But reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on weighing the totality of the circumstances. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (App. 1989) ("Each case hinges on its own particular facts."); Olliver/Pilcher Ins. v. Daniels, 148 Ariz. 530, 532, 715 P.2d 1218, 1220 (1986). Thus, we will give substantial deference both to the trial court's findings of fact and its application of law to fact, reviewing the former on a clearly erroneous standard and the latter for abuse of discretion.

A restrictive covenant cannot simply squash fair competition by the former employee. Farber, 194 Ariz. at 367, 982 P.2d at 1281 (citing Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (Ct.App.1989)). Stated differently, a covenant not to compete “is invalid unless it protects some legitimate interest beyond the employer's desire to protect itself from competition.”

When seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant, the burden is on the employer to prove the extent of its protectable interest. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (App. 1989). We have enforced a restrictive covenant similar to the one in issue here when it was no broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interest.

A covenant not to compete precludes former employees from working in the same business as the employers for certain time periods in specified areas." Hilb, Rogal Hamilton Co., v. McKinney, 190 Ariz. 213, 946 P.2d 464 (App. 1997), citing Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 772 P.2d 36 (App. 1989) and Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 514, 724 P.2d 596, 600 (App. 1986). 6. Covenants not to compete are disfavored because they restrain trade, and thus are strictly construed against employers.

An employer does have a legitimate interest in restraining a former employee “from appropriating valuable trade information and customer relationships” acquired during employment. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (App.1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188, comment b (1981)). But because an employer may not eliminate competition per se, a restrictive covenant that goes beyond protecting a legitimate business interest and prevents a former employee from using skills and talents learned on a former job is unenforceable, id. at 216–17, 772 P.2d at 39–40.

A covenant not to compete precludes former employees from working in the same business as the employers for certain time periods in specified areas. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 772 P.2d 36 (App. 1989); Amex Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 724 P.2d 596 (App. 1986). Covenants not to compete are disfavored and thus are strictly construed against employers.

In light of these requirements, we conclude it would be unreasonable and defy the expectations of the parties to limit reimbursements only to work related to documents bearing the moniker "motion to enforce." See Bryceland v. Northey , 160 Ariz. 213, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) ("We will interpret a contract in a manner which gives a reasonable meaning to the manifested intent of the parties rather than an interpretation that would render the contract unreasonable"). We also reject Defendants’ contention that Paragraph 43 only applies to the enforcement of "provision[s] in the Stipulation that expressly require[ ] Defendants to do some act."

"The burden is on the employer to prove the extent of its protectable interest." Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216, 772 P.2d 36, 39 (Ct. App. 1989). In short, a "restrictive covenant cannot simply squash fair competition by the former employee."

"Each case hinges on its own particular facts." Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (App. 1989). As the court of appeals has noted,

¶14 Restrictive covenants that prevent employees from pursuing a similar vocation after termination of employment are disfavored. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 216 (App. 1989). Thus, a covenant not to compete will not be upheld unless "it protects some legitimate interest beyond the employer's desire to protect itself from competition," Farber, 194 Ariz. at 367, ¶ 12, and is no broader than necessary to protect that interest, Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 515 (App. 1986).