Francis contends the trial court erred in finding that the contract violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule has been described as "an ancient, but still vital, rule of property law intended to enhance marketability of property interests by limiting remoteness of vesting." Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Indiana has adopted the common law rule which provides in part "an interest in property shall not be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one (21) years after a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest."

The rule against perpetuities is "an ancient, but still vital, rule of property law intended to enhance marketability of property interests by limiting the remoteness of vesting." Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1260 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). Indiana has adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Ind. Code § 32-17-8-2 provides the statutory rule against perpetuities does not apply to a "nonvested property interest . . . arising out of a nondonative transfer."

Ind. Code §§ 32-17-8-1 et seq. (Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities). For property interests created as in this case before 1991 (the date of the Indiana statute), the common law rule against perpetuities continues to govern, see section 32-17-8-1(b), and invalidates the grant of a property interest that goes into effect more than 21 years and nine months after the death of a person living when it was made. Francisv. Yates, 700 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Ind.App. 1998); Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Ind.App. 1996); see also Ind. Code § 32-1-4-1 (1982). If the grantee is a corporation and the agreement doesn't use a person's life as a measuring rod for the vesting deadline, the grant must go into effect within 21 years. E.g., Murphy Exploration Production Co. v. Sun Operating Limited Partnership, 747 So.2d 260, 265 (Miss.

See Simon Prop. Grp., L.P. v. Mich. Sporting Goods Distribs., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (to determine the meaning of a contract, the court must examine “all of its provisions, without giving special emphasis to any word, phrase, or paragraph”); Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Med. Ctr. of Ft. Wayne, Ind., 683 N.E.2d 243, 249 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) (“‘Particular words and phrases cannot be read alone; we must gather the parties' intentions from the contract considered as a whole.'” (quoting Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996))); Link v. Breen, 649 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (“to ascertain the parties' intent, words and phrases must be read in light of other language of the contract”).

We find the minority view more consistent with Florida law. See, e.g., HSL Linda Gardens Props., Ltd. v. Seymour, 163 Ariz. 396, 788 P.2d 129, 130 (Ct.App. 1990); Estate of Johnson v. Carr, 286 Ark. 369, 691 S.W.2d 161, 161 (1985); Strong v. Theis, 187 Cal.App.3d 913, 232 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1986); Neustadt v. Pearce, 145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437, 438 (1958); Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Del. 1991); Martin v. Prairie Rod Gun Club, 39 Ill.App.3d 33, 348 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1976); Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996); Trecker v. Langel, 298 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1980); Gore v. Beren, 254 Kan. 418, 867 P.2d 330, 338 (1994); Low v. Spellman, 629 A.2d 57, 58 (Me. 1993); Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 311 Md. 560, 536 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1988); Pace v. Culpepper, 347 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1977); Nickels v. Cohn, 764 S.W.2d 124, 132 (Mo.Ct.App. 1989); Mazzeo v. Kartman, 234 N.J.Super. 223, 560 A.2d 733, 737 (App.Div. 1989); Village of Pinehurst v. Reg'l Inv. of Moore, Inc., 330 N.C. 725, 412 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1992); Schafer v. Deszcz, 120 Ohio App.3d 410, 698 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1997); Webb v. Reames, 326 S.C. 444, 485 S.E.2d 384, 385 (Ct.App. 1997); Clark v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978); Lake of the Woods Ass'n v. McHugh, 238 Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1989); Smith v. VanVoorhis, 170 W.Va. 729, 296 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1982); Browe v. Rasmussen, 121 Wis.2d 697, 359 N.W.2d 181, 1984 WL 180227 (Wis.Ct.App. 1984); see also Hansen v. Stroecker, 699 P.2d 871, 873 (Alaska 1985) (recognizing tha

Thiebaud v. Union Furniture Co., 143 Ind. 340, 42 N.E. 741, 742 (1896). Furthermore, specific words and phrases cannot be read exclusive of other contractual provisions.Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). In addition, the parties' intentions must be determined from the contract read in its entirety.

"Particular words and phrases cannot be read alone; we must gather the parties' intentions from the contract considered as a whole." Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). It is clear from the language in Section 6.16 that St. Joseph was conveying a right to HOTS regarding the potential purchase and installation of a new hyperbaric medical system.

In interpreting a contract, particular words and phrases cannot be read alone; rather, the parties' intentions must be determined from considering the contract as a whole. Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Id.

As so reformed, the agreement would be valid under the common law rule against perpetuities. Unlike the Massachusetts statute in issue here, the Indiana statute construed in Buck v. Banks, 668 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind.App. 1996), on which the Wallaces rely, expressly excludes non-donative transfers from the entire chapter in which both the statutory rule against perpetuities and the reformation provision appear. I. C. 32-1-4.5-2, sec. 2 (1991) ("This Chapter . . . does not apply to . . . a nonvesting property interest or a power of appointment arising out of a nondonative transfer. . .").