Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:04-CV-083-C.
April 26, 2004
ORDER
On this day the Court considered Defendants, Mark Griffin, Wayne Havens and Lubbock Independent School District ("LISD") Board Members and Spouses' (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss, Alternative Motion to Strike and Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement filed on January 7, 2004. Plaintiffs failed to file a timely response. The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(a), 9(a) (e), and 12(b)(6). Defendants filed their alternative motion to strike pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(a), 8(a), and 12(f). Finally, the Defendants filed their alternative motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(a), 8(a), and 12(e). Defendants further based their motions on case law set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) and by the Fifth Circuit in Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 15, 2003, Plaintiffs, Linda M. Bryant and Donald S. Bryant, Jr. (collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed their Complaint against Defendants Lubbock Independent School District ("Defendant LISD"), Mark Griffin, President of the LISD Board ("Defendant Griffin"), Wayne Havens, Superintendent ("Defendant Havens"), and All LISD Board Members' Spouses ("Defendants Spouses"). The Complaint was originally filed in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas. On January 7, 2004, Defendant LISD filed its Motion to Dismiss Subject to Transfer of Venue. All Defendants joined in a Motion to Transfer Venue that was also filed on January 7, 2004, which was granted by order dated April 13, 2004, transferring the case to this Court.Following the transfer of venue, this Court granted Defendant Lubbock Independent School District's Motion to Dismiss.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The pertinent portion of the Plaintiffs' Complaint is as follows.
6. PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE AND SHOW THAT SAID DEFENDANTS DID WITH MALICE ATTEMPT ON MANY OCCASIONS TO HAVE PLAINTIFF DESTROYED IN THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD BY USING TERROR AND INTIMIDATION TO GET PLAINTIFF TO RESIGN FROM THE DISTRICT. INTIMIDATION INCLUDED THE USE OF SCHOOL POLICE, TELEPHONE CALLS THREATENING DEATH, A MALE TEACHER ATTEMPTING TO COMPROMISE SAID PLAINTIFF IN FALSE AND MISLEADING MEETINGS, AND ALLOWING CERTAIN PRINCIPALS TO MAKE FALSE STATEMENTS CONCERNING CHARACTER AND WORK ETHIC.
7. CONSPIRACY AND COLLUSION BEGINNING AT SOME TIME IN 1999 AND CONTINUING ON AS OF THIS DATE, WAS UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFF AND HAS CAUSED HARM AND MENTAL ANGUISH AND IN DOING SO, HAS AFFECTED PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY NOT TO HAVE FEAR IN GOING TO THE DISTRICT OFFICE ON 19th STREET.
8. THE CONSPIRACY AS ALLEGED IN NUMBER (7) HAS CAUSED GRIEVOUS HARM TO PLAINTIFF AND ALSO THE POSITION WITH THE BRYANT FAMILY TRUST IN BEING NAMED BY THE BANK AS A DRUG LAUNDERER OF MONEY BY THE PLAINS NATIONAL BANK, NOW CALLED PLAINS CAPITAL BANK. WHEN IN FACT THE TRUST NEVER DID BUSINESS WITH ANYONE IN THE DRUG LAUNDERING OF MONEY. THERE WAS NO OR IS ANY BASIS FOR THIS ACCUSATION.
9. NUMEROUS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAVE EXISTED OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE BY ALL DEFENDANTS.
10. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE WILL BE ADDRESSED ON BEHALF OF LINDA M. BRYANT AND DONALD S. BRYANT JR. INVOLVING THIS MATTER.
11. PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RICO STATUTE, THE ACTS COMPLAINED HEREIN CONSTITUTES RACKETEERING IN THAT SAID ACTS WERE COMMITTED BASED UPON ASSERTION OF FALSE CLAIMS FOR FRAUD, FINANCIAL GAIN, AND SCHEME OF ARTIFICER TO DEFRAUD CHARGEABLE OR INDICTABLE UNDER FEDERAL RICO STATUTE AND PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT AS THE COURT DEEMS REASONABLE.
Pl. Compl. at 2.
III. STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The test for determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was set out by the United States Supreme Court as follows: "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See also Grisham v. United States, 103 F.3d 24, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1997).
Subsumed within the rigorous standard of the Conley test is the requirement that the plaintiff's complaint be stated with enough clarity to enable a court or an opposing party to determine whether a claim is sufficiently alleged. Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989). Further, "the plaintiff's complaint is to be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the allegations contained therein are to be taken as true." Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1996). This is consistent with the well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state a claim. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). In other words, a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim "admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's rights to relief based upon those facts." Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992). Finally, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must examine the complaint to determine whether the allegations provide relief on any possible theory. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994).
Rule 12(e) More Definite Statement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) is the correct avenue for seeking a more definite statement. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) states:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten (10) days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed and make such order as it deems just.
