Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0862-14T3
04-28-2016
MARGARET E. BUCKLEY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW and SARCOM, INC., Respondents.
DeNoia & Tambasco, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant (Thomas DeNoia and G. John Germann, on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Hahn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Sarcom, Inc., has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 443,518. DeNoia & Tambasco, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant (Thomas DeNoia and G. John Germann, on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Hahn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Sarcom, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Margaret Buckley appeals from the final determination of the Board of Review (Board), that she had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work, and was accordingly disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We affirm.
Buckley worked at Sarcom from December 2006 until August 2013. On August 13, 2013, Buckley met with Kim Ferrara, an Internal Sales Manager at Sarcom, regarding a disruptive altercation between Buckley and a coworker, stemming from issues unrelated to work. Ferrara told Buckley that her behavior had been unprofessional and that she would be receiving a written warning because of the incident. Buckley was not told she was being terminated. When she was asked to sign the written warning, Buckley stated that she would "make it easy" on Ferrara and "just leave," which she proceeded to do after collecting some personal items. She did not take her laptop, which would have allowed her to work from home, and she texted a colleague saying "goodbye" and explaining that she would not tolerate another write-up from Ferrara. Buckley never returned to work, nor did she contact Sarcom after she left.
On September 18, 2013, the Deputy of the Division of Unemployment Insurance mailed Buckley a notice of determination disqualifying her from benefits because she left work voluntarily on August 13, 2013. Buckley appealed this determination on September 27, 2013.
A hearing was conducted before the Appeal Tribunal on December 9, 2013. The Tribunal reversed the Deputy's determination and found that Buckley did not leave work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work, and was therefore not disqualified from benefits. Sarcom appealed this decision to the Board on December 23, 2013, and the Board remanded for additional testimony on May 2, 2014.
The Tribunal held the remand hearing and rendered its decision on May 23, 2014, reconsidering its prior decision and affirming the Deputy's determination. The Tribunal found that Buckley had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work and, accordingly, disqualified her from benefits as of August 11, 2013. On June 4, 2014, a request for a refund of unemployment benefits was mailed to Buckley. Buckley appealed the refund demand to the Board on June 10, 2014, and the board affirmed the second Tribunal decision on September 9, 2014. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Buckley argues that her separation from employment under a subjective belief of an imminent layoff does not disqualify her from benefits, and that the claim examiner's refusal to consider Buckley's allegations of harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation represent an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
This court has a limited role in reviewing administrative agency decisions. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We will not overturn such decisions unless they are "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" or "not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Barry v. Arrow Pointiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 71 (1985); Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 384, 391 (1983). We defer to the fact-finding of administrative agencies. Doering v. Bd. of Review, 203 N.J. Super., 241, 245 (App. Div. 1985).
In order to be eligible for unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an employee who has left work voluntarily must prove that she did so with good cause. Although "good cause" is not defined in the statute, "our courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Labor & Industry Dep't Review Bd., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983). A person who leaves work for a personal reason is still disqualified under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453 (1982).
Here, Buckley initially claimed that Sarcom terminated her employment and that she was therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. The Appeal Tribunal found that she had left work voluntarily and was thus disqualified from benefits. On appeal to the Board, Buckley claimed that the Tribunal stifled her testimony regarding a hostile work environment; the board rejected this claim as "self-serving and without merit." We agree with the Board's observation that "throughout the hearing, the claimant maintained the position that she was discharged because she had an outburst in the office. Hence, it would be unreasonable for the Appeal Tribunal to explore good cause for quitting when the claimant is adamant that she was discharged by the employer and did not intend to quit her job." Because Buckley alleged that her employment was terminated, there was no reason for the Appeal Tribunal or the claims examiner to consider allegations of harassment; those issues were not relevant to the Tribunal's analysis.
In the first hearing, the examiner limited Buckley's testimony regarding allegations of harassment and retaliatory termination; the Tribunal in the second hearing allowed her attorney to question her about certain problems at work and incorporated her testimony from the first hearing. --------
Even so, the record indicates that the Tribunal gave Buckley the opportunity to expand on her prior testimony, but did not use the opportunity to discuss her allegations of harassment or retaliatory firing.
Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the Board in affirming the decision of the appeals tribunal, and decline to disturb its determination.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION