These authorities reflect the tenor of the California cases, as well as the case of Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 623, which was decided by reference to the California law. In Brunner v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 616 [ 335 P.2d 484], the court stated the general rule, by way of dictum, that an attorney is not privileged to withhold disclosing by whom he has been employed. The rule was originally expressed in the case of Satterlee v. Bliss (1869) 36 Cal. 489.

It has not been established that the identity of an attorney's client is never privileged. In Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616 [ 335 P.2d 484], the actual holding was that the attorney-client relationship did not exist under the facts. The opinion stated as the general rule that an attorney is not privileged to withhold disclosing by whom he has been employed.

Appellee asserts that while the federal "common law as to privilege" controls, were the law of California to govern, the result would be no different. This rests on the government's position that Brunner v. Superior Court, 1959, 51 Cal.2d 616, 335 P.2d 484, overrules Ex parte McDonough, 1915, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566, L.R.A. 1916C, 593. We think not.

(6) It is well established that the attorney-client privilege, designed to protect communications between them, does not ordinarily protect the client's identity. ( Brunner v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 616, 618 [ 335 P.2d 484]; Satterlee v. Bliss (1869) 36 Cal. 489, 507.) A limited exception to this rule has been recognized, however, in cases wherein known facts concerning an attorney's representation of an anonymous client implicate the client in unlawful activities and disclosure of the client's name might serve to make the client the subject of official investigation or expose him to criminal or civil liability.

This question was in effect answered by Nowell's testimony as well as by the attorney's declaration. [2] In any event there is no privilege as to the fact that an attorney-client relationship exists ( Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616, 618 [ 335 P.2d 484]) inasmuch as a showing to this effect is the very foundation of the privilege. (See Maier v. Noonan, 174 Cal.App.2d 260 [ 344 P.2d 373].)

This is the modern extension of a dispute about lawyers' privilege which has gone on for more than a century, in which Bentham is leading attacker of the privilege (Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Book IX, pt. IV, ch. V, p. 472) and Wigmore its chief champion. It is true that the privilege is to be strictly construed ( Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, p. 396; Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616, 618 [ 335 P.2d 484]; City County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234 [231 P.2d 16, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418]), a proposition conceded by Wigmore, following his defense of privilege in principle. (Wigmore, op.cit., p. 554.)

As a general proposition, client identity and fee arrangements are not protected in California by the attorney-client privilege. Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal.3d 772, 603 P.2d 19, 160 Cal.Rptr. 102 (1979); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616, 335 P.2d 484 (1959). See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2313 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

However, "[a]s a general proposition, client identity and fee arrangements are not protected in California by the attorney-client privilege." Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal.3d 772 (1979); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616 (1959)). "Both the California courts and the federal courts recognize, however, that such information may come within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would uncover client confidences."

See J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. 1961); C. McCormick, Evidence § 87, at 175-76 (2d ed. 1972).See Paper Converting Machine Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249 (E.D.Wis. 1963); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.Mass. 1950); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 355, 15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266 (1961); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 616, 335 P.2d 484 (1959). One of the widely recognized exceptions to utilization of the attorney-client privilege is that the privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime or other evil enterprise in concert with the attorney.

"What we have said is also true as to the questions relative to the furnishing of the money deposited as bail for Higgins." The Attorney General argues that the McDonough case is "a thoroughly discredited view" and has been "impliedly overruled" by the Supreme Court of California in Brunner v. Superior Court of Orange County, 51 Cal.2d 616, 335 P.2d 484. We cannot agree with either of these contentions.