"If a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)." Sisk v. Texas Parks Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion for more definite statement should not be granted if the information a party wishes to obtain can be obtained through discovery. Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1959); Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Saginaw, 991 F. Supp. 563, 572-73 (N.D. Tex. 1997); N.D. TEX. LR 12.1 ("except for motions complaining of failure to plead fraud or mistake with particularity pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), a motion for more definite statement may only be filed where the information sought cannot be obtained by discovery"). Orders made pursuant to a motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e) are reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Old Time Enters. v. Int'l Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike
Rule 12(f) states that "[u]pon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules . . . upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). "The motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy." Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Escambia County, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted); see also FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993). Accordingly, such a motion should only be granted when "the allegations are prejudicial to the defendant or immaterial to the lawsuit." Johnson v. Harvey, 1998 WL 596745, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 1998) (citations omitted). The movant establishes immateriality by showing the challenged allegations "can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation." Sadler v. Benson Motors Corp., 1997 WL 266735, at *1 (E.D. La. May 15, 1997) (citations omitted).
Rule 8(a) Plain Statement
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Rule 8(a) as having an "insistence upon simple, concise, and direct allegations." Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.3d 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 173 F.3d 946, 950 (5th Cir. 1999)). "[A] complaint which contains a "bare bones" allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice." Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Walker v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990)). Rule 7(a) Reply
In Schultea v. Wood, the Fifth Circuit held that if a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the district court may order the plaintiff, under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to file a reply tailored to answer the defendant's assertion of qualified immunity. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff's 7(a) reply shall plead with particularity facts focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiff's injury. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1999); Schultea, 47 F.3d 1427. If a plaintiff is ordered to file a Rule 7(a) reply, failure to comply with such an order will result in dismissal of a plaintiff's claims against the party alleging the defense of qualified immunity. Reyes, 168 F.3d at 161.
IV. DISCUSSION
Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement
The Court points out that "except for motions complaining of failure to plead fraud or mistake with particularity pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), a motion for more definite statement may only be filed where the information sought cannot be obtained by discovery." N.D. TEX. LR 12.1. The Court finds that no allegations of fraud or mistake were made in the Plaintiffs' Complaint; thus, Defendants' Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e), is DENIED. Alternative Motion to Strike
"The motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy." Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Escambia County, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted); see also FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993). Accordingly, such a motion should only be granted when "the allegations are prejudicial to the defendant or immaterial to the lawsuit." Johnson v. Harvey, 1998 WL 596745, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 1998) (citations omitted). The Court finds that the allegations made by the Plaintiffs are the basis of their lawsuit. Thus, the Plaintiffs' allegations are neither immaterial nor prejudicial. Defendants' Alternative Motion to Strike is DENIED. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
As stated above, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, no possible cause of action exists upon which the District Board Members' Spouses may be liable to the Plaintiffs. In fact, the Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that the Defendant Spouses are included only because Texas is a community property law state-not because of any alleged conduct of the Defendant Spouses. See Pl. Comp. at 2. Thus, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and DISMISSES the Plaintiffs' claims against the Spouses of the District Board Members.
A. Non-civil Rights Claims
As listed above, in their Complaint the Plaintiffs brought claims for (1) intimidation under paragraph 6; (2) conspiracy and collusion under paragraphs 7 and 8; (3) obstruction of justice under paragraphs 9 and 10; and (4) federal RICO violations under paragraph 11. The Court is unable to determine whether the Plaintiffs are suing Defendants Wayne Havens, Mark Griffin, and the District Board Members in their individual capacities or in their official capacities. Thus, the Court will analyze whether the Plaintiffs' Complaint has stated a claim for which relief may be granted under each capacity.
Defendants Havens, Griffin, Board Members — Official Capacity
Plaintiffs' Complaint names Mark Griffin, as President of the LISD Board; Superintendent Wayne Havens; and All LISD Board Members as Defendants. In the likelihood that the Plaintiffs are suing these individuals in their official capacities for the non-civil rights allegations, the Court will discuss why such claims are barred by the Texas Legislature.
Generally a state enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it has expressly given its consent to be sued. Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 So. Ct. 684, 687-88. An exception to this rule is the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA"), which waives the state's immunity from suit and from liability for certain listed areas. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code. §§ 101.001 et seq. (Vernon 1997 and Supp. 2003). Moreover, the TTCA waives sovereign immunity in state court only; it does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunities to suit in federal courts. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 1996). The Sherwinski court held that the TTCA waiver of immunity is limited only to courts created by the State of Texas. Id. at 851. "Applying this standard, we find that the [TTCA] waives sovereign immunity in state court only. This is the only reasonable construction of the statute. The act clearly does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal courts." Id. at 852.
