Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-2582-MBS-MGB
10-03-2018
Anthony G. Bryant, Plaintiff, v. United States Marshal, Federal Trade Commission, Attorney General of United States, and US Attorney for the District of South Carolina, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Anthony Bryant ("Plaintiff") is a nonprisoner litigant who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the record and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. Upon review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Amended Complaint (DE#8) should be summarily dismissed , without issuance and service of process, for the following reasons:
I. Relevant Law
A. Liberal Construction
Pro se pleadings are given liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, "[t]he 'special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view ... pro se filings does not transform the court into an advocate. United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2401 (2013). Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed." Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Giving "liberal construction" does not mean that the Court can ignore a prisoner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. "Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
B. Standard of Review
Upon application, an indigent litigant may commence an action "in forma pauperis" in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Id.
C. Inherent Authority to Dismiss Frivolous Case
The United States Supreme Court has observed that federal district courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous case. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (holding that federal district courts may dismiss claims that are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit").
Consistent with such authority, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "frivolous complaints are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court." Ross v. Baron, 493 F.App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); and see, e.g., Cabbill v. United States, Case No. 1:14-cv-4122-JMC-PJG, 2015 WL 6905072, *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015) (same), appeal dism'd, 2016 WL 1085106 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016); Anderson v. Patterson, Case No. 6:16-761-MGL-JDA, 2016 WL 1743095 (D.S.C. April 12, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 1732763 (D.S.C. May 2, 2016). "A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009).
Therefore, the present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See e.g., Carter v. Ervin, Case No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014), appeal dism'd, 585 F.App'x 98 (4th Cir. 2014); Mayhew, 2014 WL 468938 at *1, fn.1 (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case).
II. Allegations of the Complaint
In his Amended Complaint (DE# 8), Plaintiff names the following parties as Defendants: the United States Marshal, Federal Trade Commission, the Attorney General of United States, and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina. He checks the box for federal question jurisdiction and states that the basis for jurisdiction is: "the Identify Theft and Assumption and Deterrence Act, Communication Decency Act, Email Privacy Act.
The Amended Complaint includes two "Statements of the Claim." The first one consists of the following (verbatim):
1989 South Carolina State Trooper ticket leading to City of Charleston police report August 6, 2010 to a physical reprisal for filing DOJ complaint "Domestic abuse"(DE# 8 at 5, ¶ III). In his second "Statement of the Claim," Plaintiff indicates (verbatim):
U.S. Marshal supported local, county and state courts mismanagement of records under Article Four Relations Among the States Acts, records and judicial procedures(Id. at 6, ¶ III).
Plaintiff has also submitted two "Relief" paragraphs. In the first one, Plaintiff states the following (verbatim):
South Carolina public safety ticket 1989 undermine IO complaint waste, fraud and abuse deemed "domestic abuse" -- $ two million dollars punitive damages.(Id. at 5, ¶ IV "Relief"). In the second one, he indicates (verbatim):
Federal Trade Commission did not manage records under Cloud Act, Email Privacy Act local, county and state government(Id. at 6, ¶ IV "Relief").
III. Discussion
Review of the Amended Complaint reflects multiple grounds for summary dismissal.
A. Failure to State a Claim
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that more than conclusory statements are required to state a plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009). A plaintiff must allege specific facts that adequately support the claim. Id. The present Complaint fails to state any factual or legal basis for any federal claims. Although courts give "liberal construction" to pro se pleadings, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that federal courts may not "ignore a petitioner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim." Wilson, 699 F.3d at 797.
The allegations of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are nonsensical and incoherent. Plaintiff does not allege any supporting facts that suggesting any constitutional violation or any violation of federal law. The Amended Complaint consists of disjointed phrases that fail to state any sort of coherent claim. Even liberally construing the allegations of the pro se Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, it is not possible to discern any plausible claims from the disconnected sentence fragments in it. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that "[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. Plaintiff has also submitted an attachment (a hand-written "Declaration") that is disconnected in logic and grammar, and refers to unrelated events. (DE# 11). For example, Plaintiff states in his "Declaration" that:
The Government does not protect the public from the DEEP WEB data that cannot index or cannot find because they are passwords protected or require software comment made to Commission on Law Enforcement Agencies Inc. years 2016 Charleston County Sheriff's Office and 2017 City of Charleston Police Department regarding 1970 Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1986 Sentencing Laws, 1994 Crime Bill did not prevent drug abuse but criminalized a public health crisis mainly in census tracts in violation of U.S.C. § 241 and 242 Color of the Law as standard and/or best practices. The use of the DARK WEB to entrap occurs anonymously using a special masking for example "Onion Routers."(DE#11). The attached exhibits to his initial Complaint shed no light on Plaintiff's allegations, and any relevance cannot be discerned. (DE#1-1). Such exhibits include a docket page from another of Plaintiff's pro se cases; a 2010 response letter from the US Department of Justice regarding Plaintiff's letter regarding the effects of the Charleston Count Incinerator; a printed page about the "Tax Refund Offset Program;" an IRS notice from 2014; a receipt from the Social Security Administration showing that Plaintiff had applied for a new card in 2009; an "Award Continuation Sheet" dated 09/23/2009; and a letter from the office of Senator Tim Scott.
