t whether the owner relinquished possession); Ramcke v. Ga. Power Co. , 306 Ga. App. 736, 739-740 (3), 703 S.E.2d 13 (2010) (to be liable, owner must have ability to direct the time or manner of the work done, but it is not sufficient that owner can, under contract, inspect the work to ensure compliance or stop the work if it was not in compliance); Johnson v. Kimberly Clark , 233 Ga. App. 508, 510-511, 504 S.E.2d 536 (1998) (factual question over possession where premises owner required one of its employees to be present in any area in which the contractor was working); compare King v. Midas Realty Corp. , 204 Ga. App. 590, 420 S.E.2d 62 (1992) (terms of contract showed owner relinquished possession and control, and the right to require certain results under the contract was insufficient to find that premises owner had not relinquished control); Modlin v. Swift Textiles , 180 Ga. App. 726, 350 S.E.2d 273 (1986) (provisions in contract showed that premises owner relinquished control); Bryant v. Village Centers , 167 Ga. App. 220, 222 (1), 305 S.E.2d 907 (1983) (same). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Georgia Power's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
The rights retained by Milliken did not amount to control over the manner in which Fluor Daniel did the work, such that Milliken and not Fluor Daniel was responsible for providing a safe workplace. See Kraft, supra at 212; Bryant v. Village Centers, 167 Ga. App. 220, 222 ( 305 S.E.2d 907) (1983). Accordingly, there was no issue of material fact as to control of the premises and the trial court correctly granted Milliken's motion for summary judgment.
Rather, OKI surrendered the premises to Weeks, OKI did not interfere with Weeks' status as an independent contractor, Weeks had the duty of providing for the safety of its workers and OKI had no such duty. King v. Midas Realty Corp., 204 Ga. App. 590 ( 420 S.E.2d 62) (1992); Bryant v. Village Centers, 167 Ga. App. 220 ( 305 S.E.2d 907) (1983). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to OKI. Modlin v. Swift Textiles, 180 Ga. App. 726 ( 350 S.E.2d 273) (1986).
Further, there is no evidence that appellee in fact utilized this provision to oust D M from its contractual status as an independent contractor or to assume responsibility for the manner in which the work was done. See Bryant v. Village Centers, 167 Ga. App. 220, 222 ( 305 S.E.2d 907) (1983). In regard to appellants' arguments based upon testimony by Lusby regarding appellee's intervention in other projects in matters involving subcontractors, "`[i]t further appears that, under the contract, [appellee] retained or reserved no right or authority over the project for itself or any of its other employees, save only those consistent with the right and authority to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract.'"
Both Modlin and Black Decker also contend that Swift as owner had assumed inspection responsibility and was negligent in the exercise of that assumed duty and thus negligently failed to provide a safe place in which to work. In relation to the asserted liability of Swift as being negligent in the exercise of its assumed safety duties, we conclude that the contention of asserted negligence is the same contention as rejected by the holding of this court in Bryant v. Village Centers, 167 Ga. App. 220- 223 ( 305 S.E.2d 907). Inasmuch as the same type of contract involving the self-same language contained in the contract in this case was involved in Bryant, supra, we may legitimately substitute names in this case for names appearing in the Bryant case. When this is done, it becomes clear that Bryant, supra, controls the resolution of the summary judgment involving Swift. Making the substitutions above mentioned, the Bryant case would read insofar as pertinent to this appeal as follows: "Appellant [Modlin] is an employee of [Bahnson].