Opinion
1:23-CV-00017-RAL
03-29-2023
TIMOTHY BRUNNER, Plaintiff v. GEORGE M. LITTLE, ACTING SECRETARY, PA DOC; LONNIE OLIVER, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-ALBION; EARL JONES, D.S. FACILITY MANAGEMENT, SCI ALBION; KURT SUESSER, PROGRAM MANAGER, SCI-ALBION; AND HOWARD SISSEM, SECURITY CAPTAIN, SCI-ALBION, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN RE ECE NO. 10
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Plaintiff Timothy Brunner (“Brunner”) initiated this action on January 24, 2023, by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted on March 1, 2023. See ECF Nos. 1, 5. Brunner's complaint was docketed the same day but service on the named defendants has not yet been effectuated. See ECF No. 7. Now pending before the Court is Brunner's motion for preliminary injunction, which has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4. For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that Brunner's motion be DENIED.
II. Report
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. A federal standard is applied in examining requests to federal courts for preliminary injunctions. See Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 799 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[a]lthough the right upon which this cause of action is based is state-created, Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates a federal standard as governing requests addressed to federal courts for preliminary injunctions.”). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). “Awarding preliminary relief, therefore, is only appropriate ‘upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.'” Id. (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). Additionally, a prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably injured if relief is not granted. In addition, the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations omitted) (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)). In Reilly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made clear that “a district court-in its sound discretion-should balance those four factors so long as the party seeking the injunction meets the threshold on the first two.” Id. This means
a movant for preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two “most critical” factors: it must demonstrate that it can win on the merits (which requires a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not) and that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.Id. at 179. Thus, “[u]nless both a ‘reasonable probability of eventual success' and ‘irreparable harm' are demonstrated, preliminary injunctive relief is not to be granted.” In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137,1143 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc)); Hoxworth v. Binder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted. [W]e cannot sustain a preliminary injunction ordered by the district court where either or both of these prerequisites are absent.”); see also Doe by and through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F.Supp.3d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“failure to -demonstrate a likelihood of success in the litigation or an irreparable injury ‘must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction.'”).
Brunner's motion fails because his allegations do not support a plausible inference of irreparable harm. Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-mar Enter. Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 154, (3d Cir. 1999) (“In the absence of irreparable injury, no preliminary injunction would lie, even if the other three elements ... were found.”). Establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not enough. A plaintiff has “the burden of proving a ‘clear showing of immediate irreparable harm'” absent injunctive relief. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co. Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 205 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1987)). Irreparable harm cannot be presumed, and “must be established as a separate element, independent of any showing of likelihood of success.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 21 (2008)). “In order to demonstrate irreparable harm the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Instant Airfreight Co. v. C.F. Airfreight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir.1989). Thus, the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir.1994). Irreparable injury occurs when money damages are difficult to ascertain or would be inadequate. In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1146 (3d Cir.1982). Failure to establish irreparable injury automatically results in denial of a preliminary injunction. Instant Airfreight Co., 882 F.2d at 800; see also Nutrasweet Co., 176 F.3d at 153.
Brunner's motion seeks a preliminary injunction ordering the Defendants “to cease the harassment of plaintiff in all manners detailed in the Statement of Claim in the Complaint,” which include “excessive pat searches; unwarranted strip searches; frivolous or malicious cell searches; seizure of property; loss of outgoing mail or rejection of incoming mail; loss of checks; false or frivolous/malicious misconducts, work reports, housing reports, or incident reports; redaction of emails sent to contacts; and any other manner in which legitimate institutional procedure can be weaponized ...” ECF No. 10, p. 1. Although Brunner claims that he has suffered “irreparable harm” as a result of the “weaponizing of legitimate procedures described in the complaint,” id., nothing in his motion supports that he faces any injury approaching imminent irreparable harm. Instead, he offers conclusory allegations based solely on his personal beliefs. See, e.g., Miller v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 2010 WL 4810659, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2010) (plaintiff has not satisfied burden of proving immediate, irreparable harm by offering only conclusory allegations based on his personal beliefs); see also Drumgo v. Funk, 2023 WL 2287727 at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2023) (no irreparable harm where plaintiff's claims were based “largely upon vague and conclusory allegations with minimal support”); Miller v. Armel, 2022 WL 16732517, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 10333587 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2022) (conclusory allegations in the motion “appear calculated to obtain an expedited outcome of plaintiff's case, “which is not an appropriate basis for seeking this extraordinary remedy”).
Additionally, given Brunner's reference to the allegations made in the “Statement of Claims” in his complaint, he appears to be complaining of prior conduct, the remedy for which is money damages, not injunctive relief. Id. (citing Preacher v. Overmeyer, 2019 WL 3213533, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. July 17, 2019)).
In summary, Brunner has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate immediate, irreparable harm. In the event he succeeds on the merits of his claims, “equitable relief is available to correct any ongoing constitutional harms he alleges.” Glenn v. Basham, 2022 WL 17351406, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2022). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that his motion be denied.
III. Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).
SUBMITTED and DATED.