Plaintiff also mentions the "Privacy Act" in one of his duplicate pages regarding "Relief." Without any factual support or coherent explanation, he states that "Federal Trade Commission did not manage records under Cloud Act, Email Privacy Act local, county and state government." (Id. at 6, ¶ IV "Relief"). To have a cause of action under the Privacy Act, a plaintiff must show that specific disclosures (1) violated the Act; (2) were committed willfully or intentionally; and (3) adversely affected him. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4); Doe v. Chao, 435 F.3d 492, 500 (4th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has clearly failed to meet these elements. See, e.g., Walker v. Gambrell, 647 F.Supp.2d 529, 536 (D.Md. July 16, 2009) (dismissing pro se claim under the Privacy Act). To the extent Plaintiff may be complaining about a 1989 traffic ticket, his Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts that would state a claim under such statutes.
Even with liberal construction, the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Summary dismissal is appropriate.
B. Frivolity
Moreover, the Complaint appears to lack any arguable basis in law or in fact, and therefore is subject to dismissal as frivolous. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. For example, Plaintiff refers to federal statutes, such as Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). Such statute immunizes commercial interactive computer service providers from liability for defamatory information posted by third parties. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 509(c)(1), 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1). See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Plaintiff fails to indicate what this has to do with anything in his Amended Complaint, and states no facts that would be relevant to such statute.
Plaintiff also makes an unexplained reference to the "Cloud Act," i.e. the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The Cloud Act amended the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") and provides that the obligation to comply with search warrant requirements under the SCA apply regardless of whether a communication, record, or other information was located within or outside of the United States. See United States v. Microsoft, -- U.S. --, 138 S.Ct. 1186 (April 17, 2018). Given that Plaintiff's pleading is essentially incoherent, it appears that the legal deficiencies of the Amended Complaint cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 76 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995). Given Plaintiff's nonsensical Amended Complaint, his indecipherable declaration, and irrelevant exhibits, it is readily apparent that amendment would not cure the deficiencies of this Complaint and would be futile.
Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint whose meaning the Court cannot discern, even with liberal construction. Plaintiff's allegations are incomprehensible. This case may also be duplicative of several other pending cases recently filed by the Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff appears to repeat nonsensical fragments from another case, see 2:18-cv-2467-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. FCC et al. Additionally, in Case Nos. 2:18-cv-606-MBS-MGB, 2:18-cv-607-MBS-MGB, and 2:18-cv-1436-MBS-MGB, Plaintiff also sued the U.S. Attorney for the District of South Carolina and the Attorney General of United States. Here, Plaintiff again sues those same two officials for no discernible reason. In any event, Plaintiff's allegations are consist only of random unrelated sentence fragments.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that "district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits and may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)." Cottle v. Bell, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (per curiam) (citing with approval, Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "district courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party"); Southern Holdings, Inc. v. Horry Cty., South Carolina, Case No. 4:02-1859-RBH, 2014 WL 11071017, *6 (D.S.C. June 11, 2014) (same); Paul v. de Holczer, Case No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) ("the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency"), affirmed, 631 F.App'x 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); Reynolds v. Third Circuit Pub. Def. Office, Case No. 4:17-cv-3469-BHH-MGB, 2018 WL 1322102, *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 1124592 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2018) (summarily dismissing duplicate case as frivolous). Summary dismissal is appropriate.
C. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In fact, Plaintiff's allegations are so disconnected and incoherent that it appears that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking here. Federal-question jurisdiction requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1976); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (holding that if jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the plaintiff must show that he has alleged a claim under federal law that is not frivolous). Plaintiff has failed to do so. His allegations are inadequate to allege a substantial federal claim, and it does not appear that amendment could cure such pleading deficiency. As a result, this case should be summarily dismissed.
This federal court has an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The obligation to examine subject-matter jurisdiction is triggered whenever that jurisdiction is "fairly in doubt." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671. It is well settled that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936). The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) "federal question," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) "diversity of citizenship." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On the pre-printed complaint form, Plaintiff checks the box for federal question. (DE# 1 at 3, ¶ II "Basis for Jurisdiction"). Despite this, no cognizable basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent from the face of the pleading.
