( Peccolo v. City of Los Angeles, (1937) 8 Cal. (2d) 532, 536 [ 66 P.2d 651]; General Petroleum Corp. v. Los Angeles, (1937) 22 Cal.App. (2d) 332, 338 [ 70 P.2d 998].) [2a] In support of its first ground — that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law — defendant relies chiefly upon the case of Bruce v. Risley, (1936) 15 Cal.App. (2d) 659 [ 59 P.2d 847], wherein at the conclusion of plaintiff's case the court ruled that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and directed a verdict in favor of defendant. It there appeared that plaintiff as a prospective tenant was inspecting a storeroom owned by defendant.
Again in Wolfe, the situation presented involved a fall into a ditch after the plaintiff had walked in impenetrable darkness, in unfamiliar desert territory, for 141 feet. (See also Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 59 P.2d 847].) This quoted language constitutes the instruction given in its entirety.
In Robinson v. King, 113 Cal.App.2d 455 [ 248 P.2d 477], it was said at page 457: "Where an invitee on premises, being unfamiliar therewith, proceeds into a place of impenetrable darkness and falls into an aperture and is injured, as a matter of law he does not exercise ordinary care for his own safety and hence any injury he receives is the result of his own contributory negligence for which he may not recover." (See also Medcraft v. Merchants Exchange, 211 Cal. 404, 406 [ 295 P. 822]; Cheyney v. City of Los Angeles, 119 Cal.App.2d 75, 78 [ 258 P.2d 1099]; Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 663-664 [ 59 P.2d 847].) In Mitchell v. A.J. Bayer Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 501 [ 272 P.2d 870], it was said at page 504: "We are also of the opinion that plaintiff was shown to have been guilty of negligence as a matter of law. He stepped into an area with which he was unfamiliar; it was `pitch dark' and he took no precautions for his safety. . . .
No.[3] An invitee on premises who, being unfamiliar therewith, and proceeding into a place of impenetrable darkness, falls and is injured, does not as a matter of law exercise ordinary care for his own safety and hence any injury received is a result of his own contributory negligence for which he may not recover. ( Robinson v. King, 113 Cal.App.2d 455, 457 [ 248 P.2d 477]; Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 59 P.2d 847].) Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the case at bar it is evident that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
No. This rule is applicable: Where plaintiff's evidence discloses as a matter of law that plaintiff has been contributorily negligent the trial court is authorized to direct a verdict in favor of defendant. ( Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 663 [2] [ 59 P.2d 847]. Cf., Blodgett v. B.H. Dyas Co., 4 Cal.2d 511, 513 [4] [ 50 P.2d 801].
In Powers v. Raymond, 197 Cal. 126 [ 239 P. 1069], the plaintiff was injured as a result of falling while walking late at night along a dark, unlighted path instead of using the main well-lighted roadway. In Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App.2d 659 [ 59 P.2d 847], the plaintiff, after opening a door leading to a dark, narrow stair-landing with which he was unfamiliar, proceeded through the doorway by the light of small matches. In Cornell v. Hearst Sunical etc. Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 708 [ 131 P.2d 404], a fisherman who had traversed a wharf in daytime on many occasions and was familiar with the structure and its approaches, fell into the water on a dark night while returning to his boat which was anchored nearby.
The darkness of the night and the absence of lights were circumstances which in themselves constituted a warning. ( Bruce v. Risley, (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 664 [ 59 P.2d 847]; Powers v. Raymond, (1925) 197 Cal. 126, 132 [ 239 P. 1069]; cf. Sanders v. City of Long Beach, (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 129 P.2d 511].) It will be recalled that Carver left decedent near the shore end of the pier shortly after 10:00 p.m. Between 10:15 and 10:30 one Jose Torres, who was asleep in a room of one of defendant company's warehouses near the pier, was awakened by hearing his name shouted out; he turned on his light and opened the door; Cornell then came up to the door and said, "Take me to the doctor."
I think the law is the other way. Powers v. Raymond, 1925, 197 Cal. 126, 239 P. 1069; Bruce v. Risley, 1936, 15 Cal.App.2d 659, 59 P.2d 847; Cornell v. Hearst Sunical, etc., Corp., 1942, 55 Cal.App.2d 708, 131 P.2d 404. The judgment should be reversed.
On the other hand, the evidence shows conclusively that appellant was guilty of negligence in venturing out upon the joists at the time he did. ( Brown v. Board of Trustees, 41 Cal.App. 100 [ 182 P. 316]; Gleason v. Fire Protection Engineering Co., 127 Cal.App. 754, 757 [ 16 P.2d 750]; Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App. (2d) 659, 664 [ 59 P.2d 847]; Slyter v. Clinton Construction Co., 107 Cal.App. 348 [ 290 P. 643].) [11] At the close of the evidence respondents made a motion for a directed verdict in their favor.
He is not liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care. ( Shanley v. American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552 [ 197 P. 793]; Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., 211 Cal. 556 [ 296 P. 76].)" (See, also, Bruce v. Risley, 15 Cal.App. (2d) 659 [ 59 P.2d 847]; Adams v. Dow Hotel, 25 Cal.App. (2d) 51 [ 76 P.2d 210]; Vitrano v. Westgate Sea Products Co., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 462 [ 93 P.2d 832].) Of course, in a restricted sense, a safe condition may mean one in which there is no possibility of danger.