Opinion
C.C.A. No. 01C01-9811-CC-00471.
June 1, 1999.
WAYNE COUNTY, HON. ROBERT HOLLOWAY, JUDGE, (Habeas Corpus).
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE APPELLANT:
AARON M. BRYANT (pro se).
FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN KNOX WALKUP, Attorney General Reporter,
ELLEN H. POLLACK, Assistant Attorney General,
VICTOR S. (TORRY) JOHNSON III, District Attorney General,
STEVE R. DOZIER, Assistant District Attorney.
The petitioner, Aaron M. Bryant, appeals from the Wayne County Criminal Court's order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement for ten years in the Department of Correction. On May 6, 1998, he filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. The trial court denied habeas corpus relief because it found that the petitioner did not assert grounds which would entitle him to the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges that his conviction is based on a defective indictment. Following a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.
Additionally, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in Davidson County alleging a defective indictment. The trial court denied relief and this court affirmed. See Aaron Bryant v. State, No. 01C01-9801-CR-00038 (Tenn.Crim.App., Nashville, Apr. 21, 1999).
"Aggravated sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim [when] . . . [t]he victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (1994).
Habeas corpus relief is very limited because it is only available when "`it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered' that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired." Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37 (Tenn. 1868)). In other words, habeas corpus relief is granted only when a judgment is void. "A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment." Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 161). A petition for habeas corpus relief may be summarily dismissed "[i]f, from the showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109 (1998); see also James R. Twitty v. Howard Carlton, No. 03C01-9707-CR-00310, slip op. at 5 (Tenn.Crim.App., Knoxville, Jan. 6, 1999) (citing Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994)).
We must first determine if the allegation made by the petitioner may be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding. The petitioner contends that the indictment was defective because it did not state a mens rea. In Dykes v. Compton, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a challenge to indictments could be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding. The court stated that "the validity of an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting conviction may be addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction." Dykes, 978 S.W.2d at 529. "A valid indictment is an essential jurisdictional element, without which there can be no prosecution." Id. (citing State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997)). Therefore, a challenge to an indictment which would deprive the court of jurisdiction may be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding.
The petitioner contends that the indictment charging him with aggravated sexual battery was defective because it did not allege a mental state. The petitioner argues that the mental state "knowingly" is an essential element of the offense of aggravated sexual battery, which should have been included in the indictment.
The state contends that the indictment sufficiently alleged a mental state according to State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). In Hill, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided the issue of whether an indictment charging aggravated rape was sufficient without alleging a culpable mental state. The indictment in Hill stated that the defendant "did unlawfully sexually penetrate" the victim. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997). The court stated:
for offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment which fails to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution and conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge which the accused must defend, adequate basis for entry of a proper judgment, and protection from double jeopardy;
(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; and
(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the alleged conduct.
Id. at 726-27. The court found Hill's indictment met the constitutional and statutory requirements of notice and form. Therefore, it was valid. Id. at 729.
The Tennessee Supreme Court applied the reasoning ofHill in Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998). Ruff challenged his indictment for aggravated sexual battery as being defective because no culpable mental state was alleged. The court found that the aggravated sexual battery statute does not describe a culpable mental state. Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tenn. 1998). However, aggravated sexual battery requires "sexual contact," which describes a culpable mental state of intent. Id.;see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6) (1997) ("sexual contact" is intentional touching). "Thus, to establish the offense of aggravated sexual battery, the perpetrator must have acted with intent;" however, the mental state of intent may be inferred from the language "unlawful sexual contact." Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97. The court found Ruff's indictment satisfied the requirements ofHill and upheld Ruff's conviction. Id. at 97-98. The language of the indictment in Ruff is virtually identical to the language at issue here. In Ruff, the indictment alleged that Ruff "did unlawfully engage in sexual contact." Id. at 96-97. The indictment in this case said the petitioner "did engage in unlawful sexual contact." Accordingly, we find the indictment against the petitioner was sufficient.
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
_______________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE