Opinion
Nos. 05-04-00011-CR, 05-04-00012-CR
Opinion Filed May 9, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F03-26881-ML, F03-41233-ML. Affirm.
Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lisa Kay Bryan appeals her convictions for aggravated robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement, the trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by previous felony convictions, at 25 years' confinement and a $10,000 fine in each case. In three issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her convictions and her guilty pleas were not voluntary. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgments. In her first and second issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her convictions. She relies on the standards of review set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal sufficiency), and Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 127 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (factual sufficiency). However, these standards do not apply when a defendant has voluntarily pleaded guilty. See Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792-93(Tex.Crim.App. 1988); O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Rather, we review the record to see if the evidence "embraces every essential element of the offense charged" and establishes the defendant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The record in this case contains two signed judicial confessions in which appellant admitted to aggravated robbery charges as alleged in the indictments. At the plea hearing, appellant admitted that she committed the offenses as they were alleged in the indictments but that she just "never thought out the consequences." According to appellant, she was not thinking clearly and "was not in her right mind" because of her heroin use. She also admitted that she had committed "probably hundreds of offenses just like this" but claimed she did not intend to kick Howard or drag Howard and Wortham with her truck. Carol Jean Howard testified that on the night she was robbed, she had been shopping at WalMart. She put her purse into her car as she was unloading her purchases. Appellant, who was driving a black truck, pulled into the parking place to the left of Howard. Appellant then backed out and pulled into the parking place to the right of Howard. As she continued unloading her purchases, Howard saw appellant reach across the front seat of Howard's car and grab her purse. As she did so, appellant said, "I'll just take this." Howard ran to appellant's truck in an attempt to retrieve her purse. As Howard reached the truck, appellant kicked her in the back of the neck and then accelerated. Howard thought she must have gotten "hung up" on appellant's truck, because Howard first ran beside appellant's truck for a minute or so and was then thrown to the ground. When she fell, Howard hit her "cheek, [her] chin, and [her] wrist, [her] everything." Howard thought appellant was "determined" to kill her. Howard was sore and stiff for over a week and continued to have headaches at the time of trial. Rosalyn Ann Wortham also testified that appellant robbed her after Wortham shopped at Wal-Mart. Wortham was unloading her groceries when she noticed a black truck back into a nearby parking space. A short time later the truck pulled up next to her and appellant reached out of the truck and took Wortham's purse. Wortham held onto her purse and tried to grab appellant's hair. As Wortham reached for appellant, she "gunned the motor" and Wortham was knocked to the ground. Wortham had a black eye, and her hands, sternum, breast, and both knees were bruised and bloody. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude it contains ample evidence to support appellant's convictions. Appellant's confessions standing alone constitute sufficient evidence to support a guilty plea. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (op. on reh'g). Howard and Wortham's testimony likewise constitute sufficient evidence to support the respective guilty pleas. Although appellant contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to show her conscious objective was to hurt the complaining witnesses, we disagree. It is the trial court's duty, as fact finder, to consider all of the evidence submitted and to find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001), aff'd, 104 S.W.3d 890, (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The trial court, as fact finder in these cases, was free to disbelieve appellant's self-serving testimony and statements. We overrule appellant's first and second issues. In her third issue, appellant contends her pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she did not have a complete understanding of the charges against her and she was unaware of the likely consequences of her pleas. The record in each case contains the plea agreement showing the trial court's admonitions to appellant. At the plea hearing, appellant testified she understood her rights and the punishment range for the offenses. Appellant testified she wanted to waive a jury and plead guilty to the offenses as charged in the indictments. Appellant stated she understood the trial court could sentence her to any term in prison within the punishment range, including life in the penitentiary. Proper admonishment by the trial court constitutes a prima facie showing the defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts the defendant to show that he entered the plea without knowing its consequences and was thereby harmed. Id. Here, the record shows appellant was properly admonished about the consequences of her pleas. We cannot conclude that appellant's claim that she did not intend to hurt anyone shows her pleas were made involuntarily. We overrule appellant's third issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.