Moreover, this Court dismissed Defendant LISD from this lawsuit as to the non-civil rights claims in a previous order dated April 5, 2004, after determining that the TTCA did not waive immunity for such claims against LISD under the circumstances of this case. Because any claim against Defendants Mark Griffin, Wayne Havens, and All Board Members in their official capacities is a claim against LISD, and because all non-civil rights claims against LISD have been dismissed, then all non-civil rights claims against Defendants Mark Griffin, Wayne Havens, and All LISD Board Members in their official capacities are hereby DISMISSED. Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiffs' non-civil rights claims against any of the Defendants in their official capacity.
Defendants Havens, Griffin, Board Members — Individual Capacity
This Court must examine the complaint to determine whether the allegations provide relief on any possible theory against Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffin, and the District Board Members, in their individual capacities. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). In giving a great deal of latitude to the Plaintiffs' allegations, this Court cannot say with certainty that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege claims for which relief may be granted. Thus, with regard to Defendants' individual capacities, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffin, and the District Board Members pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED without prejudice to refiling at a later date; but, as stated below, the Plaintiffs will be required to file a Rule 7(a) Reply and "flesh out" the specifics of those claims against those Defendants.
Rule 7(a) Reply
The Court notes that the issue of qualified immunity has been raised. Thus, the Plaintiffs will be required to file a reply, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), to Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity within twenty (20) days from the date of this order. Plaintiffs' reply shall plead with particularity facts focusing specifically on the conduct of each individual who allegedly caused each Plaintiff's injury. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1999); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, this order shall serve as notice that failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against the parties raising the defense of qualified immunity. Reyes, 168 F.3d at 161. All discovery is stayed until further order of the Court. Thus, Defendants' Motion for a Rule 7(a) Reply is GRANTED. B. Civil Rights Claims
The Plaintiffs also allege civil rights violations in paragraph 9 of their Complaint. Again, as with the non-civil rights claims advanced by the Plaintiffs, the Court is unable to determine whether the Plaintiffs are suing Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffin, and the District Board Members in their individual capacities or in their official capacities for alleged civil rights violations. Regardless of how the Plaintiffs intended to sue the Defendants, the Plaintiffs' Complaint falls far short of meeting even the most liberal notice pleading standards for a civil rights claim. In paragraph 9 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Plaintiffs simply allege: "NUMEROUS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAVE EXISTED OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS." The plaintiff's complaint must be stated with enough clarity to enable a court or an opposing party to determine whether a claim is sufficiently alleged. Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiffs have simply asserted a conclusory allegation that civil rights violations have occurred; yet, the Plaintiffs have provided nothing more. A motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim "admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's rights to relief based upon those facts." Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have provided no facts whatsoever, nor have they even alleged any facts that could be construed to allude to the alleged civil rights violations in paragraph 9 of their Complaint.
For a complaint to be sufficient, the underlying facts pleaded in the complaint must be adequate to provide the defendants with "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Russell, 736 F.2d at 288 (quoting Conley, 78 S.Ct. at 103). Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff does not give a defendant proper notice of a claim as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) when, for example, the plaintiff advances an allegation — yet the complaint does not suggest how this is so or allege any facts that tend to support this gratuitous conclusion of law. Id. (citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1357 at 319-20 ". . . the court will not accept conclusory allegations concerning the legal effect of the events plaintiff has set out if these allegations do not reasonably follow from his description of what happened. . . ."). "Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint will be deemed inadequate only if it fails to (1) provide notice of circumstances which give rise to the claim, or (2) set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist." Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.3d 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). A complaint which contains a "bare bones" allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury does not provide adequate notice. Walker v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). A district court properly dismisses a plaintiff's § 1983 claims when that plaintiff fails to allege required elements of a constitutional violation. See Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532-533 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiffs' claims of civil rights violations against Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffin, and the Board Members of Lubbock Independent School District. Those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein,
1) Defendants' Alternative Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement is denied;
2) Defendants' Alternative Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike is denied;
3) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is granted as to all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Spouses of Board Members;
4) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is granted as to all of Plaintiffs' claims against the official capacities of Defendants Mark Griffin, Wayne Havens, and the Board Members of Lubbock Independent School District;
5) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiffs' non-civil rights claims against Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffin, and the Board Members of Lubbock Independent School District in their individual capacities;
6) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiffs' civil rights claims against Defendants Superintendent Wayne Havens, LISD Board President Mark Griffins, and the Board Members of the Lubbock Independent School District in their individual capacities;
7) Plaintiffs shall file a Rule 7(a) Reply addressing their non-civil rights claims against Defendants Mark Griffin, Wayne Havens, and the Board Members of the Lubbock Independent School District; and
8) All other relief requested is denied.
SO ORDERED.