown, 46 F.4th at 886; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011; ECF No. 29-3 at 118 ¶ 5. Not only that, but Plaintiff's SOTP concerns are moot because of his successful completion of SOTP. Further, the IBOP has considered his gradual release at more recent parole-review proceedings and reviewed the IDOC's release plans and recommendations. See ECF No. 57 at 39-47 (exercising its sole discretion under Iowa Code § 906.3 to deny gradual release in part due to Plaintiff's history of disciplinary incidents, which outweighed his positive efforts at rehabilitation); see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The record demonstrates that the IBOP has consistently balanced aggravating factors with the individualized mitigating factors of Plaintiff's youth at the time of his offenses and his rehabilitative efforts since then. See ECF No. 29-3 at 38, 45, 66, 73; Audio Recording: Parole Case Review (Mar. 24, 2021). The Court concludes that the IBOP has fully considered Plaintiff's rehabilitation and maturity, such that the parole review process as applied to Plaintiff is not a sham, or a de facto life sentence, and his release on parole is still possible.
Additionally, according to Brown, the mitigating factors of youth cannot justify Plaintiff's demand that the IDOC accommodate his requests for certain programming or procedural exceptions. See 46 F.4th at 887 ("[T]he State is not required to adopt procedures that are more advantageous to juvenile homicide offenders seeking release from custody."). The relevant, undisputed facts demonstrate the IDOC has met its responsibility under federal law to implement the "means and mechanisms for compliance" with Plaintiff's guarantee to realistically be considered for release. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Despite Plaintiff's challenge to the reasonability of requiring SOTP prior to release on parole, the Court defers to the IDOC in its promulgation of the SOTP rules and requirements. See Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 977. Weighing the Turner factors, Defendant IDOC's use of special SOTP criteria developed to manage juvenile offenders on the SOTP waitlist, and its requiring completion of SOTP before consideration of Plaintiff's release, was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests SOTP serves, at least under the Eighth Amendment context. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254. What is more, the civil-commitment process under chapter 229A and IDOC policy number OP-SOP-04 is a civil procedure commenced in Iowa district court, separate from parole proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff's challenge is misplaced under the penological context of Graham and Miller, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The purpose of chapter 229A, is to hold sexually violent individuals in an institutional setting until their mental health is stable enough to no longer cause them to be a threat to the community. See In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000). It is intended to be treatment, not punishment. Id.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff has received realistic and meaningful opportunities for release on parole under federal standards. Thus, it appears to the Court that what Plaintiff is really seeking is more immediate release from confinement, or the right to be released by a certain time. And to the extent that Plaintiff challenges the length of his sentence or the possibility of civil commitment under chapter 229A—such claims are appropriately brought under habeas corpus review, or a separate civil action after an adjudicative decision is made regarding Plaintiff's long-term care and treatment needs. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (determining that a challenge to the length of confinement, or seeking speedier release into the community, can only be brought under a habeas corpus proceeding). The same goes for Plaintiff's request for a reclassification hearing and placement at a lower-security facility, as well as his challenge to the denial of earned-time credit—to the extent earned-time applies to his life sentence. See Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (relying on the rule established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), to bar § 1983 challenge to the denial of earned-time credits and limiting such a challenge to habeas corpus relief). Even if Plaintiff's civil-commitment argument fell within the scope of § 1983, the process under OP-SOP-04 and chapter 229A has apparently commenced to some extent, mooting Plaintiff's concerns. See ECF No. 28-1 at 3; Preiser, 422 U.S. at 403, 95 S.Ct. 2330. The same goes for Defendants' consideration of gradual release. Plaintiff received a recommendation for gradual release from the IDOC; it is now up to the IBOP to weigh that recommendation along with any other relevant factors. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 99 S.Ct. 2100; Brown, 46 F.4th at 890. Finally, Plaintiff's earned-time credit is calculated by the IDOC and, because Plaintiff received SOTP and a recommendation for gradual release, "[w]ithout question, this is a claim for restoration of earned-time credits [or retrospective relief], so habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy." Minter v. Bartruff, 939 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2019).
Because Plaintiff lacks a federal liberty interest in release from prison on parole, as well as parole review under the Graham-Miller lens, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has received his constitutional guarantee to a meaningful opportunity to be considered for release on parole under the Eighth Amendment. See Brown, 46 F.4th at 890. Plaintiff is not serving a de facto life sentence without parole. Just because he has been parole-eligible since his last resentencing in 2014, does not guarantee that Plaintiff will receive services or administrative decisions by a specific date, nor is there any constitutional guarantee that he will be released at a specific time. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Indeed, the record before the Court demonstrates that he has received many vocational and rehabilitative services available to him while in IDOC custody. See ECF No. 29-3 at 49-63, 78-80 (certifying, for example, Plaintiff's completion of SOTP, Moral Recognition Therapy, and the NAMI Peer to Peer program). He has had the opportunity to challenge the IBOP's denial of his release by appealing each decision and providing the IBOP with certificates and detailed explanations of his rehabilitation. See, e.g., id. at 75-76, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Plaintiff likens the facts of his case to Greiman; but Greiman is distinguishable because the parole-review board in that case allegedly did not consider the inmate's juvenile-offender status and primarily relied on the severity of the original offense, which at the time violated the guarantees of Graham and Miller. See 79 F. Supp. 3d at 944. Greiman also had a distinct procedural posture because it was decided at the motion-to-dismiss stage without the benefit of full discovery. Id. Further, Greiman addressed novel constitutional claims at the time and was decided before the binding decision in Brown.
