Opinion
Civil Action 8:21-cv-955-JD-KFM
03-28-2022
De'Shawn H. Brownlee, Plaintiff, v. Nathan Mitchell, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. 39). The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges that the defendant used excessive force against him while he was a pretrial detainee in the Anderson County Detention Center (“ACDC”). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff is now a pretrial detainee at the Oconee County Detention Center.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed his complaint on April 1, 2021, raising various claims against numerous entities and individuals (doc. 1). Following initial screening, on July 22, 2021, the Honorable Joseph Dawson, III, United States District Judge, dismissed the plaintiff's claims against all of the named defendants except for his excessive force claim against ACDC Sergeant Nathan Mitchell (doc. 27).
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and jailed in the ACDC on December 19, 2018. Defendant Sgt. Mitchell is employed at the ACDC. The plaintiff alleges that “his victim” Sgt. Mitchell violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering his cell with other officers and beat him up (doc. 1, p. 5; doc. 1-1, p. 1). He alleges that he was thereafter in fear for his life, so he made a shank (doc. 1-1, p.1). On June 6, 2019, “Mitchell and his friends came back, ” so the plaintiff pulled out the shank but was disarmed and beaten again (id.). He alleges that his knee was injured by Sgt. Mitchell, and as a result he was unable to walk the same, and “it took away [his] chance of playing college basketball” (doc. 1, p. 6). In his complaint, the plaintiff states that he did not file a grievance about Sgt. Mitchell's purported conduct, noting that the “grievance process does not apply” (id., pp. 8-9). Significantly, the plaintiff expressly brings suit against Sgt. Mitchell only in his official capacity for monetary damages (id., pp. 2-3).
The plaintiff was arrested on multiple charges, including kidnaping, burglary, and robbery (doc. 39-2). In his affidavit, Sgt. Mitchell states that “[his] children were the victims of [the plaintiff's] crime” (doc. 39-6, Mitchell aff. ¶ 2).
Sgt. Mitchell filed an answer denying the allegations on June 21, 2021 (doc. 24). He then filed his motion for summary judgment (doc. 39) on January 3, 2022. By order filed on January 4, 2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendant's motion (doc. 41). The plaintiff filed his response in opposition to summary judgment (doc. 47) on March 3, 2022, and the defendant filed a reply (doc. 49) on March 10, 2022.
In his motion for summary judgment, Sgt. Mitchell argues that in his official capacity he is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In support of his motion, Sgt. Mitchell provides his affidavit that he is employed by the Anderson County Sheriff's Office as the Jail Investigator at the ACDC (doc. 39-6, Mitchell aff. ¶ 1). Upon learning the plaintiff was housed in the ACDC, Sgt. Mitchell attests that he intentionally avoided any interaction with the plaintiff as Sgt. Mitchell's children were the “victims of [the plaintiff's] crime” (id . ¶ 2). Sgt. Mitchell further attests that he did not go to the plaintiff's cell at any time and he did not assault or have any physical confrontation with the plaintiff at any time while the plaintiff was in custody at the ACDC (id. ¶ 3). Sgt. Mitchell attests that he was unaware of the plaintiff's allegation against him until the lawsuit was filed (id. ¶ 4). Attached to Sgt. Mitchell's affidavit are copies of the ACDC grievance policy (doc. 39-6, pp. 17-18), which Sgt. Mitchell attests is explained to all arriving inmates, and the plaintiff's kiosk grievances while in custody there (id., pp. 26-28; doc. 39-7). None of these show that the plaintiff filed a grievance against Sgt. Mitchell for the assaults alleged here. In addition, ACDC contract nurse Amber Brown provides her affidavit (doc. 39-8, Brown aff. ¶¶ 1-4) that she is familiar with the plaintiff and his medical history at the ACDC, he never complained to her about his knee, and his alleged knee injury does not appear in his attached medical records (doc. 39-8, pp. 3-34). Nurse Brown further attests that a detainee may request medical treatment via the kiosk system, and the plaintiff never requested medical treatment nor did he ever mention a problem with his knee in his kiosk requests (doc. 39-8, Brown aff. ¶ 5; doc. 39-8, pp. 35-68).
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff has not presented evidence of serious or significant injury to support an excessive force claim. This argument will not be addressed, since summary judgment is recommended on the issues ofexhaustion, § 1983 amenability, and Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In his response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff states that his account is truthful (doc. 47).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
In his motion for summary judgment, Sgt. Mitchell argues that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing this action. The plaintiff indicates in his complaint that he did not file a grievance at ACDC before bringing suit here, stating that the “grievance process does not apply” (doc. 1, pp. 8-9). He is incorrect.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996)), mandates, among other things, that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing civil actions concerning prison conditions under Section 1983 or any other federal law. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court”). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory, ” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Although PLRA exhaustion is not jurisdictional, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that can be pleaded by the defendants. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Anderson, 407 F.3d at 681.
The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). As the Supreme Court noted, “[a]ggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust administrative remedies for a variety of reasons, ” whether it be concerns about efficiency or “bad faith.” Id. at 89-90. This is especially true in a prison context. Id. at 90 n.1. Nevertheless, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91.
The ACDC has a grievance system using kiosks as set out in its Inmate Guide (doc. 39-6, p. 12). Sgt. Mitchell attests that when detainees arrive at the ACDC, they are given an explanation of this system and that the plaintiff is familiar with the system as shown by his filing of unrelated grievances (captioned as “Inmate Requests”) both before and after the alleged assaults at issue here (doc. 39-6, Mitchell aff. ¶¶ 5-6). The court has reviewed all of the plaintiff's grievances of record, filed from December 21, 2018, through November 25, 2020, and none raise complaints of any assault by Sgt. Mitchell (doc. 39-6, pp. 26-28; doc. 39-7, pp. 1-3; doc. 39-8, pp. 35-68; doc. 39-9, pp. 1-11). Instead, the plaintiff filed six grievances requesting a transfer to another facility because Sgt. Mitchell was his “victim”; these grievances were filed in November 2020, more than a year after the assaults allegedly occurred (doc. 39-6, pp. 26-28; doc. 39-8, pp. 66-68). Further, the plaintiff admits in his complaint that he did not file a grievance (doc. 1, pp. 8-9). Accordingly, the plaintiff clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies available to him through the ACDC grievance system before filing suit here, and his excessive force claim against Sgt. Mitchell should be dismissed.
Moreover, per his ACDC medical records, the plaintiff did not report an assault by Sgt. Mitchell or resulting injuries to the medical staff (doc. 39-8, Brown aff., ¶¶ 3-4).
Section 1983 - Official Capacity
The plaintiff's claim against Sgt. Mitchell in his official capacity must be dismissed. “Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, deprives another person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' ” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Sgt. Mitchell attests that he is an employee of the Anderson County Sheriff's Office as a Jail Investigator. Because Sgt. Mitchell in his official capacity would have been acting as an arm of the State of South Carolina during the plaintiff's allegations, he is not considered a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983”).
As noted, the plaintiff expressly brings suit against Sgt. Mitchell only in his official capacity for monetary damages (doc. 1, pp. 2-3).
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Sgt. Mitchell also argues that he is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because at all times he was engaged in the performance of his official duties. The undersigned agrees. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity, ” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir.1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself, ” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Sgt. Mitchell is an employee of the Anderson County Sheriff's Office. It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court. See Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1332. This status has been extended to deputy sheriffs as well. See McCall v. Williams, 52 F.Supp.2d 611, 615 (D.S.C. 1999). Accordingly, Sgt. Mitchell is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity against the plaintiff's claim for monetary relief.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. 39) be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).