With respect to "federal question" jurisdiction, the allegations of the Complaint do not indicate that this case is one "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff does not plausibly state any facts that would suggest a violation of any federal statute or constitutional provision by the Defendants. Even though Plaintiff appears to assert federal question jurisdiction, this court is not bound by Plaintiff's characterization of his suit because there are no facts alleged to support any federal cause of action.
When considering the issue of whether a case is one "arising under the Constitution . . ." or, in other words, whether "federal question" jurisdiction exists in a case, a federal court is not bound by a party's characterization of the case. District courts are authorized to disregard such characterizations to avoid "unjust manipulation or avoidance of its jurisdiction." Lyon v. Centimark Corp., 805 F. Supp. 333, 334-35 (E.D. N.C. 1992); see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) ("Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit."). Thus, even though the Plaintiff appears to assert that his Amended Complaint was filed under federal-question jurisdiction, this court may disregard such assertion because no basis for federal question jurisdiction is actually presented.
The Amended Complaint also alleges no basis for diversity jurisdiction. The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—28 U.S.C. § 1332. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 & nn.13-16 (1978). Diversity jurisdiction is lacking in this case because according to the information provided by the Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina are residents of the State of South Carolina. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to support a finding that the $75,000 jurisdictional amount would actually be in controversy in this case.
(1) citizens of different States[.]
D. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff's Complaint names the United States Marshal and Federal Trade Commission (agencies of the federal government) and several federal officials (the Attorney General of United States and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina) as defendants. It is well-settled that federal agencies are entitled to sovereign immunity unless Congress waives immunity and consents to suit. Global Mail Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Service, 142 F.3d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1998).
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (establishing a cause of action against federal officials for violation of federal constitutional rights). A Bivens claim for damages is not actionable against the United States, federal agencies, or public officials acting in their official capacities.
Plaintiff may not sue the United States or its agencies without their consent. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994) (holding that suit against federal agency could not proceed); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 355 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Bivens does not allow for recovery of money damages, or suits in general, against the government itself."); Moore v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Bivens-type claims cannot be brought against federal agencies"). The same is true for actions brought against federal agency officials in their official capacities. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 1996); Estate of Riopedre v. United States, 2015 WL 505584 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2015).
Sovereign immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction. Global Mail Ltd., 142 F.3d at 210; United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1053 (2001). Such pleading deficiency cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading. Rice, 40 F.3d at 76. Thus, the Complaint against the federal agencies and the individual federal officials in their official capacity is also subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity.
E. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff names the Attorney General of United States and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina as defendants. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges no actions by them. If Plaintiff is attempting to complain about any actions taken by them in performing their official duties, any claim against such officials in their individual capacity would be subject to summary dismissal. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) ("[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have immunity for performing functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"); and see Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Redden v. McMaster, Case No. 8:08-2845-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 4458877, *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (emphasizing that prosecutors "have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings").
F. With or Without Prejudice
The only remaining question is whether to dismiss this case with or without prejudice. Despite availing himself of the opportunity to amend, Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint that fails to state a plausible claim of any kind. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally with prejudice unless the court specifically orders that the dismissal is without prejudice (and provides an explanation for using its discretion to deviate from the general rule). Abdul-Mumit, et al. v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC, et al, -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 3405474, *5 (4th Cir. July 13, 2018) (citing Carter v. Norfolk Community Hosp. Association, Inc., 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1985)). Here, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, is legally and factyually frivolous, and seeks monetary damages against federal defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For all these reasons, the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal with prejudice.
"Unless otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice." McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009); Carter, 761 F.2d at 974 ("A district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is, of course, with prejudice unless it specifically orders dismissal without prejudice."). Here, it appears that the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint cannot be remedied through more specific pleading. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 76 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that dismissal with prejudice was therefore appropriate), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "[o]nce a court has determined that the complaint is truly unamendable, a dismissal without prejudice is of little benefit to the litigant, as the claim cannot be made viable through reformulation." McLean, 566 F.3d at 399.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers to several federal statutes, without any supporting facts or explanation. His Amended Complaint is so incoherent that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking here. Thus, alternatively, the District Court would be within its discretion to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, is legally and factually frivolous, and seeks monetary damages against federal defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). For these reasons, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal with prejudice. Alternatively, the Amended Complaint appears to be so incoherent that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking here. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, and given that amendment has not cured such apparent deficiency, dismissal without prejudice would be appropriate in this situation. The Plaintiff has already had the opportunity to amend his initial Complaint. Given the Plaintiff's failure to remedy the deficiencies of the initial Complaint, it appears that further amendment of the pleadings would be futile.
V. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Amended Complaint (DE#8) should be summarily dismissed with prejudice, and without issuance and service of process; alternatively, if District Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Amended Complaint may be dismissed without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. October 3, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Warning on the following page:
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).