In summary, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is legally foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the expansive reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. See Brown, 46 F.4th at 886. Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate any genuine dispute of material fact for the finder of fact over whether Defendants reasonably denied Plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to be considered for release on parole or prevented his ability to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation under federal law. Therefore, Defendants are granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims under Counts One and Five.
B. Remaining State Claims
Plaintiff also alleges state claims of cruel and unusual punishment under article I, section 17 (Counts Two and Six) and state due-process claims under article 1, section 9 (Counts Four and Eight) of the Iowa Constitution. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the IBOP's decisions to deny him parole under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A. See § 17A.19.
"The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment." State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 840 (Iowa 2018). But the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution is interpreted as providing greater protections than the federal Constitution for juvenile offenders. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 378; State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016); see also Robert J. Smith, Zoe Robinson, & Emily Hughes, State Constitutionalism and the Crisis of Excessive Punishment, 108 Iowa L. Rev. 537 (2023) (describing how state constitutionalism often provides greater protections for juvenile offenders, in particular when states like Iowa are in limited lockstep with the federal Constitution).
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Brown, the Iowa Supreme Court has concluded that the constitutional guarantee of an individualized sentencing determination based on a youthful offender's demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation extends to parole proceedings and procedures. See Zarate, 908 N.W.2d at 842 ("[T]he parole board, not the sentencer, is in the best position to determine whether the offender is incorrigibly corrupt." (citing Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 839)); Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 791. Likewise, juvenile offenders in Iowa are viewed at parole-review proceedings under the Graham-Miller lens. See Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 774.
In addition, unlike Eighth Circuit in Brown, the Iowa Supreme Court has determined that "a juvenile offender has a liberty interest in a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation and thereby gain release [on parole]." Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 776, 778; see also Iowa Code § 906.4(1); Bomgaars, 967 N.W.2d at 48 (concluding adult offenders serving an indeterminate sentence also "have a liberty interest in parole"). Cf. Brown, 46 F.4th at 890 (holding "inmates have no liberty interest in release from prison before expiration of their valid sentences."). This substantive right excludes "a guarantee of release, [but a juvenile offender] is constitutionally entitled to a reasonable channel to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation." Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 776 (citing Greiman, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 945). Thus, a liberty interest in parole exists under article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution independent of federal law, and the IBOP's procedures are facially constitutional according to Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 783-85.
The Iowa Supreme Court, however, has never concluded whether a juvenile offender's liberty interest extends to any substantive right to receive SOTP at a particular time. See Bomgaars, 967 N.W.2d at 49. Though Bonilla holds that "[i]f the state, through the Board, wishes to condition release upon successful completion of certain programing such as SOTP, the [IDOC] cannot unreasonably withhold such programming from a juvenile offender." 930 N.W.2d at 786. And then, Bomgaars clarified that the "[I]DOC's current practices with regard to SOTP [for adult offenders] are reasonable." 967 N.W.2d at 53.
Thus, while existing Iowa caselaw indicates there are stronger constitutional protections for juveniles under Iowa law—which will impact the merits of Plaintiff's claims to the extent they are not moot—there are open questions of state law regarding the extent of a juvenile offender's procedural protections and the reasonability of access to rehabilitative programming for Plaintiff. In addition, although Plaintiff has obtained SOTP, he still challenges what he believes are unreasonable procedural barriers to obtaining a meaningful opportunity for release, including his inability to pursue college coursework. He also claims entitlement to additional evidentiary and reclassification hearings beyond a "paper review" in accordance with Graham and Miller. Because the Court has granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's federal claims, it must now decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state claims. See § 1367(c)(3).
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III. Generally, "[a] district court exercising original jurisdiction over federal claims also has supplemental jurisdiction over state claims which 'form part of the same case or controversy' " as the federal claims. Starkey v. Amber Enters., Inc., 987 F.3d 758, 765 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if it has dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See § 1367(c)(3). This is a " 'purely discretionary' call." McManemy v. Tierney, 970 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). "In fact, when a district court has dismissed every federal claim, as here, 'judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' will usually 'point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.' " Id. at 1041 (quoting Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 970-71 (8th Cir. 2016)); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
Here, the events that underly Plaintiff's federal claims also form the basis of his state-constitutional claims. As discussed above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983—the only claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. The Court therefore has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) over Plaintiffs' remaining state claims. The Court does not identify any factor that distinguishes this case from the usual case. See McManemy, 970 F.3d at 1041; Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7, 108 S.Ct. 614. On balance, particularly given the more expansive due process rights afforded to juvenile offenders under Iowa law, in conjunction with the lack of state caselaw interpreting Brown under these circumstances, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Two, Four, Six, and Eight. Plaintiff's state constitutional claims are thus dismissed without prejudice for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ordered that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 28, 29) are GRANTED.