Bryant v. Carrier

16 Citing cases

  1. Johnson v. Pearce

    148 N.C. App. 199 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    In Johnson v. Pierce, supra, this Court held that a claim for criminal conversation may be based solely upon post-separation sexual relations. See also Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619 (1938) (fact that intercourse occurs during separation of plaintiff and spouse does not bar action for criminal conversation).

    Our Supreme Court, and this Court following its lead, have made it abundantly clear that `"[t]he mere fact of separation will not bar an action for criminal conversation occurring during separation.'" Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938) (quoting 30 C.J. 1156); see also Brown, 124 N.C. App. at 380, 477 S.E.2d at 237; Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460, 465, 322 S.E.2d 780, 785 (1984), vacated by, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985). Here, the evidence showed that defendant and plaintiff's wife engaged in sexual intercourse during the coverture.

  2. Misenheimer v. Burris

    360 N.C. 620 (N.C. 2006)   Cited 28 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that damages for mental anguish recoverable under a theory of criminal conversation

    The elements necessary to support a claim for criminal conversation are marriage and sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the existence of the marriage. See Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 194-95, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938); see also 1 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina Family Law § 5.46(B), at 402 (5th ed. 1993) [hereinafter Family Law]. Criminal conversation is frequently described as a strict liability tort in that a plaintiff may prevail even if the defendant was unaware of the marriage. A plaintiff is not required to prove love and affection in the marriage or any negative effect on the marriage by the sexual inter-course. See, e.g., Family Law § 5.46(B), at 403-04.

  3. Edwards v. Stills

    335 Ark. 470 (Ark. 1998)   Cited 62 times   1 Legal Analyses

    App. 1986) (holding that a deranged person, one who cannot form a rational intent, cannot be guilty of a wanton tort requiring actual or constructive malice and cannot be held liable for punitive damages); Goff v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113 (Ky.Ct.App. 1986) (holding that mentally deficient persons are insulated from punitive damages, recognizing the duty to balance the protection of society at large with compassion for those unable to conform their conduct to the expected standard); Jewell v. Colby, 24 A. 902 (N.H. 1891) (holding that insanity is a defense to damages sought on account of the defendant's intent or motive because an insane person has no will or motive); Lee v. Thomas, 534 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976) (holding that the defendant was not liable for exemplary or punitive damages because he was insane at the time, such that he did not know right from wrong, did not know the nature and consequence of his actions, and was not able to properly conduct his business affairs). In Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619 (N.C. 1938), the Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized that while an insane person is civilly liable for his torts and for compensatory damages, he is not necessarily liable for punitive damages. In order to justify punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the defendant "was not insane at the time of the wrongs complained of, but was mentally competent, and that he had legal capacity to commit the acts alleged with such elements of aggravation as would justify the award of punitive damages."

  4. Dolin v. Kindred

    4:19-CV-46-FL (E.D.N.C. Jun. 14, 2019)

    A claim for criminal conversation under North Carolina law is stated when it is established '"the plaintiff was lawfully married . . . and that during the existence of such marriage . . . the defendant [ ] had sexual intercourse with [the] plaintiff's [spouse] . . . ." Vonfeldt v. Grapsy, No. 1:16CV1179, 2017 WL 590337, at *2 (M.D.N.C. 14 Feb. 2017) (quoting Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 194-95, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938)), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2017 WL 1187841 (30 Mar. 2017); Bowden v. Agnew, No. 1:12CV1237, 2013 WL 3545507, at *5 (M.D.N.C. 11 July 2013) ("A claim of criminal conversation requires that an 'actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture.'" (quoting Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996))).

  5. Vonfeldt v. Grapsy

    1:16cv1179 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    For a criminal conversation claim, North Carolina's common law requires proof that "the plaintiff was lawfully married . . . and that during the existence of such marriage . . . the defendant [] had sexual intercourse with [the] plaintiff's [spouse] . . . ." Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 194-95, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938). Effective October 1, 2009, North Carolina statutorily limited alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims from their full reach under the common law, by exempting from liability conduct that (although at a time when the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse remained married) "occurs after the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse physically separate with the intent of either the plaintiff or [the] plaintiff's spouse that the physical separation remain permanent."

  6. State v. Hunt

    722 S.E.2d 484 (N.C. 2012)   Cited 31 times
    Finding "expert testimony is not necessarily required to establish the extent of a victim's mental capacity to consent to sexual acts"

    We previously have applied these principles to authorize lay witness opinions or observations about mental capacity in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 653–54, 374 S.E.2d 858, 863–64 (1989) (capacity to stand trial); Mayhand, 298 N.C. at 424–25, 259 S.E.2d at 236 (insanity defense); In re Will of Jones, 267 N.C. 48, 51, 147 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1966) (execution of a will and codicil); Moore v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 448–50, 146 S.E.2d 492, 499–500 (1966) (contracts); State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727 passim, 62 S.E.2d 50 passim (1950) (credibility of a witness); Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 193–94, 198 S.E. 619, 620–21 (1938) (liability for punitive damages in criminal conversation case). Moreover, courts in a number of other jurisdictions explicitly have rejected the notion that expert testimony is required to establish that a victim lacks the mental capacity to consent to sexual acts. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) (stating that expert testimony is not required to establish that a victim is “incapable of understanding the consequences of sexual intercourse” because “[a] person's capacity to understand something ... is a factual issue for the jury ... [that] may properly be established by circumstantial evidence”); People v. Thompson, 142 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1437, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 810 (“There is a nationwide consensus that expert testimony on th[e] issue [of a victim's mental capacity to consent] is not required.”), rev. denied, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 15393 (2006); Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 412, 282 P. 257, 259 (1929) (stating that the jury could determine whether

  7. Vogel v. Sylvester

    148 Conn. 666 (Conn. 1961)   Cited 75 times

    The same rule would apply in an action of criminal conversation. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619. The rule would apply here, even as to sufferings and disabilities subsequent to the divorce.

  8. Peek v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.

    242 N.C. 1 (N.C. 1955)   Cited 92 times
    In Peek v. Trust Co., 242 N.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 745, the lower court charged: "Now, the law does not prohibit the sale of a motor vehicle without transfer and delivery of certificate of registration of title; in other words, one can sell a motor vehicle on one day and the title pass, and deliver or transfer the paper certificate of title on a later date.

    And where this is not done, objection may not be raised for the first time after trial. Hauser v. Furniture Co., 174 N.C. 463, 93 S.E. 961; Chestnut v. Sutton, 207 N.C. 256, 176 S.E. 743; Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619; McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure, p. 634. Assignment No. 45 is that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury "as to the elements of fraud in the plaintiff's acts and omissions in dealing with the defendant Wachovia Bank and Trust Company and the effect of such fraudulent conduct and omissions."

  9. McKinney v. High Point

    237 N.C. 66 (N.C. 1953)   Cited 40 times

    The allegations in the amended complaint that said tank constitutes a constant hazard to plaintiffs' property from airplanes, windstorms, tornadoes, cyclones and electrical storms; that there is a constant hazard to plaintiffs' property from the danger of said tank leaking or bursting seem to be too uncertain, contingent and speculative to be considered as an element of damages, and are not susceptible of the exactness of proof required to fix a liability. The law in respect to such damages is set forth in Johnson v. R. R., 184 N.C. 101, 113 S.E. 606; Bowen v. King, 146 N.C. 385, 59 S.E. 1044; Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619. The complaint sets forth a cause of action for the taking of plaintiffs' property, and we so hold.

  10. Barker v. Dowdy

    223 N.C. 151 (N.C. 1943)   Cited 4 times

    The complaint describes the tortious conduct of the defendant and sets out sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife, and also for the alienation of her affections. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619; Chestnut v. Sutton, 207 N.C. 256, 176 S.E. 743; Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769. The demurrer, however, is based on the view that it appears on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff, with knowledge of the adulterous relations between the defendant and his wife, continued for some months to cohabit with her. This admission in the complaint is urged not as a condonation, such as might defeat an action for divorce ( Blakely v. Blakely, 186 N.C. 351, 119 S.E. 485), but as showing connivance, active or passive, on the part of the plaintiff, in the wrongful conduct of the defendant.